Post match analysis and discussion

The result was largely determined by tactical naïveté from the English manager and players. When playing the WM formation, the defending centre-half would traditionally mark the opposition's centre forward – usually whoever was wearing the number 9 shirt. In the game, England centre-half Harry Johnston found himself marking Hidegkuti – who was effectively operating as a midfielder. This meant that Johnston was constantly drawn out of position, allowing the rest of the Hungarian team to exploit the space. England were also undone by the use of Kocsis and Puskás as strikers – as these two were wearing numbers 8 and 10 respectively, England thought they were inside forwards. This in turn led to uncertainty about who should mark them – and to further confuse the English players, the Hungarian forwards were continually swapping positions, confusing the inflexible English defence. The England team were largely drawn out of position because their defenders were marking whoever was wearing a particular number, instead of marking the player who was playing in a particular area.

In addition, the England team members were not used to playing together as a team on a regular basis, whilst the Hungarians had the benefit of four years' experience of playing together at a club and international level. The fitness of the Hungarians in comparison to the English players was notable; Pat Ward-Thomas of The Guardian commented, "...the immense advantage of playing together so often, superior fitness (the Hungarians always looked finer athletes with their poised, beautifully balanced movements), and extraordinary understanding was obvious."

The Guardian newspaper report of the game was representative of the impact that Hungary's style of play had made: "The English team was competent by British standards except at inside forward, but on the evidence of this afternoon this standard will not long be good enough for England to retain her position in the high places of the football world. The essential difference lay in attack, where none of the English forwards except Matthews approached the speed, ball control, and positional play of the Hungarians, which were as near perfect as one could hope to see."^[3]

Sir Bobby Robson said of the game: "We saw a style of play, a system of play that we had never seen before. None of these players meant anything to us. We didn't know about Puskás. All these fantastic players, they were men from Mars as far as we were concerned. They were coming to England, England had never been beaten at Wembley – this would be a 3–0, 4–0 maybe even 5–0 demolition of a small country who were just coming into European football. They called Puskás the 'Galloping Major' because he was in the army – how could this guy serving for the Hungarian army come to Wembley and rifle us to defeat? But the way they played, their technical brilliance and expertise – our WM formation was kyboshed in ninety minutes of football. The game had a profound effect, not just on myself but on all of us." Robson went on to say: "That one game alone changed our thinking. We thought we would demolish this team – England at Wembley, we are the masters, they are the pupils. It was absolutely the other way."^[4]

"We completely underestimated the advances that Hungary had made, and not only tactically," Billy Wright said.^[5] "When we walked out at Wembley that afternoon, side by side with the visiting team, I looked down and noticed that the Hungarians had on these strange, lightweight boots, cut away like slippers under the ankle bone. I turned to big Stan Mortensen and said, 'We should be alright here, Stan, they haven't got the proper kit'."^[6]

Six members of the England team – Bill Eckersley, Alf Ramsey, George Robb and the Blackpool trio of Harry Johnston, Stan Mortensen and Ernie Taylor – were never selected to play for England again.

Return fixture

On 23 May 1954, England visited Budapest in the hope of avenging the 6–3 defeat; instead, Hungary beat England 7–1. It still ranks as England's heaviest footballing defeat.^[7]

Long-term influences

The result sent a shockwave through English football; for the first time, English manager and coaches started to look to the continent for tactical and training advances. Matt Busby at Manchester United was amongst the first to recognise that competing with the best European sides was essential to further the English game, and ensured that his team competed in the early European Cup – despite initial objections from the FA about English clubs taking part in the competition. Don Revie was an admirer of the Hungarian team, and enjoyed a late flourish to his playing career by adopting the Hidegkuti withdrawn centre forward role at Manchester City to great success, renaming it the "Revie plan". Bill Nicholson at Tottenham Hotspur was a swift adopter of the Hungarian principles, and used them to build the first English double-winning team of the 20th century, and to win the first European trophy – the UEFA Cup Winners' Cup – by an English side. Ron Greenwood built a successful European Cup Winners Cup side at West Ham based on the Hungarian team principles. Don Revie^[8] and Malcolm Allison adopted training and coaching schedules based on the Hungarian coaching styles.

The effect of this match on Alf Ramsey and Greenwood may be measured from the fact that England's 1966 World Cup winning side contained something of a club nucleus when Ramsey selected three West Ham players (Bobby Moore, Geoff Hurst and Martin Peters), and in 1977 when Greenwood picked six Liverpool players (Ray Clemence, Phil Neal, Emlyn Hughes, Terry McDermott, Ray Kennedy and Ian Callaghan) to play Switzerland.

The popular 1998 Hungarian comedy film 6:3 Play It Again Tutti is based on the match.^[9]

See also

• Wolverhampton Wanderers F.C. v Budapest Honvéd FC

Notes and references

External links

• Highlights of the game
• Footage of entire game