Post-World War II

After World War II, the Communist Party, under Josip Broz Tito's leadership, seized power and established a socialist state in Yugoslavia.^[1] Each constituent republic had its own branch of the Communist party, with Serbia having the Communist Party of Serbia.^[2] The federal Communist party was renamed the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) at its 6th Congress in 1952.^[3] Its branches did the same; the Communist Party of Serbia became the League of Communists of Serbia (SKS).^[4]

Upon the death of Tito, Yugoslavia experienced an economic crisis, constitutional problems, and a rise in ethnic nationalism.^[5] To reduce its debt, Yugoslavia implemented austerity measures.^[6] Despite government efforts, the debt, inflation, and unemployment all increased during the 1980s.^[7] Additionally, the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo experienced ethnic riots in 1981, which was clamped down on by authorities.^[8] Kosovo Albanian demonstrators demanded the formation of the Republic of Kosovo, which would have the same constitutional rights as the other constituent republics of Yugoslavia.^[9] The SKS leadership responded to the protests by purging the League of Communists of Kosovo and University of Pristina.^[10] These riots have been interpreted by Dejan Jović as "the beginning of the deep state crisis in Yugoslavia, one that would lead to its dissolution".^[11] Publicist and political analyst Zlatoje Martinov somewhat concurs, claiming that the constituent republicans throughout the 1980s evolved into "de facto states with their own armed forces".^[12]

The Stambolić–Milošević relationship

In the 1960s, the Faculty of Law of the University of Belgrade was known for enrolling students who would go on to become high-ranking politicians in Serbia.^[13] Slobodan Milošević enrolled there in 1960 and met Ivan Stambolić with whom he soon formed a close bond.^[14] After finishing his studies, Milošević became Stambolić's protégé.^[15] For instance, when Stambolić became the director of Tehnogas, an industrial gas company, in 1965, he appointed Milošević as the assistant director at Tehnogas.^[16] When Stambolić left Tehnogas, Milošević became its director.^[17] Later in 1978, when Stambolić became the prime minister of Serbia, he appointed Milošević as director of Beobank, one of the leading banks of Yugoslavia at the time.^[18]

Stambolić was seen as a reformist and anti-nationalist.^[19] Upon the expiration of his mandate as prime minister in 1982, he was appointed president of the League of Communists of Belgrade City Commission.^[20] Later that same year, Milošević entered politics after being appointed head of the Stari Grad SKS committee; he left his position as the director of Beobank in December 1983.^[21] Stambolić was elected president of the SKS Presidency in April 1984, becoming the leader of the SKS. Milošević was appointed as his successor to his previous position.^[22]

Milošević was considered to be a technocrat, but inside the City Commission, he began initiating campaigns against liberals and dissidents.^[23] Miloš Vasić [sh], a journalist and co-creator of the Vreme magazine, described Milošević's actions as Stalinist, saying that he "talked about 'people's democracy', 'great steps forward in the service of socialism', no other Communist leaders used this jargon".^[15] By 1985, Milošević gained full control over the League of Communists of Belgrade, appointing officials who were loyal to him; he also garnered support from various professors from the University of Belgrade that were close to Milošević's wife Mirjana Marković.^[24]

Since the president of the SKS Presidency was limited to a two-year term in office, leading party officials began jockeying for Stambolić's successor in January 1985.^[25] Stambolić championed Milošević as his successor and gained support from leading officials, such as his uncle Petar Stambolić, a member of the Central Committee of the 12th SKJ Congress (12th SKJ CC) and the state presidency, Nikola Ljubičić, a state presidency and 12th SKJ CC member, Dobrivoj Vidić, a state presidency and Presidency of the 12th SKJ Congress member, and Dušan Čkrebić, the outgoing president of the SKS Presidency.^[26] However, Milošević's candidature was not supported by the reformists, such as candidate Dragoslav Marković, the president of the Presidency of the SKJ Central Committee from 1983 to 1984, who claimed that Milošević would not bring unity within SKS.^[27] Besides himself, Marković nominated Špiro Galović and Radiša Gačić as competing candidates.^[28] Despite support in some corners for his election, Gačić opet to support Milošević after being pressured by Stambolić.^[29] In early 1986, Stambolić tried to win over as many as possible for Milošević's candidacy; he told Azem Vllasi, the future president of the presidency of the Provincial Committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo, that it would be easier to work with Milošević than with Marković.^[30]

