Predicted impact of Brexit

This article outlines the delivered and predicted impact of Brexit, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom).

Some effects of Brexit depend on the negotiated withdrawal agreement. Other effects depend on the trade deal negotiated during the transition period after withdrawal or whether the transition period ends before an agreement is ratified (a "no-deal" Brexit).[1]

Brexit effect can impact entities inside the UK, or have effect on Gibraltar, to impact the European Union and impact third countries. It is also likely to have an impact on the Irish border.

With the Brexit, Ireland is the main English-speaking country remaining in the European Union, the other one being Malta. These two countries both have other official languages as well and Malta uses English as a second official language.


According to a 2016 study by Ken Mayhew, Emeritus Professor of Education and Economic Performance at Oxford University, Brexit posed the following threats to higher education: "loss of research funding from EU sources; loss of students from other EU member states; the impact on the ability of the sector to hire academic staff from EU member states; and the impact on the ability of UK students to study abroad."[2] The UK received more from the European agencies and institutions for research than it financially contributed[3][4] with universities getting just over 10% of their research income from the European agencies and institutions.[5] All funding for net beneficiaries from European agencies and institutions, including universities, was guaranteed by the British government in August 2016.[6] Before the funding announcement, a newspaper investigation reported that some research projects were reluctant to include British researchers due to uncertainties over funding.[7] Currently the UK is part of the European Research Area and the UK is likely to wish to remain an associated member.[8]

Blue passport

Since March 2020, blue passports are issued by the United-Kingdom while most of the European Union keeps its burgundy passports.[9]

The Home Office have said that the blue Brexit passport is seen as "the greenest British passport ever" and that "the carbon footprint from manufacture is limited to zero by including projects for planting trees."[9] The Home Office also said that the blue passport includes security features, such as a "hard-wearing, super-strength polycarbonate data page", with embedded technologies to secure personal data.[9] However, the European Union does not require its members to have burgundy passports, and one member, Croatia, has not changed the colour of its passport from blue since joining in 2013. In December 2017, the UK government admitted that the colour of the UK passport could have been changed without leaving the EU.[10]

The blue passport has been controversial. Home Secretary Priti Patel said "leaving the European Union gave us a unique opportunity to restore our national identity and forge a new path in the world" and "by returning to the iconic blue and gold design, the British passport will once again be entwined with our national identity".[9] Patron of the European Movement and former MEP Edward McMillan-Scott said the passport would be seen as offensive to many Europeans and that "it will be seen as a symbol of the attitude prevailing in the Conservative party towards the rest of Europe that is isolationist, ignorant and self-destructive".[9] The UK government initially announced that manufacturing the passport would create 70 jobs in the UK, though ultimately, British company De La Rue lost the bid to a Franco-Dutch company who manufactures the new passports in Poland.[11]

Borders and customs

Border between the UK and Ireland

The UK–Ireland border crosses this road at Killeen (near Newry), marked only by a speed limit in km/h. (Northern Ireland uses mph.)

The United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland have been part of the Common Travel Area since before the EU was formed. This allows their citizens freedom of movement within the area, with only passport checks at airports and seaports. Their membership of the EU Customs Union and Single Market means there are no customs checks or tariffs. Since 2005, the border has been essentially invisible.[12]

After Brexit, the border between Northern Ireland (part of the UK) and the Republic of Ireland (part of the EU) became the only UK–EU land border. There was concern over this becoming a "hard border" with fewer, controlled crossing points and customs checks.[13] This could have compromised the Good Friday Agreement that ended the Northern Ireland conflict,[14][15][16] and lead to violence.[17] All involved parties agreed a hard border should be avoided.[18] To forestall this, the EU proposed a "backstop agreement" (the Northern Ireland Protocol) that would have kept the UK in the Customs Union and kept Northern Ireland in some aspects of the Single Market also, until a lasting solution was found.[19] The backstop was supported by the Irish government and many Irish nationalists, but opposed by many Ulster unionists and Conservatives. They say it would have undermined the UK's territorial integrity, prevented it making its own trade deals, and fear it could have kept the UK (or part of it) under EU rules indefinitely.[19] The backstop was part of the Withdrawal Agreement, but the UK parliament overwhelmingly voted down the agreement.[19]

The original proposal was for Northern Ireland alone to remain in the EU Single Market and Customs Union. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) opposed this, believing it threatened the unity of the UK. Theresa May then agreed to keep the whole UK in the Customs Union, should it come into effect.[19] When Boris Johnson became Prime Minister, he promised to remove the backstop from the withdrawal agreement and replace it with "alternative arrangements".[20] In October 2019, the UK government and EU agreed on new arrangements for Northern Ireland in a revised withdrawal agreement.

If there were a no-deal Brexit, the UK government announced that it would not have performed customs checks at the Irish border and acknowledged that might have presented a smuggling risk.[21][22] European Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, said if there was a no-deal Brexit the Republic of Ireland would have had to implement border checks on the EU's behalf.[23] In 2019, the President of Ireland signed into law the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (Consequential Provisions) Act, to help deal with challenges a no-deal Brexit posed to the Republic and its citizens.[24][25][26]

According to Gove, Irish border will not have customs officers saying ‘halt’.[27]

Border with France

The French and British governments say they remain committed to the Le Touquet Agreement, which lets UK border checks be completed in France, and vice versa (juxtaposed controls).[28] The two governments signed the Sandhurst Treaty in January 2018, which will shorten the time taken to process migrants attempting to reach the UK from Calais, from six months to one month. The UK also announced it will invest a further £44.5 million on border security at the English Channel.[28]

If there had been a "no-deal" Brexit, trade between the UK and France would have defaulted to World Trade Organization rules. To ensure the smooth flow of freight, France created a new "smart border" which will scan trucks' licence plates and automatically link them to shipping documents filled out online by exporters. Trucks travelling to Britain will either be waved through, or undergo checks if they carry food, plants or livestock. Gérald Darmanin, French Minister of Public Action and Accounts, said there would not be long queues in Calais.[29] France is spending €50 million on expanding port infrastructure and plans to recruit 700 more customs staff by the end of 2020.[30]

Customs between the EU and UK

In mid-2020, the UK announced plans to spend £705m to shore up UK borders in light of Brexit. This includes £235m for new staffing and IT systems, and £470m for port and inland infrastructure.[27]

The Freight Transport Association's UK policy director Elizabeth de Jong stated that a "make do and mend" approach will be necessary while waiting for the necessary trade-related infrastructure to be built. This "mending" process is not expected to be complete until 2025, and will be inherently costly.[31]

At the end of the transition period, Michael Gove suggests that all EU imports will be subject to inevitable border checks, constituting a significant change. Such checks would involve customs declarations, mandatory safety and security certificates, and physical checks of food and goods of animal origin.[31]

A related consequence of Brexit is that deferred VAT payments no longer exist.[31]

Economic effects

Economists expect that Brexit will have damaging immediate and longer-term effects on the economies of the UK and at least part of the 27 other EU member states. In particular, there is a broad consensus among economists and in the economic literature that Brexit will likely reduce the UK's real per capita income in the medium and long term, and that the Brexit referendum itself damaged the economy.[lower-alpha 1][44] Studies on effects since the referendum show a reduction in GDP, trade and investment, as well as household losses from increased inflation.


