Definition

Koenkai (後援会) are Japanese political support groups centered on individual politicians that emerged in the post-war period.^[1] In their most basic form, koenkai serve two functions. First and most importantly, they act as a vote mobilization machine that supports the politician for whom the koenkai was established.^[2] Throughout time, the vote-gathering role played by koenkai has been substantial and consistent, especially for the LDP.^[3][4] From 1972 to 2003, people who identified themselves with koenkai were found to be 10% more likely to vote in comparison to people who did not.^[2] LDP and DSP politicians ranked koenkai as the most common mean of gathering vote. For the Japan Socialist Party, it was the second most important.^[5] From 1972 to 2003, people who identified themselves with koenkai were 10% more likely to vote than people who did not.^[2] Secondly, koenkai also helped to channel supporters' wishes and expectations to the party candidate, who would respond accordingly in exchange for votes.

Koenkai are, however, not party political support groups. The individual element implies that the identity of the group is structured upon the candidate's qualities, qualifications, and values. Therefore, members are often introduced to koenkai because of personal connections with the politician, instead of aligning themselves with the ideology of any particular party.^[6] At the same time, this allows for the possibility that members of a candidate's koenkai might cast their vote for a politician of a different party. This happened before with the case of Toshiki koenkai, who despite being a conservative politician, was able to win 80% of the vote of CGP (Komeito) supporters in the 2000 election.^[2]

Structure

Koenkai are organized in terms of three factors: location, personal link to a politician, and function (activities, interests, etc.). The first two factors prove to be immensely important, and they are often utilized when a koenkai is first established. Several interviews with politicians who have their own support group in Krauss's Rise and Fall of Japan LDP (2011) point to the fact that politicians usually start out from the region where they live and with the people who they know, e.g. former classmates, family members or colleagues. From that point, it is common for these groups to extend in concentric circles.^[7]

Koenkai also display some consistent characteristics. First of all, koenkai are permanent formal-membership organizations. A certain fee, usually of an insignificant amount, is collected upon entrance and a membership card or an equivalent is distributed. Koenkai differ from campaign organization, since activities are held all year round and not limited to election season.^[2] Koenkai are better understood as consisting of a network of smaller groups whose interests are tied to one candidate, rather than being a singular, ideologically coherent organization, even though there might exist a headquarter or coordinator group. In an interview in 2002, one candidate stated that he had about 300 smaller koenkai organizations.^[2] Some of the commonly observed groups are: the local koenkai (chiiki koenkai), the women's clubs, the enterprise group (taxi drivers, restaurant owners, barbers, etc.), manager-rank supporters, hobby clubs and the elderly club.^[8][5][9] At any rate, these groups' interests might overlap, and their embodiment was the candidate representing the koenkai.

During the 1980s, the number of people who identified themselves as members of koenkai accounts for 15-18% of the whole electorate. Members of the medium-sized and rural areas were the majority, with farmers, shopkeepers and manufacturers forming the core of parties like LDP. "Floating" voters in urban areas were equally desirable, but their resistance to political enticement was higher due to their volatility.^[10] Between 1972 and 2003, more men were shown to be associated with koenkai than women. Even though women membership reached an all-time high in 1993, their participation dropped to just 80% that of men by 2003.^[5] Koenkai members also tend to belong to older age groups. People in their twenties are the least likely to join koenkai, while those over fifty are found to be more likely.

Activities

Finance

The money that is necessary for financing koenkai is provided to politicians by their political factions.^[2] This became increasingly important as regulations regarding funding for koenkai were tightened in 1999, further preventing companies and labour unions from providing financial support to koenkai.^[4] Nonetheless, koenkai are exorbitant machines to be maintained. In 1996, PR-only candidates' most substantial expenditures were on koenkai, accounting for 38% of total campaign spending. 10 young LDP Diet members revealed their spending account in 1989 and the sum reserved for koenkai equals 18.9 million yen a year.^[10] This figure abated over time, to a more modest 20% in 2003.^[4] Nonetheless, the actual amount of money spent on personal support groups suggests a considerable sum of money. It is estimated that in the 1980s, the annual cost of running a koenkai approximated US$1 million per year.^[11] Another study conducted in 1975 proposed the sum of US$500.000 for a modest koenkai, in contrast to 700.000-1 million USD for more expensive ones.^[12]

