Károlyi–d'Espèrey talks

On 6 November, Károlyi led a delegation consisting of the Minister for Nationalities, Oszkár Jászi, Hungarian National Council representative Ferenc Hatvany, Workers' and Soldiers' councils representatives Dezső Bokányi and Imre Csernyák [hu], and Prime Minister's office secretary Bakony. They were accompanied by 12 journalists from Budapest – travelling by train to Subotica and then to Novi Sad, where they boarded the SS Millenium, which took them to Belgrade.^[11] The group also included a French interpreter.^[12] Károlyi hoped to save as much of the former Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen as possible. He hoped the Triple Entente would by sympathetic to his government on account of his wartime declarations against the war and alliance with Germany – and perceive Hungary as a neutral, friendly nation.^[13]

The day when the Hungarian delegates arrived, d'Espèrey received orders to continue negotiations while applying provisions of the armistice of Villa Giusti. He went to Niš, where he had talks with Mišić and Regent Alexander regarding the upcoming talks with Károlyi, with a particular emphasis placed on the demarcation line.^[12]

On 7 November, d'Espèrey arrived in Belgrade accompanied by the chief operating officer of the Serbian Supreme Command, Colonel Danilo Kalafatović. D'Espèrey summoned Károlyi and the rest of the delegation to his residence at 7:00 p.m. to start negotiations.^[12] While the two were travelling to Belgrade, a telegram was sent from Paris to d'Espèrey instructing him to discuss only the implementation of the armistice of Villa Giusti and to forego any discussion of political matters. This message was forwarded to Belgrade via Thessaloniki, Skopje and Niš where it was intercepted by the assistant Chief of Staff of the Serbian Supreme Command, Colonel Petar Pešić. He forwarded the telegram to Kalafatović along with a separate telegram from Mišić asking Kalafatović not to hand the message to d'Espèrey until after the negotiations were completed. Pešić later sent another telegram to Kalafatović instructing him to tell d'Espèrey that in case he had agreed to a demarcation line further south than the Timișoara–Sombor line, Serbia would continue the war against Hungary alone. Kalafatović never showed d'Espèrey the last telegram because the line agreed between him and Alexander in Niš was ultimately included in the terms.^[14]

Károlyi offered to agree to a cessation of hostilities and to implement a neutral foreign policy. D'Espèrey presented him with 18 conditions for the armistice, explaining that he considered Hungary a defeated power. Károlyi stated he could not accept d'Espèrey's terms and expect not to be executed upon returning to Budapest. He asked permission to send a telegram to French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, which was reluctantly granted by d'Espèrey. In the message, Károlyi explained he could only accept the terms of the armistice if the territorial integrity of Hungary was preserved – except in terms of Croatia-Slavonia, which he was willing to relinquish. At 10:30 p.m., the meeting was suspended for dinner and resumed for another 90 minutes at midnight. Károlyi then returned to Budapest, leaving two members of the delegation in Belgrade to await Clemenceau's reply.^[15]

Approval and signing of the agreement

Károlyi reported on the negotiations at a cabinet meeting on 8 November, noting the amount of horses and rolling stock demanded by the Allies for transportation. He also reported that the administration of the country (including south of the demarcation line) would be left to Hungary. The cabinet decided to wait for Clemenceau to reply before acting any further. That day, the Serbian Drina Division was tasked with occupying Syrmia and a part of Slavonia east of the Brod–Osijek–Pécs line.^[16]

Clemenceau's reply to Károlyi's messages arrived in Belgrade on 9 November. D'Espèrey was instructed to discuss military matters only and leave the political matters to others. He then left Kalafatić to forward the message to the remaining Hungarian delegates. The two returned to Budapest the night of 9–10 November, and d'Espèrey left to Niš for a conference with Mišić and Henrys before proceeding to Thessaloniki. On 9 November, a unit of former prisoners of war led by Serbian Army Major Vojislav Bugarski captured Novi Sad unopposed,^[17] and a different unit captured Vršac the following day.^[18]

In Thessaloniki, d'Espèrey urged the Romanian government to enter the war on the side of the Allies, and they complied – ordering mobilisation on 10 November and commencing hostilities the next day.^[17] On 11 November, Bugarski forwarded Kalafatović a message he was given by a Hungarian officer stating that the Hungarian National Council had accepted Clemenceau's terms and that Minister of War Béla Linder was arriving that day to Belgrade to sign the agreement. The message was then relayed to d'Espèrey in Thessaloniki.^[19] He authorised Henrys to sign the agreement as revised by Clemenceau on behalf of the Allies, together with Mišić.^[19]

After learning of the armistice of 11 November 1918 and that it applied to Hungary as well, Mišić again instructed Bojović to advance as far east in Banat as possible towards the Orșova–Lugoj– Timișoara line regardless of the presence of any Allied forces there.^[20] The armistice signatories met in the building of the State Direction of Funds in Belgrade at 9:00 p.m. on 13 November. No further changes were discussed regarding the text, except the time of cessation of hostilities. Originally, the draft stipulated a time 24 hours after the signing of the agreement, but Linder insisted that hostilities had already ceased. Henrys accepted his view and Mišić then complied as well. The agreement was signed by Mišić, Henrys, and Linder at 11:15 p.m.^[20]