According to one study, the referendum result had pushed up UK inflation by 1.7 percentage points in 2017, leading to an annual cost of £404 for the average British household.[45] Subsequent data shows that the Brexit referendum pushed up UK inflation by 2.9%, which amounts to annual costs of £870 for the average UK household.[46] Studies published in 2018, estimated that the economic costs of the Brexit vote were 2.1% of GDP,[47][48] or 2.5% of GDP.[49] According to a December 2017 Financial Times analysis, the Brexit referendum results had reduced national British income by between 0.6% and 1.3%.[50] A 2018 analysis by Stanford University and Nottingham University economists estimated that uncertainty around Brexit reduced investment by businesses by approximately 6 percentage points and caused an employment reduction of 1.5 percentage points.[51] A number of studies found that Brexit-induced uncertainty about the UK's future trade policy reduced British international trade from June 2016 onwards.[52][53][54][55][56] A 2019 analysis found that British firms substantially increased offshoring to the European Union after the Brexit referendum, whereas European firms reduced new investments in the UK.[57][58]

In January 2021 British firms halted exports to the European Union: this resulted in between 2/3 and 3/4 of maritime HGV coming from the EU to return empty to the EU, while maritime British export were reduced by 68% compared to January 2020.[59]

In the long term

There is overwhelming or near-unanimous agreement among economists that leaving the European Union will adversely affect the British economy in the medium- and long-term.[lower-alpha 2][44] Surveys of economists in 2016 showed overwhelming agreement that Brexit would likely reduce the UK's real per-capita income level.[35][36][37] 2019 and 2017 surveys of existing academic research found that the credible estimates ranged between GDP losses of 1.2–4.5% for the UK,[44] and a cost of between 1–10% of the UK's income per capita.[33] These estimates differ depending on whether the UK exits the EU with a hard Brexit or soft Brexit.[33] In January 2018, the UK government's own Brexit analysis was leaked; it showed that UK economic growth would be stunted by 2–8% in total over the 15 years following Brexit, the amount depending on the leave scenario.[60][61]

According to most economists, EU membership has a strong positive effect on trade and as a result the UK's trade would be worse off if it left the EU.[62][63][64][65] According to a study by University of Cambridge economists, under a "hard Brexit" whereby the UK reverts to WTO rules, one-third of UK exports to the EU would be tariff-free, one-quarter would face high trade barriers and other exports risk tariffs in the range of 1–10%.[66] A 2017 study found that "almost all UK regions are systematically more vulnerable to Brexit than regions in any other country."[67] A 2017 study examining the economic impact of Brexit-induced reductions in migration" found that there would likely be "a significant negative impact on UK GDP per capita (and GDP), with marginal positive impacts on wages in the low-skill service sector."[33][68] It is unclear how changes in trade and foreign investment will interact with immigration, but these changes are likely to be important.[33]

With Brexit, the EU would lose its second-largest economy, the country with the third-largest population and "the financial capital of the world", as the German newspaper Münchner Merkur put it.[69] Population is reduced from 513 million (EU-28) to 447 million (EU-27_2020). GDP is down from 15.9 trillion (EU-28) to 13.5 trillion (EU-27_2020) ; GDP per capita changes from 31,000 (EU-28) to 30,000 (EU-27_2020). Furthermore, the EU would lose its second-largest net contributor to the EU budget (2015: Germany €14.3 billion, United Kingdom €11.5 billion, France €5.5 billion).[70] Thus, the departure of Britain would result in an additional financial burden for the remaining net contributors, unless the budget is reduced accordingly: Germany, for example, would have to pay an additional €4.5 billion for 2019 and again for 2020; in addition, the UK would no longer be a shareholder in the European Investment Bank, in which only EU members can participate. Britain's share amounts to 16%, €39.2 billion (2013), which Britain would withdraw unless there is an EU treaty change.[71]

All the remaining EU members (as well as Switzerland, Norway and Iceland) will also likely experience adverse effects (albeit smaller effects than the UK), in particular Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium.[72][73][74]

In the short term

Short-term macroeconomic forecasts by the Bank of England and other banks of what would happen immediately after the Brexit referendum were too pessimistic.[75] The assessments assumed that the referendum results would create greater uncertainty in markets and reduce consumer confidence more than it did.[75] A number of economists noted that short-term macroeconomic forecasts are generally considered unreliable and that they are something that academic economists do not do, unlike banks.[33][75][76][77] Economists have compared short-term economic forecasts to weather forecasts whereas the long-term economic forecasts are akin to climate forecasts: the methodologies used in long-term forecasts are "well-established and robust".[33][75][76][78]

Regional inequality in UK

Studies on the economic impact that different forms of Brexit will have on different parts of the country indicate that Brexit will exacerbate regional economic inequality in the UK, as already struggling regions will be hardest hit by Brexit.[79]

UK financial sector

Economists have warned that London's future as an international financial centre depends on whether the UK will obtain passporting rights for British banks from the European Union. If banks located in the UK cannot obtain passporting rights, they have strong incentives to relocate to financial centres within the EU.[80][81] According to John Armour, Professor of Law and Finance at Oxford University, "a 'soft' Brexit, whereby the UK leaves the EU but remains in the single market, would be a lower-risk option for the British financial industry than other Brexit options, because it would enable financial services firms to continue to rely on regulatory passporting rights."[81] Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley are among the financial firms that have moved some of their business away from the UK to Europe to avoid disruptions anticipated by Brexit.[82][83][84]


According to a 2017 study by the University of Exeter and Chatham House researchers, there are considerable benefits for the UK to be integrated into the European energy market. The study notes, "if the UK wants to enjoy the economic benefits of remaining part of what is an increasingly integrated European electricity market then, as European legislation is currently drafted, it will not only have to forgo an element of autonomy through accepting legislation and regulations made collectively at the EU level, but it will also lose much of its voice in that decision making process, effectively becoming a rule-taker rather than a rule-maker."[85]

EU institutions and agencies

Council of the EU

Analyses indicate that the departure of the relatively economically liberal UK will reduce the ability of remaining economically liberal countries to block measures in the Council of the EU.[86][87] According to the Lisbon Treaty (2009), decisions of the Council are made by qualified majority voting, which means that a majority view can be blocked should at least four members of the Council, representing at least 35% of the population of the Union, choose to do so. In many policy votes, Britain, allied with other northern EU allies (Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian and the Baltic states), had a blocking minority of 35%.[88][89]

European Parliament

The UK's 73 seats in the European Parliament became vacant upon its withdrawal in 2020. 27 of these seats were redistributed to other countries, with the remaining 46 reserved for potential new member states, reducing the overall number of MEPs from 751 to 705.[90] UK MEPs retained full rights to participate in the European Parliament until withdrawal, though there were discussions about excluding UK MEPs from key committee positions.[91]

In April 2017, a group of European lawmakers discussed what should be done about the vacated seats when the UK leaves the EU. One plan, supported by Gianni Pittella and Emmanuel Macron, was to replace the 73 seats with a pan-European constituency list; other options which were considered include dropping the British seats without replacement, and reassigning some or all of the existing seats from other countries to reduce inequality of representation.[92][93]

As soon as the first February 2020, MEPs elected in 2019 who had their seat blocked by the UK still in the EU, became full MEP with their own seats.

This makes a political shift in the European parliament, with 8 more seats for the right: 5 for the right wing PPE and 3 from the far right ID, and 13 seats less for the left: 6 less for the greens, 6 less for the S&D, and one less for the GUE/GNL. The greens become a group smaller than the far right. [94]

European Parliament constituencies in the United Kingdom disappeared.