A large part of this money goes to organizing various activities, especially non-political ones. 15-20% of the designated funds are channeled to different activities held all year round, while another 15-20% are contributed to weddings and funerals.^[8] Politicians are expected to make a gift of no less than 50,000 yen for weddings and 20,000 yen for funerals.^[10] The membership fee collected at the beginning is barely sufficient for financing these projects, and members are often said to be more than reimbursed because their meager financial contribution is awarded with "trips to hot springs, sightseeing tours of the Diet building, records, fans, towels and souvenirs".^[1] With a 1000 yen entrance fee, a councilman from Fukuoka Chuoku took his koenkai members on a cruise around the city's bay "to contemplate the moon in the summer" (outsukiyukai), listen to jazz, enjoy prepared lunch boxes and play bingo. He also distributed free T-shirts.^[10]

Urban village explanation

This theory supposes that the emergence of koenkai was a response to the incredible economic growth and societal changes that Japan experienced after 1955. The underlying assumption is that Japanese society was characterized by a strong sense of the collective, and evidence has suggested that this sentiment persists well into modernity. The case of Yokohama prefecture showed that despite rapid urbanization which has led to former villages being merged into new districts in the 1990s, the support for Conservative politicians still aligned along the former village's boundaries.^[14]

In the past, Japanese people organized their lives around communal farming activities, such as water and tool management.^[15] However, the country's economic prosperity destabilized the usual links by which people related to each other, and koenkai was conjured up as a replacement. As has been discussed previously, koenkai's leaders usually start out with their immediate circle of relatives and friends, and the area where they live is to be the first target of the vote-gathering campaign. From this perspective, the urban village explanation offers a striking insight into the existence of koenkai, as it can be seen that the family, close relations and the villages have served as the core value of Japanese lives throughout history. After 1955 we saw its transformation into becoming a more political entity.^[16]

This theory is further supported by evidence showing that the chonankai – the neighbourhood associations existing in many regions in Japan – support local politicians and their koenkai in favorable terms.^[14] Composed of households of respective areas, chonankai are official types of organizations under the supervision of the government for promoting apolitical activities related to culture, welfare, sports and the likes. Nonetheless, it is suggested that there is a close relationship between koenkai and chonankai heads. In fact, many politicians were chonankai heads in the past, or held an assembly seat at the time.  This results in the fact that koenkai's leaders may receive support from neighbourhood association via different channels, and this ultimately affects the residents' consent, to a significant degree, of chonankai endorsing a candidate.^[14]

Electoral explanation

This other line of reasoning views the existence of koenkai from a purely political sense. In general, this theory expounds that the rise of koenkai can be attributed to the peculiarity of the Japanese voting system. Between 1947 and 1993, Japan's electoral system was based upon the single non-transferable vote (SNTV).^[5] Under this system, a party was able to send many of its members to a single constituency. If a party wanted to secure the majority in that district, the votes would have to be spread out evenly among its politicians from that region.^[2] Any politician receiving an excessive number of votes risked the under-performance of others. Thus, this created a problem for the local party branches, which were in charge of managing candidates' campaigns. The solution was to leave politicians gathering votes on their own devices, since the competition between candidates would encourage them to seek for more support, and the result would be an optimized chance of most politicians winning seats in that district. Because of such changes in campaign regulations, politicians started establishing their own support groups – or koenkai.

Secondly, between 1947 and 1986, the minimum amount of vote required to win a seat in the constituency, calculated in terms of overall vote percentage, was 8%. As it became possible to win the election with a small number of vote, campaign strategy altered from appealing to a vast base of voters, to concentrating on securing firm and loyal support from citizens and cooperation. Among these groups, agriculture co-op and construction companies tended to provide the most significant boost in votes.^[9]

Other restrictions made to campaign protocol were highly relevant. Firstly, the period of campaigning was shortened to no more than 12 days. Consequently, politicians were only allowed to appeal to the public during these short periods.^[10] Nonetheless, activities that were non-political were tolerated, and therefore, koenkai were created to attract supporters at times other than the permitted 12 days. Candidates were allowed to have only one office, and one campaign car with a public address system. Campaign materials were strictly rationed, for example, 35,000 postcards and 60-100,000 handbills were the maximum that can be utilized. This number equals only 1/7 of the average constituency.^[5] All the while, politicians were strictly banned from using media platforms to reach the public. Even though limited appearances in newspapers or on TV was accepted, politicians found themselves being forced to seek other vehicles of support, and koenkai were thought of as the perfect solution.

