Writ of error

Habeas appeals

The Supreme Court never had an opportunity to exercise the authority to hear appeals from habeas petitions in the circuit courts. In Ex parte McCardle (1867), the first such case, the Court denied a motion to dismiss, finding that it had such jurisdiction.^[26] William H. McCardle had been arrested by a military commission for violating the Military Reconstruction Act by publishing anti-Reconstruction editorials in the Vicksburg Times.^[27] Before the Court could reach the merits, Congress repealed said jurisdiction.^[28] In Ex parte McCardle (1869), the Court held that the repeal was a valid exercise of Congress's Exceptions Clause power.^[29]

Original habeas

In Ex parte Yerger (1868), the Court held that the jurisdiction strip at issue in McCardle did not revoke the Court's authority to hear original habeas petitions under § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.^[30] Other than Yerger, the Court only had one additional opportunity to hear such an original habeas case.^[31]

Certificates of division

Despite intervening statutory developments that decreased the likelihood of division in the circuit courts, the Chase Court heard seventeen of its thirty-six criminal cases on certificates of division. In Ex parte Milligan (1866), the Court held that habeas petitions in the circuit courts could be a source of certified questions to the Supreme Court.^[32] But, in United States v. Rosenburgh (1868)^[33] and United States v. Avery (1871),^[34] the Court held that a motion to quash an indictment could not be so certified, even if the motion calls into question the jurisdiction of the circuit court.

Prerogative writs

In Ex parte Robinson (1873), on a petition for a writ of mandamus, the Court held that fines and imprisonment are the only punishments authorized by the Judiciary Act of 1789 for contempt of court. Thus, where attorney misconduct took place before a criminal grand jury, the Court held that the attorney could not be disbarred for contempt.^[35]

Alien crew members

In United States v. Tynen (1870), the Court overturned a conviction under a statute that required vessel owners to only employ U.S. citizen crew members. The Court held that a new statute which did no more than increase the punishment operated as an implied repeal of the first statute, and thus a conviction under the first statute was invalid.^[36]

Counterfeiting

In United States v. Howell (1870), the Court held that a counterfeiting statute was not void for repugnancy, distinguishing United States v. Cantril (1807), a decision of the Marshall Court interpreting a nearly identical statute.^[37]

Draft obstruction

A Civil War-era statute prohibited obstruction of the draft or the enrollment of members in the armed forces.^[38] The Court repeatedly upheld a strict division between the two prohibitions, holding that the draft obstruction provision did not apply to enrollment obstruction and vice versa.^[39]

Embezzlement

In United States v. Hartwell (1867), a prosecution for embezzlement of government funds under the Sub-Treasury Act, the Court held that the prohibition applied even to a relatively low level government official.^[40]

Liquor

In United States v. Holliday (1865), the Court upheld a criminal prohibition on selling liquor to Indians under the Indian Commerce Clause and held that the offense did not require that the sale take place on a reservation.^[41]

In the License Tax Cases (1866), the Court upheld a federal tax on liquor licenses (which was enforced by criminal prosecution).^[42]

Naptha mixing

In United States v. Dewitt (1869), the Court held that the federal naptha mixing prohibition was unconstitutional (except in areas under exclusive federal jurisdiction) because it infringed on the police power of the states.^[43]

Obstruction of the mail

In United States v. Kirby (1868), the Court held that the arrest of a mail carrier under a bench warrant was not prohibited by the mail obstruction statute.^[44]

Constitutional issues

Double jeopardy

In Ex parte Lange (1873), the Court held that double jeopardy was violated by the imposition of a fine and imprisonment under a statute that authorized either fine or imprisonment.^[31] Since the defendant had already paid the fine, the Court held that the lower court could no longer even alter the sentence to mere imprisonment.^[31]

Ex post facto law

In Gut v. Minnesota (1869), the Court held that a retroactive change to Minnesota's criminal venue statute was not an unconstitutional ex post facto law.^[45]

Incorporation

In Pervear v. Massachusetts (1866), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment did not apply to the state governments, and—in the alternative, assuming that it did—a fine of $50 and three months hard labor was not an excessive punishment for bootlegging.^[21] And, in Twitchell v. Pennsylvania (1868), the Court held that the criminal procedure provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not apply to the state governments.^[46]

Other

Sufficiency of an indictment

In United States v. Cook (1872), the Court held that—where a criminal statute both defines an offense and its exceptions—a criminal indictment must plead facts taking the case out of the exceptions if and only if the exception is inseparable from the definition of the offense. The Court held that the embezzlement statute at issue contained no such exceptions, and that the Crimes Act of 1790's statute of limitations was not such an exception.^[47]

Special verdicts

In United States v. Buzzo (1873), a prosecution for tax evasion, the Court held that where the jury is instructed to deliver a special verdict, the element of intent must be specifically included within the special verdict.^[48]

Statutory venue

In United States v. Arwo (1873), a prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon on the high seas, the Court found that the statutory venue provision—providing for venue in the first judicial district into which the defendant is brought—was satisfied.^[49]