EU agencies

Brexit requires the offices and staff of the European Medicines Agency and European Banking Authority, previously based in London, to move out of the UK.[95] The agencies, which together employ more than 1,000 people, are currently located in Amsterdam and Paris.[96]


With Brexit, the UK leaves the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP),[97] which provides financial support to farmers in the EU. Most of the payments to farmers comes from the EU budget, paid for by contributions from member states.[98] However, the UK receives much less than it contributes, and the CAP has been criticised for encouraging farming which harms the environment, favouring big landowners and imposing high food prices.[98]

Brexit allows the UK to develop its own agriculture policy.[99] The UK government and devolved legislatures have set out plans to support farmers while enhancing the environment.[99] The current UK government has committed to maintaining the same payments to farmers until the end of the current parliament, even without a withdrawal agreement.[97] The Agriculture Bill is intended to replace the CAP with a new system based on paying farmers "public money for public goods" such as environmental protection, public access to the countryside and measures to reduce flooding. The UK government has also said it will ensure continued "access to seasonal agricultural labour" from abroad after Brexit.[99] Farming unions warned that a "no-deal" Brexit, however, would have had "severe impacts" on farming.[100]


Smoking fishermen sorting velvet crabs at Fionnphort, Scotland

After Brexit, the UK left the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)[101] that lets all EU countries fish within 12 nautical miles of the UK coast[102] and lets the EU set catch quotas.[103] The UK fishing industry has long criticised the CFP,[104] arguing that it favours non-UK fishermen because the UK has a larger fishing zone than most of its neighbours.[103] The combined EU fishing fleets land about 6 million tonnes of fish per year,[105] about half of which are from UK waters.[106] The UK's share of the overall catch is about 750,000 tonnes.[107]

The UK becomes an independent coastal state and is fully responsible for managing fisheries in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), extending 200 nautical miles (nm) from shore.[101] It still is bound by the UN Law of the Sea Convention, which requires it to co-operate with neighbors on managing shared fish stocks and prevent overfishing.[101] By leaving the CFP, the UK could develop fisheries policy that better suits its needs.[103] The UK also leaves the London Fisheries Convention that lets Irish, French, Belgian, Dutch and German vessels fish within six nautical miles of the UK's coast.[108] This was welcomed by the National Federation of Fishermen's Organisations and the Scottish government,[109] but the Irish fishing industry expressed concern as a third of its catch is from UK waters.[110]

Access for foreign fishing vessels to UK waters will be a matter for negotiation.[101] According to Wageningen Economic Research, if there was a "hard Brexit that banned EU fishermen from UK waters", British fishermen could catch more fish but the price of their fish would drop, while the resulting trade barriers would lead to higher seafood prices for consumers, because the UK imports most of its seafood. This would be a "lose-lose situation" for both the UK and the EU, and for both British consumers and the fishing industry.[111] According to a 2018 study, "Brexit poses a major challenge to the stability of European fisheries management [...] potentially putting at risk recent recovery and future sustainability of shared fish stocks". It said that denying access to foreign fishing vessels would risk tariffs being imposed, while granting access and seeking a more modest re-balancing of fishing entitlements would lessen this risk.[112]

In February 2020, as soon as the withdrawal occurred, Fisheries issue was raised in Guernsey. After the first ban, a temporary "régime d’autorisation" has been set up to allow individual boats to fish in Guernsey.[113]

Following the end of the Brexit transition period, fish from Iceland that used to be shipped to Britain for export to the rest of the EU began to be shipped to Rotterdam. This is separate from fish intended for the UK market.[114]

In May 2021, France threatened to cut off electricity to the British Channel Island of Jersey in a fight over post-Brexit fishing rights, as part of the 2021 Jersey dispute.[115]


Cars crossing into Gibraltar clearing customs formalities. Gibraltar is outside the customs union, VAT area, and Schengen Zone.

Gibraltar, a British Overseas Territory, participated in the referendum and left the EU together with the UK, although 96% of those who participated in the referendum in Gibraltar voted to remain. Gibraltar is outside the EU Customs Union and Schengen Zone, meaning it has customs and identity checks at its border with Spain.

Spain asserts a territorial claim on Gibraltar. After the referendum, Spain's Foreign Minister renewed calls for joint Spanish–British control.[116] This was rebuffed by Gibraltar's Chief Minister,[117] and the UK government states it would only negotiate on Gibraltar's sovereignty with the consent of its people.[118]

The European Council's guidelines for withdrawal negotiations stated that UK–EU agreements made after Brexit would not apply to Gibraltar without Spain's consent.[119] Gibraltarian government minister (and former Chief Minister) Joe Bossano condemned the EU's attitude, suggesting that Spain was being offered a veto, adding "It's enough to convert me from a supporter of the European Union into a Brexiteer".[120]

In late 2018, the British and Spanish governments agreed that any dispute over Gibraltar would not affect Brexit negotiations,[121] and the British government agreed that UK–EU treaties made after Brexit would not automatically apply to Gibraltar.[122] Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez said that "With Brexit we all lose, especially the United Kingdom, but when it comes to Gibraltar, Spain wins."[123][124]


A 2019 study in the Lancet suggested that Brexit would have an adverse impact on health services in the UK under every Brexit scenario, but that a no-deal Brexit would have had the worst impact.[125] The study found that Brexit would deplete the National Health Service (NHS) workforce, create uncertainties regarding care for British nationals living in the EU, and put at risk access to vaccines, equipment, and medicines.[125] It was claimed that supplies of life saving medications including cancer medication could have been disrupted for up to six months in no-deal Brexit. The Department of Health and Social Care stated in August 2019 that it had taken steps to ensure the supply of medicines and medical products remains uninterrupted after Brexit.[126]

Law and courts

After Brexit, the UK will have the final say over the laws that govern it.[127] Under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, which was passed by the British parliament, EU laws will no longer have supremacy over UK laws after Brexit.[128] To maintain continuity, the Act converts EU law into UK law as "retained EU law". After Brexit, the British parliament (and the devolved legislatures) can decide which elements of that law to keep, amend or repeal.[128] Furthermore, UK courts will no longer be bound by the judgments of the EU Court of Justice after Brexit. Its case law from before Brexit will still apply to UK courts, but the UK Supreme Court will not be bound by it.[129] According to Catherine Barnard from UK in a Changing Europe, any future UK–EU trade agreement will require some EU law to take precedence in UK law.[129]

Brexit will leave Ireland and Cyprus as the only two remaining common law jurisdictions in the EU. Paul Gallagher, a former Attorney General of Ireland, has suggested this will isolate those countries and deprive them of a powerful partner that shared a common interest in ensuring that EU legislation was not drafted or interpreted in a way that would be contrary to the principles of the common law.[130] Lucinda Creighton, a former Irish government minister for legal affairs, has said that Ireland relies on the "bureaucratic capacity of the UK" to understand, influence and implement EU legislation.[131]


After Brexit, the UK would be able to control immigration from the EU and EEA.[132] Being part of the EU and EEA means that citizens of any member state can move to the UK to live and work with very little restrictions (freedom of movement). The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 retains freedom of movement as UK law until it is repealed.[133] The Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill would repeal free movement and make EU immigration subject to UK law.[134] The current UK government intends to replace it with a new system. The government's 2018 white paper proposes a "skills-based immigration system" that prioritizes skilled migrants, limits the length of time low-skilled migrants can work in the UK, and applies a stricter criminality threshold. EU and EEA citizens already living in the UK can continue living there after Brexit by applying to the EU Settlement Scheme, which began in March 2019. Irish citizens will not have to apply to the scheme.[135][136][137] If there is a no-deal Brexit, EU citizens who arrive in the UK before the end of 2020 can apply to stay until the end of 2023.[138]

Studies estimating the long-term impact of Brexit on immigration note that many factors affect future migration flows but that Brexit and the end of free movement will likely result in a large decline in immigration from EEA countries to the UK.[139][140] The Migration Policy Institute estimated immediately after the referendum that the UK "would continue to receive 500,000 or more immigrants (from EU and non-EU countries taken together) per year, with annual net migration around 200,000".[141] The decline in EEA immigration is likely to have an adverse impact on the British health sector.[142]

Official figures for June 2016–June 2017 showed that net non-British EU immigration to the UK slowed to about 100,000 immigrants per year (corresponding to the immigration level of 2014) while immigration from outside the EU rose. Taken together, the two inflows into the UK resulted in an only slightly reduced net immigration of 230,000 newcomers. The Head of the Office of National Statistics suggested that Brexit could be a factor for the slowdown in EU immigration, but cautioned there might be other reasons.[143] The number of non-British EU nurses registering with the NHS fell from 1,304 in July 2016 to 46 in April 2017.[144]

Since the referendum, some British citizens have attempted to retain their EU citizenship by applying to other EU member states for citizenship,[145][146] and petitioning the European Commission.[147]


Currently, EEA sportspersons face minimal bureaucracy when playing in the UK. After Brexit, any EU citizen wanting to do so could be required to hold a work permit. Such work permits can be tricky to obtain, especially for young or lower ranked players. Conversely, British nationals playing in EEA states may encounter similar obstacles where none exist today.[148][149]

It has been computed that with Brexit, people like N'Golo Kanté or Riyad Mahrez would not have qualified to work in England or Wales. The same occurs with those under 18, such as Cesc Fàbregas or Paul Pogba when they signed for their respective English clubs.[150]

An agreement will be need to be reached on how regulations might change after Brexit when UK will no longer be a member of the Espace économique européen.[150]


Some Brexit issues remain unsolved by the withdrawal agreement, including continued freedom of movement within the EU, "posted workers" (per the definition in Council Directive 96/71/EC), and other complex issues.[151]

When the United Kingdom left the European Union on 31 January 2020, there were an estimated 1.8 million British citizens living in other EU member states. The vast majority of these British citizens have since been permanently and irrevocably removed from electoral registers and stripped of all democratic voting rights. Brexit has caused the single largest disenfranchisement in European history.