Departures from the agreement

Charles I abdicated on 13 November, and days later, the First Hungarian Republic was proclaimed with Károlyi still at the helm.^[23] Henrys set up a French military mission to supervise the implementation of the armistice and deployed it to Budapest. It was led by Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Fernand Vix [hu] otherwise assigned to Henrys's staff. It consisted of twelve officers and forty-five enlisted men who arrived at Budapest on 26 November. In addition to the implementation of the agreement, Vix was tasked with gathering intelligence on economic and military matters.^[24] Within 24 hours, Vix was sent orders to obtain Hungarian withdrawal from areas of present-day Slovakia, in violation of the armistice of Belgrade, to enforce a claim by Czechoslovakia directed through French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon.^[25] The Serbian Army occupied Subotica on the day of the armistice, but proceeded to capture Pécs the following day, as well as Timișoara, Orșova, and Lugoj on 15 November. It went on to occupy Sombor and Senta on 16 November, and the part of Arad on the south bank Mureș on 21 November.^[18] The Serbian Army thereby completed the occupation of Banat, thus abolishing the Banat Republic which had been proclaimed only days earlier.^[26] In early December, the commander of the French forces in Romania, General Henri Mathias Berthelot, informed Vix that Romanian troops would advance to the Satu Mare–Carei–Oradea–Békéscsaba line on the pretext of protection of Romanian population in the area of Cluj-Napoca, and then ordered Vix to obtain Hungary's withdrawal from the city of Cluj-Napoca itself. Vix complained about the conflict of authority to Henrys and d'Espèrey as he was also receiving instructions from Berthelot and the Czechoslovak envoy to Hungary, Milan Hodža. Vix ultimately told Henrys that the armistice of Belgrade was worthless.^[27]

On 25 November, only days after the signing of the armistice, the Great People's Assembly of Serbs, Bunjevci and other Slavs in Banat, Bačka and Baranja was convened in Novi Sad to proclaim the unification of these regions with Serbia.^[28] The State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs moved to seize Međimurje – a region predominantly inhabited by Croats located just north of the demarcation line. The first attempt to occupy Međimurje in mid-November failed, but a second incursion by the Royal Croatian Home Guard resulted in the region's occupation on behalf of the newly established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on 24 December 1918.^[29]

According to Jászi, before the armistice, the Hungarian public believed that the Allies would somehow reward Károlyi's pacifist pronouncements. Given that much hope had been placed in the principles of Wilsonianism, the terms of the armistice led to widespread disillusionment. D'Espèrey was perceived as malicious, menacing, and ignorant. Many Hungarians grew bitter, not only because they found the terms of the armistice unjust, but also due to the real and perceived breaches of those terms. The number of discontent people grew further with the return of demobilised Hungarian troops, released prisoners of war and refugees from the occupied territories. The Károlyi government lost further support as it instituted a policy of land reform – criticised as too radical by landowners and as half-hearted by others. Discontent conservatives grouped around Károlyi's brother Gyula, whereas discontent former officers were led by Gyula Gömbös. The leader of the Communist Party of Hungary, Béla Kun, appealed to the proletariat.^[30]

Hungarian Soviet Republic

In order to address increasingly frequent skirmishes along the Hungarian–Romanian line of control, the Paris Peace Conference decided on 26 February 1919 to allow Romanian troops in an area 25 kilometres (16 miles) beyond the demarcation line established by the armistice of Belgrade, and set up an additional neutral zone to be occupied by Allied forces other than Romanians. This established the "temporary frontier" along the Arad–Carei–Satu Mare line. Vix was tasked with presenting the demand to the Hungarian authorities, along with the request that their withdrawal must start on 23 March and be completed within ten days.^[31] On 20 March 1919, Hungary was presented with the demand that became known as the Vix Note. In response, Károlyi resigned, and a revolutionary council established by the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party assumed power. The council abolished the First Hungarian Republic, replacing it with the Hungarian Soviet Republic.^[32] In the summer of 1919, Soviet Hungary fought a war against Czechoslovakia and a war against Romania, resulting in the downfall of the communist regime and the Romanian capture of Budapest on 4 August.^[33] France urged the Army of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to move against the Hungarian Soviet Republic by advancing north from Bačka, but no such military intervention ever took place.^[34] In June 1919, Banat was partitioned by the Allies against Romanian complaints that this was contrary to the promise of the entire region being awarded to Romania under the Treaty of Bucharest. By December, the Romanians gave way to diplomatic pressure and agreed to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes receiving the western part of Banat.^[35]

On 12 August, the armed forces of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes occupied Prekmurje. The move had been authorised by the Paris Peace Conference a month earlier as compensation for the kingdom's contribution to the suppression of the Hungarian Soviet Republic.^[36] A short-lived republic was proclaimed in Prekmurje in late May, but was suppressed by Hungarian troops in early June.^[37]

On 4 June 1920, the Paris Peace Conference produced the Treaty of Trianon as the peace agreement between the Allies and Hungary. Territorial changes under the treaty awarded Transylvania, Crișana, the southern part of Maramureș and the eastern part of Banat to Romania – exceeding the armistice of Belgrade demarcation line in Romania's favour. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes formally received Bačka, the western part of Banat, and the southern part of Baranya – a territory similar to the one specified in the armistice of Belgrade. A Yugoslav-Hungarian Boundary Commission was tasked with defining a definitive delimitation between the two states.^[38] From those territories, as well as those lost to Czechoslovakia and Austria, 350,000–400,000 refugees left or fled to Hungary, where subsequently, according to Hungarian author Paul Lendvai, they became receptive to extremist and populist views.^[39]