China–United_States_Exchange_Foundation

China–United States Exchange Foundation

China–United States Exchange Foundation

Hong Kong-based lobbying organization


The China–United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF) is a Hong Kong-based nonprofit organization whose stated aim is to encourage dialogue and exchanges between the people of the United States and China. CUSEF was founded in 2008 by Tung Chee-hwa, a billionaire, former Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and vice chair of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, who remains the chairman of the foundation.[1] CUSEF's governing board has included members such as Ronnie Chan, Elsie Leung, and Victor Fung.[2]

Quick Facts Abbreviation, Formation ...

CUSEF donates to universities and think tanks in the U.S. while also sponsoring trips for journalists, students, and former U.S. officials and politicians to China to speak with officials.[3][4] According to various journalists and academics, CUSEF is a central part of the Chinese Communist Party's united front strategy of influence in the U.S.[1][5][6][7]

History

According to Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) filings, CUSEF is classified as a "foreign principal" which has hired lobbying and public relations firms since 2009 such as Brown Lloyd James, Fontheim International, Covington & Burling, Capitol Counsel LLC, Podesta Group, and Wilson Global Communications to craft and promote pro-Beijing messages.[8][4]

In 2023, CUSEF launched a campaign to lobby members of the Congressional Black Caucus.[9]

Sanya Initiative

Since 2008, CUSEF has partnered with the China Association for International Friendly Contact and the EastWest Institute to organize forums, termed the U.S.-China Sanya Initiative, between retired People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers and retired U.S. military personnel.[10][11][12] Past forums were reported to have attempted to influence retired U.S. military officers to lobby against U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and to delay a Pentagon report on PLA capabilities.[13][14]

Trips for elected officials

In 2019, CUSEF sponsored a trip to China by a delegation of mayors from Indiana, Ohio, and South Dakota, including James Brainard and Paul TenHaken.[15]

University funding

CUSEF funds the Pacific Community Initiative at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.[16][17] CUSEF also provides funding to the University of Montana's Max S. Baucus Institute.[18]

In 2018, the University of Texas at Austin refused a donation from CUSEF after a letter by Senator Ted Cruz raised concerns about the foundation's reported links to the Chinese Communist Party.[2][19][20] In 2023, US House representatives Mike Gallagher, Ryan Zinke, and Matt Rosendale pressed the University of Montana to cut ties with CUSEF related to its funding of student trips to China.[21]

Foundation grants

In 2021, CUSEF gave a $5 million grant to the George H.W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations.[22] CUSEF also provides funding to the Carter Center[23] and has partnered with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Brookings Institution, Atlantic Council, and Center for American Progress.[7]


References

  1. Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany (November 28, 2017). "This Beijing-Linked Billionaire Is Funding Policy Research at Washington's Most Influential Institutions: The Chinese Communist Party is quietly reshaping public opinion and policy abroad". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on August 31, 2019. Retrieved September 20, 2020.
  2. Lam, Jeffie; Chung, Kimmy (January 15, 2018). "University of Texas at Austin rejects funding from Hong Kong-based foundation, citing its links to Communist Party". South China Morning Post. Archived from the original on November 9, 2020. Retrieved September 20, 2020.
  3. Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany (June 30, 2020). "China's influence operations are getting harder to hide". Axios. Archived from the original on September 23, 2020. Retrieved September 20, 2020.
  4. Lim, Louisa; Bergin, Julia (2018-12-07). "Inside China's audacious global propaganda campaign". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Archived from the original on 2020-03-10. Retrieved 2019-08-31.
  5. Cole, J. Michael; Hsu, Szu-Chien (2020-07-30). Insidious Power: How China Undermines Global Democracy. Eastbridge Books. pp. 29–37, 56–57. ISBN 978-1-78869-214-4. Archived from the original on 2021-06-06. Retrieved 2020-09-20.
  6. Hamilton, Clive; Ohlberg, Mareike (2020). Hidden Hand: Exposing How the Chinese Communist Party Is Reshaping the World. New York: Oneworld Publications. pp. 210–212. ISBN 978-1-78607-784-4. OCLC 1150166864.
  7. Bowe, Alexander (August 24, 2018). "China's Overseas United Front Work: Background and Implications for the United States" (PDF). United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Archived (PDF) from the original on September 9, 2018. Retrieved May 12, 2019.
  8. Dotson, John (September 16, 2020). "The China-U.S. Exchange Foundation and United Front "Lobbying Laundering" in American Politics". Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on September 20, 2020. Retrieved September 19, 2020.
  9. "Lobby firm woos African Americans to promote China's foreign influence ops". Intelligence Online. 30 August 2023. Archived from the original on 20 September 2023. Retrieved 4 December 2023.
  10. "Sanya Initiative". China-United States Exchange Foundation. Archived from the original on 2020-10-23. Retrieved 2020-09-20.
  11. Cavanaugh, Joshua (June 3, 2020). "U.S.-China Sanya Initiative Dialogue: Report from the 11th Meeting". EastWest Institute. Archived from the original on 2020-09-05. Retrieved 2020-09-05.
  12. Wortzel, Larry M. (March 1, 2014). "The Chinese People's Liberation Army and Information Warfare". Monographs, Collaborative Studies, & Irps. Strategic Studies Institute: 33–34. JSTOR resrep11757. Archived from the original on October 30, 2022. Retrieved December 4, 2023.
  13. Kan, Shirley A. (July 25, 2013). "U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress" (PDF). Congressional Research Service. Archived (PDF) from the original on September 27, 2020. Retrieved September 27, 2020.
  14. Garnaut, John (2013-05-24). "China gets into the business of making friends". The Sydney Morning Herald. Archived from the original on 2020-07-06. Retrieved 2020-07-06.
  15. "Fall 2019 Mayors Delegation to China". United States Heartland China Association. 2019-11-30. Archived from the original on 2023-05-30. Retrieved 2023-09-28.
  16. Diamond, Larry; Schell, Orville (2019-08-01). China's Influence and American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance. Hoover Press. p. 61. ISBN 978-0-8179-2286-3. OCLC 1104533323. Archived from the original on 2020-05-28. Retrieved September 4, 2022.
  17. "Pacific Community Initiative". Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. 29 January 2020. Archived from the original on 2020-10-21. Retrieved 2020-10-18.
  18. Redden, Elizabeth (January 16, 2018). "Thanks, but No, Thanks". Inside Higher Ed. Archived from the original on September 20, 2020. Retrieved September 20, 2020.
  19. Rogin, Josh (January 15, 2018). "University rejects Chinese Communist Party-linked influence efforts on campus". The Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Archived from the original on 2020-12-15. Retrieved 2020-09-20.
  20. Quinn, Jimmy (4 December 2023). "Obama China Ambassador's Institute Faces Scrutiny over Beijing Ties". National Review. Retrieved 4 December 2023.
  21. Lachlan, Markay; Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany (June 5, 2021). "Bush family nonprofit's $5 million deal with China influence group". Axios. Archived from the original on June 6, 2021. Retrieved June 6, 2021.
  22. Eisenman, Joshua; Sobolik, Michael (August 31, 2021). "U.S. Institutions Must Get Smarter About Chinese Communist Party Money". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 2021-08-31. Retrieved 2021-09-05.

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