In France, on 15 March 2020, 800 elected conseillers municipaux of British nationality no longer had the right to be reelected, as a result of Brexit.[152]

For European citizens, entering the UK will require a passport from October 2021 and onward (i.e. an identity card will no longer be sufficient).[153]



By leaving the EU, the UK would leave the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA), a single market in commercial air travel.[154] The UK will negotiate a future relationship with the EU on the "basis of equivalence of traffic rights and a level playing field".[155] It could negotiate to re-join as a non-EU member (like Bosnia and Herzegovina), negotiate access through a bilateral agreement (like Switzerland), or negotiate a new 'open skies' bilateral deal with the EU.[154] If there is a "no-deal" Brexit, UK airlines will still have permission to operate within the EU with no restrictions, and vice versa. UK airlines licensed before Brexit will still have permission to operate provided they are majority owned and effectively controlled by nationals of the UK and/or nationals of the EU and EEA.[155]

The UK government seeks continued participation in the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). Otherwise, the UK's Civil Aviation Authority would take on the role of regulator for UK airlines. A substantial increase in CAA staff and resources would be needed to meet the demands of its new role.[154]

The UK has its own air service agreements with 111 countries, which permit flights to-and-from the country, and these will continue after Brexit. It has air service agreements with a further 17 countries through its EU membership, and it has sought to replace these.[156] By July 2019, the UK had concluded air service agreements with the United States,[157] Canada[157] Switzerland,[158] Albania, Georgia, Iceland, Israel, Jordan, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, North Macedonia and Norway.[159]

Three British airlines, Monarch, Flybmi and Thomas Cook, went bankrupt in the period 2017–2019; all three bankruptcies have been partially attributed to Brexit, more specifically the political uncertainty of the Brexit process and the falling exchange rates of the Pound sterling.[160][161][162]


The EU announced that the Channel Tunnel rail link would remain open on current terms for three months if there had been a "no-deal" Brexit. The EU Commission said this should be enough time for new permanent arrangements to be agreed.[163]

Road traffic

After the UK withdrew from the EU, only a registration plate featuring the Union Jack flag and the country code GB satisfies the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic as those registration plates display the international vehicle registration code for the country of registration (GB) incorporated into the vehicle registration plate, and is supplemented with a flag or emblem of the national state.

Until the UK withdrew from the EU, the EU format was also valid within countries party to the Vienna Convention of Road Traffic as it displayed the country code supplemented with the symbol of the regional economic integration organisation (EU stars) the country belongs. The EU format was still valid within the EU during the transition period which ended on 31 December 2020. The rules now vary from country to country. In Spain, Cyprus and Malta, an oval sticker is also needed. In other EU countries a registration plate displaying GB and the Union Jack (but not a different flag) is sufficient.[164]

While the UK no longer benefits from EU road traffic policy, the UK remains a member of other treaties which provide some kinds of transport facility.

The Vienna Convention on Road Traffic is recorded by the UN, not the EU, allowing road traffic between the UK and EU member states member of that convention.

Driving licences

EU law continued to apply to the UK during the transition period and UK driving licences were valid in the EU, and EU driving licences were valid in the UK, until 31 December 2020.

From 1 January 2021, UK driving licence holders are still able to use their driving licence to drive in the EU for short visits, although with some exceptions.[164][165] Where the exceptions apply, International Driving Permits, governed by treaties such as the 1949 Geneva Convention on Road Traffic and the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic, facilitate driving between the UK and the EU/EEA countries. Depending on which convention the country in question has ratified, an IDP governed by the 1949 Geneva Convention might be required in some EEA countries, and an IDP governed by the 1968 Vienna Convention in other EEA countries.[164]

From 1 January 2021, UK driving licenses are no longer European driving licences, so that UK driving license holders now require an IDP to drive in those non-EU/EEA countries which recognise European, but not UK, driving licences. So an IDP is required to drive in several countries in Europe (e.g. a 1949 IDP in Andorra, and a 1968 IDP in Albania, Monaco and Turkey).[166]

When no driving license agreement exists, British drivers lose their driving licences.[167]


The UK was in the European Common Transit Convention (CTC) as an EU member and has negotiated continuous membership after Brexit.[168] This would apply to any new trading relationship with the EU.[169] The CTC applies to moving goods between the EU member states, the EFTA countries (Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) as well as Turkey, Macedonia and Serbia. The CTC, with its supplementary Convention on the Simplification of Formalities in the Trade of Goods, reduces administrative burdens on traders by removing the need for additional import/export declarations when transiting customs territories, and provides cash flow benefits by allowing the movement of goods across a customs territory without the payment of duties until the final destination.[170]

Under the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) mutual market access for the transport of goods is limited to point-to-point crossborder transports, with up to two extra movements (cabotage) in the other party's territory permitted.[171]

Passenger transport

Except in Ireland, mutual market access for passenger transport is limited under the TCA to point-to-point crossborder transports.[129] Bus services on the island of Ireland can continue to pick up and set down passengers in both Ireland and Northern Ireland.[172]

Private transport

From 1 January 2021, drivers taking their own cars to the EU or EEA now need a green card issued under the International Motor Insurance Card System to prove that their cars are insured. Trailers and caravans need separate green cards.[164]


Ferries continue with obstacles such as customs checks:[173] To avoid such an issue, new ferry departures between the Republic of Ireland and the European mainland have been established.[173]


First Minister of Scotland Nicola Sturgeon addresses journalists over Brexit and Scotland's place within Europe at Bute House.

After the Brexit referendum, the Scottish Government—led by the Scottish National Party (SNP)—announced that officials were planning another independence referendum because Scotland voted to remain in the EU while England and Wales voted to leave.[174] It had suggested this before the Brexit referendum.[175] The First Minister of Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon, requested a referendum be held before the UK's withdrawal.[176] The UK Prime Minister rejected the requested timing, but not the referendum itself.[177] In March 2017, the Scottish Parliament voted in favour of holding another independence referendum. Sturgeon called for a "phased return" of an independent Scotland back to the EU.[178]

On 21 March 2018, the Scottish Parliament passed the Scottish Continuity Bill.[179] This was passed due to stalling negotiations between the Scottish Government and the British Government on where powers within devolved policy areas should lie after Brexit. The Act allows for all devolved policy areas to remain within the remit of the Scottish Parliament and reduces the executive power upon exit day that the UK Withdrawal Bill provides for Ministers of the Crown.[180] The bill was referred to the UK Supreme Court, which found that it could not come into force as the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, which received royal assent between the Scottish Parliament passing its bill and the Supreme Court's judgement, designated itself under schedule 4 of the Scotland Act 1998 as unamendable by the Scottish Parliament.[181] The bill has therefore not received royal assent.[182]


Concerns have been raised that Brexit might create security problems for the UK, particularly in law enforcement and counter-terrorism where the UK could use the EU's databases on individuals crossing the British border. Security experts have credited the EU's information-sharing databases with helping to foil terrorist plots. British leaders have expressed support for retaining access to those information-sharing databases, but it could be complicated to obtain access as a non-member of the EU. Brexit would also complicate extradition requests. Under a hard Brexit scenario, the UK would lose access to databases comprising European plane travel records, vehicle registrations, fingerprints, and DNA profiles.[183]

UK bilateral international agreements

Before the withdrawal agreement was ratified, the Financial Times said that there were approximately 759 international agreements, spanning 168 non-EU countries, that the UK would no longer have been a party to upon leaving the EU.[184]

UK–EU relationship post-Brexit

The UK's post-Brexit relationship with the EU could take several forms. A research paper presented to the UK Parliament in July 2013 proposed a number of alternatives to being a member state which would continue to allow access to the EU internal market. These include remaining in the European Economic Area,[185] negotiating deep bilateral agreements on the Swiss and Norwegian model,[185][186] or leaving the EU without EEA membership or a trade agreement under the WTO Option.