Historical institutionalist explanation

The Historical Institutionalist perspective tries to bring more nuances into the development of koenkai. According to Matthew Carlson, "In the historical institutionalism approach ... structure and history are deemed to be the most significant determinant in creating or modifying institutions".^[17] Therefore, the timeline relevant to the history of koenkai is traced to figure out the factors on a macro-scale.^[2] A few of such variables can be named in the case of koenkai, including the merger of LDP at a koenkai's early development stage, contemporary institutions such as factions, and positive returns that reinforce the base of koenkai over time.^[2] Therefore, this theory can even be extended to include the previous two explanations (Urban Village and Electoral) as factors that shape the course of koenkai throughout development.

Kakuei Tanaka

The koenkai of Kakuei Tanaka (田中角栄 4 May 1918 – 16 December 1993)– Prime Minister of Japan from 1972 to 1974 – has been recognised as the one that boasted the most far-reaching influence of its kind in Japanese political history.^[18] Tanaka's Etsuzankai - literally translated into "cross the mountains of Niigata to get to Tokyo"^[19] – was based in the Third District of his hometown –Niigata Prefecture. By the 1970s, the number of people associating with Etsuzankai reached an all-time high of 98,000 members, accounting for approximately 20% of Niigata's eligible voters. Among these were very powerful figures, including the 26 out of 33 mayors of Niigata's separate municipalities, and half the number of city councils and prefectural legislature officials. The organization also ran its own publication, called the Monthly Etsuzan, whose circulation was over 50,000.^[20]

Etsuzankai was founded on June 28, 1953 in Kamo village, with the help of Seiji Tanako, Jiro Kikuta and Seihei Watanabe. One year before that, Tanaka gained a reputation among people in the northern region of Niigata almost over-night, thanks to a railway construction bestowed to the villagers. People living in other municipalities of Niigata quickly joined his koenkai and provided him with ardent support in expectance of favourable treatment in return. Tanaka was able to seize upon the opportunities and turn that into a major source of support for his political activities.

Etsuzankai financed its own structure, first and foremost, with funds from Tanaka's Tokyo-based business and political acquaintances. For example, one of Tanaka's friend – Kenji Osano – was an annual donor of 24 million yen. However, more importantly, Etsuzankai's tendency to initiate construction works attracted several firms who wished to secure construction bids. After 1965, it became common that Tanaka in return would receive 0.02% to 0.03% of a whole project expenditure as 'thank you money'. This money was then spent upon organizing activities for its members at an immense scale.^[19] It is said that Tanaka once held a trip for 11,000 people to go to a hot spring at Nukumi in Yamagata Prefecture at the cost of US$1.4 million.^[21] Etsuzankai was famed for one of its specialties, called the "pilgrimage to Meijro". This was a 3 days and 2 nights trip for members to spend time leisurely bathing and eating in Tokyo, touring the Diet building and Imperial Palace, watching musical at Asakusa and occasionally going to resorts at Enoshima, Atami and Izu.^[22] Other activities including contests, sing-a-longs and picnics.^[19]

At the same time, its financial prosperity allowed Etsuzankai to become a political organization with overwhelming power. The money that was given out at events like the births, marriages, funerals of its members subtly manipulated, suffocated or directed opinions in Niigata.^[19] In addition to that, Etsuzenkai's influence transcended party boundaries. While controlling the local LDP, the group also facilitated the election of a socialist mayor in one of Niigata's municipalities. The Asahi reported in the mid-1970s that the Etsuzankai "virtually controls… agricultural committees, popular welfare committees, election management committees". This thorough penetration of Tanaka's koenkai into all important facets of Niigata's people's lives propelled him into becoming the father figure of the district. After his arrest in 1976 on corruption charges, many of Niigata's residents still expressed deep respect towards him. By 1983, many years after the scandal, 75% of the people in Niigata maintained that the prefecture had benefited from Tanaka's leadership, while another 65% thought that he was indispensable to their future welfare.^[20]