The presidency of SKS eventually voted 12 for and 8 against to nominate Milošević as the sole candidate for the president of SKS.^[31] Milošević was elected at the 10th Congress, held on 26–28 May 1986 and held immediately after the 10th SKS Congress' closure, as the president of the SKS Presidency, with 151 out of 157 votes in favour, while Stambolić was elected president of Serbia by the presidency of SKS.^[32] Previously at an electoral session in April 1986, Dragiša Pavlović, a reformist and Stambolić's ally, was elected president of the League of Communists of Belgrade City Commission, as Milošević's successor.^[33] Following Milošević's election, Galović told Stambolić: "In the next sixth months, [Milošević] will stab you in the back!".^[34] The 10th Congress was the second to last Congress of SKS.^[35]

Kosovo Polje gathering

Wikiquote has quotations related to Kosovo Polje gathering.

Stambolić, while still the president of the SKS Presidency, initiated discussions to solve Kosovo issue in 1985.^[36] The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts selected a committee of academics to draft a document that could address the issue.^[37] The draft document, titled The Memorandum, was leaked by the newspaper Večernje novosti in 1986.^[38] The document made numerous allegations regarding the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, including that the Constitution discriminated against Serbs and that there was an ongoing "physical, political, legal, and cultural genocide" of the Serb population in Kosovo.^[39] Both Stambolić and Milošević condemned the memorandum.^[40]

Amidst the tensions in Kosovo, Stambolić sent Milošević to Kosovo Polje on 20 April 1987.^[41] There, Milošević gave a speech, which, according to writer Adam LeBor was in "the standard party line of 'Brotherhood and unity'".^[41] After returning to Belgrade, Milošević consulted with officials about the situation in Kosovo Polje.^[42] Together with Vllasi, Milošević returned to Kosovo Polje on 24 April.^[43] Milošević then took a populist turn.^[44] Milošević gave a speech, and then, while walking through the crowd of Kosovo Serb demonstrators, he repeated "no one will dare to beat you!" (niko ne sme da vas bije!) twice to the demonstrators.^[45] Political scientist Lenard J. Cohen characterised the event as the "serpent in the bosom".^[46] Following the gathering, Milošević's popularity amongst Kosovo Serbs ascended.^[47]

According to Stambolić, Milošević returned to Belgrade "as a new man".^[48] Stambolić was also appalled by how Milošević sided with one ethnic group.^[49] Stambolić had tried to reconcile the nationalists and Titoists but failed.^[50] "Stambolić could not make the political leap of faith", Vasić said.^[51] After the gathering in Kosovo Polje, Milošević's criticism towards Stambolić and Pavlović intensified, mainly driven by their positions on Kosovo.^[52] Stambolić and Pavlović favoured a more conciliatory approach than did Milošević.^[53] At a Central Committee of SKJ meeting in June 1987, Milošević proposed the "unification of the Republic of Serbia" and to strip away Kosovo's and Vojvodina's autonomous rights.^[54] Boško Krunić, a Vojvodina politician, said that "[Milošević] was very straightforward about the autonomy of Vojvodina. He opposed it".^[55] Following the meeting, Kosovo Serbs organised a protest in front of the Federal Assembly of the SFRY in Belgrade, demanding the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy.^[56]

Paraćin massacre

Aziz Kelmendi, a Kosovo Albanian recruit in the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), shot and killed four JNA soldiers on 3 September 1987 in Paraćin.^[56] Of those killed, two were Bosniaks, one was a Serb, and the fourth was a half-Croat and half-Slovene.^[57] Kelmendi then fled from the military camp in Paraćin and committed suicide.^[58] The media, such as newspapers Politika and Borba, portrayed the killings as politically motivated.^[59] Stambolić and Milošević did not attend the Serb JNA soldier's funeral.^[60] Those who were present chanted nationalist slogans, including slogans against Vllasi.^[61] In the aftermath of the Paraćin massacre, Serbs smashed windows of local Albanian-owned business shops in Paraćin, Valjevo, and Subotica.^[62]