UK relations with CANZUK countries and the United States

Pro-Brexit activists and politicians have argued for negotiating trade and migration agreements with the "CANZUK" countries—those of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.[187][188] Numerous academics have criticised this alternative for EU membership as "post-imperial nostalgia".[189][190][191] Economists note that distance reduces trade, a key aspect of the gravity model of trade, which means that even if the UK could obtain similar trade terms with the CANZUK countries as it had as part of the Single Market, it would be far less valuable to the UK.[192][193][194]

In August 2019 United States President Donald Trump pledged to negotiate a "very big trade deal" with the UK after Brexit.[195]

In November 2020 Canada and the UK reached an interim post-Brexit trade agreement called "Canada-United Kingdom Trade Continuity Agreement" and would set the stage for further more comprehensive agreements at a later date.[196]

World Trade Organization

Questions have arisen over how existing international arrangements with the EU under WTO terms should evolve. Some countries—such as Australia and the US—wish to challenge the basis for division (i.e., division between the UK and the continuing EU) of the trade schedules previously agreed between them and the EU, because it reduces their flexibility.[197]

The 8 March 2021, the US agreed a way to split TRQ between the EU and the UK.[198]



  1. "This is what happens if the UK leaves the EU without a deal". 19 October 2019.
  2. Mayhew, Ken (1 March 2017). "UK higher education and Brexit". Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 33 (suppl_1): S155–S161. doi:10.1093/oxrep/grx012. ISSN 0266-903X.
  3. Between 2007 and 2013 the UK received €8.8 billion from the EU for research while contributing €5.4 billion to the EU's research budget.UK research and the European Union: the role of the EU in funding UK research (PDF). London: Royal Society. 2016. pp. 12, Figure 4.
  4. MacKenzie, Debora. "Here's why British scientists are so opposed to Brexit". MIT Technology Review. Retrieved 16 January 2019.
  5. Around 11% of the research income of British universities came from the EU in 2014–2015 University Funding Explained (PDF). London: UK Universities. July 2016.
  6. Elgot, Jessica; Elliott, Larry; Davis, Nicola (13 August 2016). "Treasury to guarantee post-Brexit funding for EU-backed projects". The Guardian.
  7. Sample, Ian (12 July 2016). "UK scientists dropped from EU projects because of post-Brexit funding fears". The Guardian. Retrieved 18 July 2016.
  8. "It is likely that the UK would wish to remain an associated member of the European Research Area, like Norway and Iceland, in order to continue participating in the EU framework programmes."UNESCO Science Report: towards 2030 (PDF). Paris: UNESCO Publishing. 2015. p. 269. ISBN 978-92-3-100129-1.
  9. McDonald, Henry (22 February 2020). "Blue Brexit passports to be issued from next month". The Guardian. Retrieved 14 October 2020.
  10. Dearden, Lizzie (22 December 2017). "Blue passports could have been re-introduced without Brexit, Government admits". The Independent. Retrieved 5 February 2021.
  11. Parsons, Andrew (22 February 2020). "UK post-Brexit blue passports made in Polish factory". The Times. Retrieved 5 February 2021.
  12. "FactCheck: What are the options for the Irish border after Brexit?". Retrieved 25 October 2018.
  13. Lyons, Niamh (31 January 2017). "Brexit will not mean hard border, leaders vow". The Times, Ireland edition. Retrieved 29 April 2017.
  14. Brexit: the unexpected threat to peace in Northern Ireland Nic Robertson, CNN, 6 April 2018
  15. George Mitchell: UK and Ireland need to realise what's at stake in Brexit talks. Belfast Telegraph, 8 April 2018
  16. Brexit threatens Good Friday agreement, Irish PM warns. David Smith, The Guardian, 14 March 2018
  17. "'Violence in NI' if hard border returns". BBC News. 18 February 2019.
  18. "Britain does not want return to Northern Ireland border controls, says May". The Irish Times. 26 July 2016. Retrieved 12 October 2016.
  19. "Brexit: What are the backstop options?". BBC News. 13 September 2019.
  20. Campbell, John (22 August 2019). "Brexit: How could 'alternative arrangements' for the Irish border work?". BBC. Retrieved 27 September 2019.
  21. Cooper, Charlie (13 March 2019). "UK to unilaterally waive all checks at Irish border in no-deal Brexit". Politico.
  22. "Brexit Q&A: From smuggling to taxes - what does it all mean?".
  23. "Jean-Claude Juncker: Border is coming in no-deal Brexit - but blame Britain, not EU". Irish Independent. 23 September 2019.
  24. Ireland, Office of the President of. "Media Library News Releases".
  25. "Emergency Brexit law passes Oireachtas with cross-party support". The Irish Times. 14 March 2019.
  26. "Which areas are covered in Brexit Omnibus Bill?". RTÉ News. 22 February 2019.
  27. "Holidaymakers urged to take out extra travel insurance post-Brexit". the Guardian. 12 July 2020.
  28. "Calais migrants: UK and France sign new treaty". BBC News. 19 January 2018.
  29. "France starts Brexit trial in northern port of Calais". Radio France Internationale. 30 August 2019.
  30. "Brexit: What are EU countries doing to prepare for no deal?". BBC News. 4 September 2019.
  31. "Michael Gove confirms post-Brexit trade barriers will be imposed". The Guardian. 10 February 2020.
  32. Goodman, Peter S. (20 May 2016). "'Brexit,' a Feel-Good Vote That Could Sink Britain's Economy". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 28 November 2017. finding economists who say they believe that a Brexit will spur the British economy is like looking for a doctor who thinks forswearing vegetables is the key to a long life
  33. Sampson, Thomas (2017). "Brexit: The Economics of International Disintegration". Journal of Economic Perspectives. 31 (4): 163–184. doi:10.1257/jep.31.4.163. ISSN 0895-3309. The results I summarize in this section focus on long-run effects and have a forecast horizon of 10 or more years after Brexit occurs. Less is known about the likely dynamics of the transition process or the extent to which economic uncertainty and anticipation effects will impact the economies of the United Kingdom or the European Union in advance of Brexit.
  34. Baldwin, Richard (31 July 2016). "Brexit Beckons: Thinking ahead by leading economists". Retrieved 22 November 2017. On 23 June 2016, 52% of British voters decided that being the first country ever to leave the EU was a price worth paying for 'taking back control', despite advice from economists clearly showing that Brexit would make the UK 'permanently poorer' (HM Treasury 2016). The extent of agreement among economists on the costs of Brexit was extraordinary: forecast after forecast supported similar conclusions (which have so far proved accurate in the aftermath of the Brexit vote).
  35. "Brexit survey". Retrieved 1 November 2017.
  36. "Brexit survey II". Retrieved 1 November 2017.
  37. Sodha, Sonia; Helm, Toby; Inman, Phillip (28 May 2016). "Economists overwhelmingly reject Brexit in boost for Cameron". The Observer. ISSN 0029-7712. Retrieved 1 November 2017. CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link)
  38. "Most economists still pessimistic about effects of Brexit". Financial Times. Retrieved 22 November 2017.
  39. Wren-Lewis, Simon. "Why is the academic consensus on the cost of Brexit being ignored?". The Conversation. Retrieved 22 November 2017.
  40. "Brexit to Hit Jobs, Wealth and Output for Years to Come, Economists Say". Bloomberg L.P. 22 February 2017. Retrieved 22 November 2017. The U.K. economy may be paying for Brexit for a long time to come... It won't mean Armageddon, but the broad consensus among economists—whose predictions about the initial fallout were largely too pessimistic—is for a prolonged effect that will ultimately diminish output, jobs and wealth to some degree.