Aichi Kiichi

Aichi Kiichi (愛知 揆一 10 October 1907 – 23 November 1973) served as Japan's vice minister of Ministry of Finance in 1953 and won a Lower House seat for Miyagi First District in 1955.^[23] He had also spent some time as a high-ranking officer in the Ministry of Justice, Home Affairs, International Trade & Industry as well as the Ministry of Education. The New York Times claims Aichi Kiichi was one of the key figures who "helped … Japan through her trying but economically triumphant postwar period".^[24]

Winning a seat in the Lower House was particularly challenging. Thus, Aichi's secretary, Muto Yoichi, and Aichi's wife found the need of initiating a strong support group – or koenkai - for Aichi. In the summer of 1955, a series of talk sessions in the morning, speeches in the afternoon and dinner and alcohol at night were held for 45 days on end to gather interests from the people. Former classmates of Aichi in High School were elected to leaders of local koenkai, as youth groups, women's political groups and women's support groups were established. At the same time, taking advantage of being vice minister of MOF, Aichi started mobilizing for financial support from local financial institutions in Tokyo, including Shichijushishi Bank and Tokuyo Bank.^[23]

As the numbers of staff and volunteers for Aichi-kai increased, gatherings at local levels were held at a more frequent rate, sometimes up to 10 times a day. Aichi's koenkai activities were highlighted with more festivity at times, when a bicycle parade or gathering of 10,000 people in Sendai (Miyagi Prefecture's biggest city) would be organized.^[23]

 However, the case of Aichi Kiichi's koenkai gives evidence to what has been contended as a tradition of Japanese politics: hereditary politics.^[25][26] After Aichi's death in 1973, his son-in-law Aichi Kazuo (愛知 和男, born 20 July 1937) succeeded the organization that has been developed by his father. Despite the initial faltering and disintegration, Kazuo was able to gather more votes than his father-in-law in his day, using the existing organization. Aichi-kai's influence over rural agriculture co-ops, or nokyo, small businesses associations of barbers, public baths, and restaurants remained significant. These were people who started out supporting his father, and their sense of loyalty was then dedicated to Achi's son-in-law. Supporters saw him as a respectable "family man", who went to elite school (Hibiya High School and Tokyo University) and who had a "charming wife and good children".^[23]

However, necessary changes to Aichi-kai were made to adapt to the new urban landscape of Sendai. First of all, the hierarchical element in structuring koenkai was abandoned and replaced with several sub-organizations of different sizes existing on equal terms. More importantly, the theme that dominated Aichi-kai's activities was no longer drinking, singing and small talk, but instead it was a more urban-type, friendly relationship between the candidate and supporters. Finally, the two-way function that traditionally defined koenkai did not apply to Kazuo's support group. Membership of the new Aichi-kai was seen as something desired, and people did not participate simply in exchange for benefits.^[23]

As a result, shortly before the electoral reforms in 1994, Kazuo's koenkai boasted between 170,000 and 180,000 members. 2/3 of this figure was transformed into actual votes for Aichi Kazuo.^[23]

Takeshita Noboru

Takeshita Noboru (竹下 登, 26 February 1924 – 19 June 2000) was an LDP career politician and the 74th Prime Minister of Japan between 1987 and 1989. Throughout his life in politics, Takeshita was known for the large behind-the-scenes influence he held over Japanese politics, leading to him being informally bestowed the mantle of the ‘last shadow shogun'.^[27] Takeshita's political base was founded in Shimane Prefecture, where he held a seat in the House of Representatives between 1958 and 2000. In total, Takeshita was consecutively re-elected to this seat fourteen times.

Over his political life, Takeshita established a large koenkai, which was primarily made-up of local business owners and local government workers, both of which contributed to strength of his local support group. Due to the huge support Takeshita enjoyed as a result of his koenkai, his electoral district in Shimane came to be known as ‘Takeshita Kingdom'.^[28] Despite being embroiled in many political scandals, related to insider trading and corruption (for which he was never charged), Takeshita's immense local support never waned. In return for this unwavering support, Takeshita dedicated much of his time and effort to developing his local constituency. As a result, under Takeshita's watch, his Shimane constituency was host to many "excessively huge public works projects", and throughout the 1990s Takeshita's electoral district received the highest amount of public investment per capita in the whole of Japan.