Days preceding the session

In light of the events in Kosovo and Paraćin, Stambolić and Pavlović endeavored to tackle the issue at hand, with Pavlović calling a press conference on 11 September.^[63] In his assessment, Pavlović highlighted the increasing prevalence of Serbian nationalism and underscored the significance of critiquing this ideology, pointing out its inability to address social issues or enhance inter-nationality events.^[64] "We must criticise Serbian nationalism today because, among other things, Serbian nationalists imagine themselves as saviours of the Serbian cause in Kosovo, without in fact being able to solve a single social problem, and especially without being able to improve inter-nationality events", Pavlović said during the press conference.^[64] In the following days, Milošević discussed the Kosovo issues with Dušan Mitević, a journalist from Radio Television of Serbia (RTS).^[65] Milošević told Mitević that Marković had written an op-ed, titled "Dragiša Pavlović's Shallow Opinions", about the dispute between himself and Pavlović under Politika journalist Dragoljub Milanović's name.^[66] With the op-ed's publication, the policy differences between the Stambolić–Pavlović group and Milošević came to light.^[67] Dejan Jović referred to the Stambolić–Pavlović grouping as "institutionalists" and Milošević's supporters as "revolutionists", while Stambolić, in his 1995 book The Road to Nowhere, used the terms "cool heads" and "hot heads".^[68] There were also other policy differences between them, regarding the proper implementation of democratic centralism and dispute over personnel appointments.^[69]

Milošević consulted with Borisav Jović, a member of the SKS Presidency and future president of the Assembly of SR Serbia, shortly after the 11 September conference in which the former told him that Pavlović had to be expelled from the party; Milošević agreed with Jović's suggestion.^[70] Pavlović called another session of the City Commission of Belgrade on 17 September where he tried to clarify his political position, stating "Inflammatory words bring nothing but fire. With unmeasured words, only a hysterical mood without a solution that leads to the worst will be created".^[71] Pavlović told the attendees that Stambolić wrote him a letter in which he said that if he did not get the right to speak at the session of the Central Committee of SKS, Stambolić would speak in his favour.^[72] Despite the SKS Presidency's position, the League of Communists of Belgrade still stood behind Pavlović.^[72] Mitević, in the minority, particularly criticised the letter and Stambolić's involvement.^[72] The following day, on 18 September, a closed session of the presidency of the Central Committee of SKS was held, with Pavlović's comments at the press conference on the agenda.^[73] When officials tried to interpret his press conference differently and present him as being opposed to the policies of the presidency of the Central Committee of SKS, Pavlović denied the accusations that were made against him. At the session, Vllasi, Stambolić, Branislav Ikonić, and Desimir Jevtić supported Pavlović.^[74] Stambolić tried to reconcile Pavlović and Milošević, and suggested that "they meet for coffee every day, or maybe even lemonade".^[73]

Gačić and Đorđe Stojšić, the president of the League of Communists of Vojvodina Presidency, tried to present a compromise solution but were cut short by Ilija Davidović, an executive secretary of the Presidency of the Central Committee of SKS, who accused Stambolić of writing a letter in support of Pavlović.^[74] Milošević read the alleged letter, which was written by Mitević, out load and then criticised Pavlović, proposing to dismiss him from the presidency of the Central Committee of SKS.^[75] A vote was then held on 20 September, in which a majority of 10 voted in favour, 4 voted against, and 5 abstained from voting on Pavlović's removal.^[74] Milošević succeeded in presenting the letter as a scandal to gain more votes in his favour.^[47] He then called a session of the Central Committee of SKS for 23–24 September, at which Pavlović's comments were again on the agenda.^[76] Despite calling the session, Milošević was concerned that the Veterans' Union of Belgrade (SUBNOR), which had supported Pavlović earlier, would support Pavlović again at the session.^[74] SUBNOR ended up not taking a position on the matter due to concerted pressure by the State Security Service.^[74]