  41. Johnson, Paul; Mitchell, Ian (1 March 2017). "The Brexit vote, economics, and economic policy". Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 33 (suppl_1): S12–S21. doi:10.1093/oxrep/grx017. ISSN 0266-903X.
  42. "Most economists say Brexit will hurt the economy—but one disagrees". The Economist. Retrieved 22 November 2017.
  43. "This is the real reason the UK's economic forecasts look so bad". The Independent. 23 November 2017. Retrieved 28 November 2017. One thing economists do generally agree on is that leaving the European Union and putting new trade barriers between Britain and our largest and closest trading partners is extremely unlikely to boost UK productivity growth—and is far more likely to slow it
  44. "Brexit: Everyone Loses, but Britain Loses the Most". PIIE. 1 March 2019. Retrieved 17 March 2019.
  45. Breinlich, Holger; Leromain, Elsa; Novy, Dennis; Sampson, Thomas (20 November 2017). "The consequences of the Brexit vote for UK inflation and living standards: First evidence". Retrieved 21 November 2017.
  46. Breinlich, Holger; Leromain, Elsa; Novy, Dennis; Sampson, Thomas (2 March 2020). "The Brexit vote and inflation – updated evidence". Retrieved 2 March 2020.
  47. Born, Benjamin; Müller, Gernot; Schularick, Moritz; Sedláček, Petr (29 May 2019). "£350 million a week: The output cost of the Brexit vote". Retrieved 5 June 2019.
  48. "Centre for Economic Policy Research". Retrieved 28 November 2017.
  49. Savage, Michael; McKie, Robin (29 September 2018). "Britain's bill for Brexit hits £500m a week – and rising". the Guardian. Retrieved 29 September 2018.
  50. Giles, Chris (18 December 2017). "The real price of Brexit begins to emerge". Financial Times. Retrieved 19 December 2017.
  51. Bloom, Nicholas; Chen, Scarlet; Mizen, Paul (16 November 2018). "Rising Brexit uncertainty has reduced investment and employment". Retrieved 20 November 2018.
  52. Crowley, Meredith; Exton, Oliver; Han, Lu (21 January 2019). "The impact of Brexit uncertainty on UK exports". Retrieved 21 January 2019.
  53. "DP13446 Renegotiation of Trade Agreements and Firm Exporting Decisions: Evidence from the Impact of Brexit on UK Exports". Retrieved 21 January 2019.
  54. Graziano, Alejandro; Handley, Kyle; Limão, Nuno (2018). "Brexit Uncertainty and Trade Disintegration". Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  55. Soegaard, Christian. "Brexit has already hurt EU and non-EU exports by up to 13% – new research". The Conversation. Retrieved 5 November 2018.
  56. Douch, Mustapha; Edwards, T. Huw; Soegaard, Christian (2018). "The Trade Effects of the Brexit Announcement Shock". Archived from the original on 6 November 2018. Retrieved 5 November 2018. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  57. Breinlich, Holger; Leromain, Elsa; Novy, Dennis; Sampson, Thomas (12 February 2019). "Voting with their money: Brexit and outward investment by UK firms". Retrieved 13 February 2019.
  58. "Brexit referendum spurs British companies into investing in EU". Reuters. 11 February 2019. Retrieved 13 February 2019.
  59. Reporters, Telegraph (7 February 2021). "Hauliers say exports to European Union are down 68pc since Brexit" via
  60. "The Government's Own Brexit Analysis Says The UK Will Be Worse Off in Every Scenario Outside The EU". BuzzFeed. Retrieved 30 January 2018.
  61. "Secret data show Britain worse off under all Brexit scenarios". Financial Times. Retrieved 30 January 2018.
  62. "HM Treasury analysis: the long-term economic impact of EU membership and the alternatives". Government of the United Kingdom. Retrieved 8 June 2016.
  63. "Brexit and the UK's Public Finances" (PDF) (IFS Report 116). Institute for Fiscal Studies. May 2016. Retrieved 18 June 2016. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  64. "The economic consequences". The Economist. Retrieved 1 November 2017.
  65. "If it ain't broke, don't Brexit". The Economist. Retrieved 1 November 2017.
  66. Corsetti, Giancarlo; Crowley, Meredith; Exton, Oliver; Han, Lu (13 December 2017). "A granular analysis of the exposure of UK exports to EU tariffs, quotas and antidumping under 'no deal'". Retrieved 13 December 2017.
  67. Chen, Wen; Los, Bart; McCann, Philip; Ortega-Argilés, Raquel; Thissen, Mark; van Oort, Frank (2017). "The continental divide? Economic exposure to Brexit in regions and countries on both sides of The Channel". Papers in Regional Science. 97: 25–54. doi:10.1111/pirs.12334. ISSN 1435-5957.
  68. Portes, Jonathan; Forte, Giuseppe (1 March 2017). "The economic impact of Brexit-induced reductions in migration" (PDF). Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 33 (suppl_1): S31–S44. doi:10.1093/oxrep/grx008. ISSN 0266-903X.
  69. "EU-Austritt des UK: Diese Folgen hat der Brexit für Deutschland und die EU" [UK Exit from EU: Brexit has these consequences for Germany and the EU]. (in German). 22 August 2016. Retrieved 30 November 2016. Die Briten haben sich für einen Abschied entschieden, Europa wird nun anders aussehen. Der Kontinent verliert seine (neben Frankreich) stärkste Militärmacht samt Atomwaffenarsenal, seine zweitgrößte Volkswirtschaft, das Land mit der drittgrößten Bevölkerung, die Finanzhauptstadt der Welt und einen von zwei Plätzen im UN-Sicherheitsrat. [The British have decided to leave. Europe will now look different. The continent will be losing its strongest military power (alongside France), ... its second largest economy, the country with the third largest population, the financial capital of the world, and one of two seats on the UN Security Council.]
  70. Hendrik Kafsack (8 August 2016). "EU-Haushalt: Deutschland überweist das meiste Geld an Brüssel". Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (in German). Retrieved 9 October 2016.
  71. Reuters/dpa (10 September 2016). "Brexit wird teuer für Deutschland". Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (in German). Retrieved 9 October 2016.
  72. McCann, Allison; Schreuer, Milan; Tsang, Amie (7 February 2019). "Where Europe Would Be Hurt Most by a No-Deal Brexit". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 20 May 2019.
  73. "Europe's small open countries brace for Brexit". The Economist. 11 April 2019. ISSN 0013-0613. Retrieved 20 May 2019.
  74. "Single Market gains: Luxembourg, London, and Zurich inhabitants benefit the most from EU Single Market". Retrieved 2 June 2019.
  75. "Central bank of the year: Bank of England – Central Banking". Central Banking. 16 February 2017. Retrieved 22 November 2017.
  76. Macro, Mainly (9 February 2017). "mainly macro: How Brexit advocates intend to smear economics". mainly macro. Retrieved 22 November 2017.
  77. Eichengreen, Barry (10 August 2017). "The experts strike back! How economists are being proved right on Brexit". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 28 November 2017.
  78. David Miles (11 January 2017). "Andy Haldane is wrong: there is no crisis in economics". Financial Times.
  79. Carter, Andrew; Swinney, Paul (2019). "Brexit and the Future of the UK's Unbalanced Economic Geography". The Political Quarterly. 90: 72–83. doi:10.1111/1467-923X.12649. ISSN 1467-923X. What all of these studies agree on is that whichever Brexit deal is struck, even the most advantageous will have a negative impact on future economic growth for all places across the UK in the short to medium term. And they also agree that over the longer term its places that are already struggling that are likely to struggle the most, further exacerbating the country's unbalanced economic geography.
  80. Eichengreen, Barry (7 January 2019). "The international financial implications of Brexit". International Economics and Economic Policy. 16: 37–50. doi:10.1007/s10368-018-0422-x. ISSN 1612-4812. S2CID 159090073.