Takeshita's health declined considerably in early 2000, leading to him stepping down from his role in Shimane.^[29] He died two months later, just two days before the 2000 general election at which he had initially intended to run for an unprecedented 15th time.^[30]

Suzuki Zenko

Suzuki Zenkō (鈴木 善幸, 11 January 1911 – 19 July 2004) was an influential Japanese politician for the LDP. He served as the 44th Prime Minister of Japan from 17 July 1980 to 27 November 1982. He was a member of the LDP from its establishment in 1955 until his death in 2004. Suzuki was elected to his seat in Iwate Prefecture on 12 consecutive occasions until his retirement from politics in 1990.^[31]

During his time in politics, Suzuki formed a substantial koenkai in his home district. Partly in thanks to the large influence which Suzuki acquired through the various high-ranking positions he held in government, during his time in politics his electoral district received many subsidies from the government, allowing economic development to flourish in the region. Suzuki's contributions to the area are considered to be particularly responsible for the development of fisheries in the area. One notable example of the benefits Suzuki returned to his support groups in Iwate is that of Shimanokoshi, a small hamlet on the Iwate coast. The hamlet received enough subsidies for economic development, that it in the 1960s it became the first designated "fourth class fishing port" on the whole coast.^[32] Another notable beneficiary of Suzuki's work was in the town of Tanohata, whose mayor was also a member of Suzuki's koenaki (despite he himself not being a member of the LDP). During the time in which Suzuki held his seat, the town saw a rapid development of its agricultural (particularly in regards to dairy farming) and road infrastructures.^[32]

Suzuki continued to enjoy considerable support from his koenkai until his retirement in 1990. He died in 2004. Suzuki's son, Suzuki Shunichi (鈴木 俊一), now also represents the LDP in the Lower House, holding the same Iwate seat as his father.^[33]

Yukio Hatoyama

In 2009, the then DPJ Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama was engulfed in a funding scandal, which was partly a result of the huge expenses needed to run koenkai.^[39] Hatoyama's premiership was placed under large pressure when it emerged that he had received large sums of undeclared political donations. Most famously, it emerged that Hatoyama's mother, Yasuko, heiress to Bridgestone Tyres Co., had contributed ¥900 million in undeclared donations between 2004 and 2008.^[40] Whilst Hatoyama survived the scandal and remained in office, his credibility was left damaged by the scandal.

Ichirō Ozawa

In 2009, the DPJ president Ichirō Ozawa was forced to resign as party leader after becoming embroiled in a fundraising scandal,^[41] related to the alleged false reporting of land purchases and loans to his koenkai made between 2004 and 2005.^[42] Whilst Ozawa denied any involvement from him or his funding group,^[43] two of his aides were formally convicted and jailed for their involvement in the scandal.^[44] In 2011, Ozawa went on trial in Tokyo and was charged with breaking political fundraising laws.^[45] However, in April 2012, Ozawa was formally acquitted.

Recruit scandal

The Recruit scandal was an insider-trading and corruption scandal which engulfed the LDP government in 1988. It emerged that the Tokyo-based company Recruit Holdings Co., Ltd. had been making donations to the koenkai of prominent LDP politicians, many of whom had also bought shares in the company. Amongst those caught up in the scandal was former LDP Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. It emerged that Recruit had donated 112 million yen to Nakasone's koenakai throughout the 1980s, whilst his aides had purchased 29,000 shares in Recruit in 1984.^[46]

Italy

Christian Democracy (Italian: Democrazia Italiana, DC) was a Christian democratic centrist political party in Italy. It employed clientelism as a means to cement the party's domination of Italian politics across a 50-year span from 1944 to 1994. Similar to the tactics found in Japanese koenkai, they used clientelistic policies in order to gain support and insight into public opinion, which then influenced public policies.^[47]

Mexico

The centrist Mexican political party Institutional Revolutionary Party (Spanish: Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) has in the past employed clientelistic tactics, similar to those found in Japan. During the party's rule of Mexico from 1929 to 2000, the party established a network of local civil and political organisations which were loyal to the party. Through this, political powers and benefits, and state resources were predominantly directed to regions in which the party had large support bases.^[48]