The majority opinion was written by Dickson CJ, with Chouinard and LeDain JJ concurring. A second opinion was given by LaForest J, agreeing with Dickson CJ's judgement with a slight disagreement on his application of section 1. A third opinion was given by Beetz J, with McIntyre J concurring, agreeing with Dickson CJ's result but for different reasons, and also found that there was no violation of section 2(a).
Dickson
Dickson analyzed the pith and substance of the law in order to determine if the law can be characterized as a provincial power or a federal power. This analysis focused on the nature of the Act, whether it was religious in nature or secular in nature (i.e.. related to civil and property rights). He concluded that it was secular in nature.
Dickson noted that the act was not attempting to advance any religious ideology, but rather was intending to provide employees with a day of rest. The choice of Sunday is not determinative of a religious purpose; other countries use Sunday as a day of rest for entirely secular reasons. The exemption for people of the Jewish faith is not sufficient to show a religious purpose either.
Turning to the second issue, Dickson found a marginal violation of section 2(a) with respect to Nortown only. A company that has a legitimate and sincere religious practice that requires them to open a store on Sunday has the right to do so. The provision that attempts to accommodate those of the Jewish faith was insufficient to catch all sincere religious practitioners and so violated section 2(a). A law that indirectly places a burden on an individual or group that has the effect of degrading their ability to practise their religion is in violation of the Charter. Here, the law was requiring the store owner to choose between their religion or their business and so was degrading to their faith.
Regarding section 7 and 15, Dickson found that there was no deprivation of liberty or adverse impact to violate section 7, and he also found that there could be no section 15 claim as the section had not yet come into effect at the time of the charge.
On the third issue, Dickson found that the violation could be justified under section 1. In applying the Oakes test, he found that the purpose of giving people a day of rest was clearly pressing and substantial, as the well being of all workers is important, especially those in the retail industry. He found that the law was proportional as well. The law corresponded to the objective of giving all workers a day of rest, and the availability of exceptions provided for minimal impairment.