  81. Armour, John (1 March 2017). "Brexit and financial services". Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 33 (suppl_1): S54–S69. doi:10.1093/oxrep/grx014. ISSN 0266-903X.
  82. "Goldman Sachs Opens Luxembourg Wealth Outpost for Brexit". 4 December 2020. Retrieved 11 December 2020.
  83. "Morgan Stanley to Shift $120 Billion of Assets to Germany". 10 December 2020. Retrieved 11 December 2020.
  84. "Goldman Sachs is moving more people to Paris ahead of Brexit". eFinancialCareers. 1 December 2020. Retrieved 11 December 2020.
  85. Lockwood, Matthew; Froggatt, Antony; Wright, Georgina; Dutton, Joseph (1 November 2017). "The implications of Brexit for the electricity sector in Great Britain: Trade-offs between market integration and policy influence". Energy Policy. 110: 137–143. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2017.08.021. ISSN 0301-4215.
  86. "With or without you? Policy impact and networks in the Council of the EU after Brexit". ResearchGate.
  87. Gruyter, Caroline de. "There Is Life for the EU After Brexit". Carnegie Europe.
  88. "A two-speed post-Brexit Europe is best avoided". Financial Times.
  89. Dorothea Siems (18 June 2016). "Sperrminorität". Die Welt (in German). Retrieved 9 October 2016.
  90. "Redistribution of seats in the European Parliament after Brexit". European Parliament. 31 January 2020. Retrieved 2 February 2020.
  91. "European Parliament moves to sideline British MEPs". The Irish Times. Retrieved 15 November 2016.
  92. "MEPs debate who inherits British seats". Retrieved 12 April 2017.
  93. ""Is Brexit an opportunity to reform the European Parliament?" [pdf]" (PDF).
  94. "Quelle sera la composition du Parlement européen après le Brexit ?". 4 July 2019 via Le Monde.
  95. Collis, Helen (23 May 2017). "Brussels releases criteria to host EU agencies after Brexit". Politico. Retrieved 26 May 2017.
  96. "EU states set for squabble over who gets London's agencies after Brexit". Reuters. 2017. Retrieved 22 November 2017.
  97. Farm payments in a ‘no deal’ Brexit. House of Commons Library. 15 August 2019.
  98. Common Agricultural Policy. Institute for Government.
  99. Brexit: UK agriculture policy. House of Commons Library. 11 September 2018.
  100. "Farming unions in warning against no-deal Brexit". BBC News. 10 January 2019.
  101. Briefing Paper: Fisheries and Brexit. House of Commons Library. 5 September 2019.
  102. "Reality Check: How would Brexit affect the UK's fishing waters?". BBC News. 31 May 2016.
  103. Common Fisheries Policy. Institute for Government.
  104. What does a no deal Brexit look like for fishing?. UK in a Changing Europe. 7 February 2019.
  105. "Main world producers (2007)" (PDF). Retrieved 23 July 2018.
  106. Daniel Boffey (15 February 2017). "UK fishermen may not win waters back after Brexit, EU memo reveals". The Guardian. London. Retrieved 3 July 2017. Source: House of Lords, NAFC Marine Centre, University of the Highlands and Islands.
  107. Milne, Claire (21 June 2017). "Is the EU 'pinching our fish'?". Retrieved 3 July 2017.
  108. "UK to withdraw from international fishing arrangement". BBC News. 2 July 2017.
  109. "Scottish government says UK is right to leave fishing deal". BBC News. 2 July 2017.
  110. Lorna Siggins (3 July 2017). "Fishing announcement UK's "first serious shot on Brexit"". The Irish Times. Retrieved 3 July 2017.
  111. Carrington, Damian (24 April 2018). "Hard Brexit would mean more and cheaper British fish – but there's a catch". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 17 January 2019.
  112. Phillipson, Jeremy; Symes, David (1 April 2018). "'A sea of troubles': Brexit and the fisheries question". Marine Policy. 90: 168–173. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2017.12.016. ISSN 0308-597X.
  113. huffingtonpost
  114. Gréta Sigríður Einarsdóttir (21 January 2021). "Icelandic Seafood Export Bypasses UK Due to Brexit Delays". Iceland Review. Retrieved 28 January 2021.
  115. "UK Royal Navy ships patrolling Jersey amid fishing row with France". BBC News. 6 May 2021.
  116. "Brexit: Spain calls for joint control of Gibraltar". BBC News. Retrieved 26 June 2016.
  117. Joe Duggan (12 September 2016). "Chief Minister Fabian Picardo says 'British means British' at National Day political rally".
  118. "the UK would seek the best possible deal for Gibraltar as the UK exits the EU, and there would be no negotiation on the sovereignty of Gibraltar without the consent of its people." Theresa May, 6 April 2017, "UK won't negotiate away Gibraltar sovereignty, May tells Tusk". The Guardian. 6 April 2017.
  119. "Brexit: Gibraltar angered by Spain's EU 'veto'". BBC News. 1 April 2017.
  120. 'Sir Joe slams EU's ‘disgraceful’ stance on Brexit and Gibraltar Archived 17 February 2018 at the Wayback Machine': The Gibraltar Chronicle, 2 February 2018
  121. "UK, Spain reach Brexit deal over Gibraltar: Spanish PM", Digital Journal, 18 October 2018
  122. "Spanish PM lifts effective veto on Brexit deal after Gibraltar ‘guarantee’". The Irish Times. 24 November 2018.
  123. "Spanish PM: "With Brexit we all lose, but on Gibraltar, Spain wins"". El País. 26 November 2019.
  124. "Spain revives call for shared control over Gibraltar after Brexit". Reuters. 25 November 2018.
  125. McKee, Martin; Galsworthy, Mike; Stuckler, David; Jarman, Holly; Greer, Scott; Hervey, Tamara; Fahy, Nick (25 February 2019). "How will Brexit affect health services in the UK? An updated evaluation" (PDF). The Lancet. 393 (10174): 949–958. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(19)30425-8. ISSN 0140-6736. PMID 30819519. S2CID 72334219.
  126. Health unions warn no-deal Brexit could cause 'fatal' medicine shortages The Independent. 29 August 2019
  127. The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: Supremacy and the Court of Justice. House of Commons Library, 8 November 2017.
  128. Explanatory notes on the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. The Stationery Office. pp.4, 8
  129. Barnard, Catherine. Where does Brexit leave UK law?. UK in a Changing Europe. 17 April 2019.
  130. Burns, Kevin (11 September 2017). "Legal experts say common law Ireland to be "isolated" within EU after Brexit". Irish Legal News. Retrieved 12 September 2017.
  131. "Irish Government's legal bill "to go up after Brexit"". Irish Legal News. 11 September 2017. Retrieved 12 September 2017.
  132. Managing migration after Brexit. Institute for Government. 8 March 2019.
  133. Factsheet: end of free movement. Home Office. 21 December 2018.
  134. The Immigration Bill: An end to free movement. House of Commons Library. 15 March 2019.
  135. "The post-Brexit immigration plans at a glance". The Guardian. 19 December 2018.
  136. Briefing Paper: EU Settlement Scheme. House of Commons Library. 19 September 2019.
  137. Future skills-based immigration system: executive summary. Home Office. 19 December 2018.
  138. "No-deal Brexit plan: EU nationals could stay three years". BBC News. 4 September 2019.
  139. Forte, Giuseppe; Portes, Jonathan (1 May 2017). "Macroeconomic Determinants of International Migration to the UK". Rochester, NY. SSRN 2979949. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  140. Portes, Jonathan (1 November 2016). "Immigration after Brexit". National Institute Economic Review. 238 (1): R13–R21. doi:10.1177/002795011623800111. ISSN 0027-9501.
  141. Somerville, Will (June 2016). When the Dust Settles: Migration Policy after Brexit. Migration Policy Institute Commentary.
  142. Bennhold, Katrin (21 November 2017). "Where Brexit Hurts: The Nurses and Doctors Leaving London". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 22 November 2017.
  143. Wright, Robert (22 February 2018). "Annual net migration of EU citizens to UK falls below 100,000". Financial Times. Retrieved 13 June 2018.
  144. Siddique, Haroon (12 June 2017). "96% drop in EU nurses registering to work in Britain since Brexit vote". The Guardian. Retrieved 1 November 2017.
  145. Moss, Stephen (5 February 2019). "'The UK no longer feels like home': the British Europhiles racing for EU passports". The Guardian.
  146. Rosenbaum, Martin (30 June 2018). "Surge in Britons getting another EU nationality". BBC News.
  147. "Brexit: New move to keep EU citizenship". BBC News. 18 July 2018.
  148. "Brexit: What effect could leaving the European Union have on football transfers?". BBC Sport. 31 October 2018.
  149. "How Brexit will affect Premier League football |".
  150. "Brexit: quel impact pour la Premier League ?". France 24. 25 March 2019.
  151. "British residents in Spain 'confused and alarmed' about post-Brexit future". the Guardian. 6 March 2020.
  152. "Reportage. Municipales : ces élus que le Brexit prive de leurs droits". Courrier international. 6 March 2020.
  153. Esteves, Solange (13 October 2020). "Brexit. Attention, il faudra bientôt un passeport pour aller au Royaume-Uni". Ouest-France (in French). Retrieved 14 October 2020.
  154. Aviation and the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA). Institute for Government. 10 September 2017.
  155. Air services from the EU to the UK if there is a no-deal Brexit. Government of the United Kingdom. 5 September 2019.
  156. "Flights to and from the UK if there's no Brexit deal". Government of the United Kingdom. 24 September 2018. Retrieved 9 February 2019.
  157. Grayling, Chris (30 November 2018). "Transatlantic flight guarantee as UK and Canada agree new air arrangement". UK Government, Department for Transport. Retrieved 9 February 2019.
  158. "Switzerland and Britain reach post-Brexit aviation deal". 17 December 2018.
  159. International agreements if the UK leaves the EU without a deal: Aviation. Government of the United Kingdom. 18 July 2019.
  160. Martin, Will (3 October 2017). "What brought down Monarch, the UK's biggest ever airline collapse". Business Insider.
  161. Sephton, Connor (17 February 2019). "Flybmi goes into administration - blames 'Brexit uncertainty'". Sky News. Retrieved 7 July 2020.
  162. Segal, David (24 September 2019). "What Killed Thomas Cook, One of the Oldest Names in Travel?". New York Times.
  163. "EU announces plans to keep Channel Tunnel rail link open after no-deal Brexit". Reuters. 12 February 2019.
  164. "Brexit: What are the rules on driving in the EU after transition?". BBC News. 2 January 2021. Retrieved 18 February 2021.
  165. "Visit Europe from 1 January 2021". GOV.UK. Retrieved 29 December 2020.
  166. "International driving permits". GOV.UK. Retrieved 18 February 2021.
  168. "UK to remain in Common Transit Convention after Brexit". GOV.UK.
  169. "UK to remain in Common Transit Convention". 18 December 2018.
  170. "UK to remain in European Common Transit Convention after Brexit", Irish Examiner, 17 December 2018.
  171. "EU-UK RELATIONS: A new relationship, with big changes" (PDF). European Commission. 24 December 2020. Retrieved 18 February 2021.
  172. "UK-EU TRADE AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT: Summary" (PDF). UK Government. December 2020. Retrieved 18 February 2021.
  173. "Getting to Europe Post Brexit – The Impact on Ferry Companies". 23 April 2018.
  174. "Scotland Says New Vote on Independence Is 'Highly Likely'". The New York Times. 25 June 2016.
  175. Simons, Ned (24 January 2016). "Nicola Sturgeon Denies She Has "Machiavellian" Wish For Brexit". The Huffington Post UK. Retrieved 3 February 2016.
  176. "Nicola Sturgeon says Scotland will pursue EU membership after independence". The Independent. 20 March 2017. Retrieved 20 March 2017.
  177. Stewart, Heather (16 March 2017). "Theresa May rejects Nicola Sturgeon's referendum demand". The Guardian. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
  178. "Sturgeon: independent Scotland may need "phased" return to EU". The Guardian. 14 May 2017.
  179. "Whitehall lawyers drawing up plans to challenge Continuity Bill in courts". Herald Scotland. 2018. Retrieved 3 April 2018.
  180. "Forging a new UK-wide agricultural framework post-Brexit". LSE. 2018. Retrieved 3 April 2018.
  181. "European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018". Retrieved 6 August 2019.
  182. "EU Continuity Bill was within competence of Scottish Parliament when it was passed". Holyrood Magazine. 13 December 2018. Retrieved 6 August 2019.
  183. "Why Brexit may be good for terrorists and the Kremlin and bad for European security". The Washington Post. 2018.
  184. McClean, Paul (30 May 2017). "After Brexit: the UK will need to renegotiate at least 759 treaties". Financial Times. Retrieved 31 May 2017. Through analysis of the EU treaty database, the FT found 759 separate EU bilateral agreements with potential relevance to Britain, covering trade in nuclear goods, customs, fisheries, trade, transport and regulatory co-operation in areas such as antitrust or financial services. This includes multilateral agreements based on consensus, where Britain must re-approach 132 separate parties. Around 110 separate opt-in accords at the UN and World Trade Organization are excluded from the estimates, as are narrow agreements on the environment, health, research and science. Some additional UK bilateral deals, outside the EU framework, may also need to be revised because they make reference to EU law. Some of the 759 are so essential that it would be unthinkable to operate without them. Air services agreements allow British aeroplanes to land in America, Canada or Israel; nuclear accords permit the trade in spare parts and fuel for Britain's power stations. Both these sectors are excluded from trade negotiations and must be addressed separately.
  185. "Leaving the EU – Research Paper 13/42" (PDF). House of Commons Library. 1 July 2013. Retrieved 19 May 2015.
  186. "Brexit: What is the Norway model?". BBC News. 30 October 2018.
  187. Andrew Roberts (13 September 2016). "CANZUK: after Brexit, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Britain can unite as a pillar of Western civilisation". The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved 3 September 2018.
  188. James C. Bennett (24 June 2016). "Brexit boosts 'CANZUK' replacement for European Union: Column". Retrieved 3 September 2018.
  189. Scotti, Monique (21 January 2018). "Push for free movement of Canadians, Kiwis, Britons and Australians gains momentum". Retrieved 3 September 2018.
  190. "Post-imperial nostalgia: Brexit and the Empire". Daily Times. 8 March 2017. Retrieved 3 September 2018.
  191. "Brexit, CANZUK, and the Legacy of Empire". The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 2019. Retrieved 14 January 2019.
  192. Krugman, Paul (10 July 2018). "Opinion | Brexit Meets Gravity". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 14 January 2019.
  193. 21 August; 2018|#LSEThinks; Brexit, Economics of; Comments, Featured|7 (21 August 2018). "Long read: Can Brexit defy gravity? It is still much cheaper to trade with neighbouring countries". LSE BREXIT. Retrieved 14 January 2019.
  194. Sampson, Thomas; Dhingra, Swati; Ottaviano, Gianmarco; Reenen, John Van (2 June 2016). "How 'Economists for Brexit' manage to defy the laws of gravity". Retrieved 14 January 2019.
  195. "Johnson Walks Tightrope at G7, as Trump Pledges ‘Very Big Trade Deal’ for U.K." The New York Times. 25 August 2019.
  196. "Canada, U.K. strike transitional post-Brexit trade deal | CBC News". CBC. Retrieved 22 November 2020.
  197. "Australia raises doubts over post-Brexit plans for EU food import quotas". The Guardian. 25 November 2017.