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Relationship to Constitutions
Limited government is closely associated with constitutions; the United States Constitution of 1789 and the French Constitution of 1793 were both enacted in an effort to reaffirm limited government, although in different ways. The U.S. Constitution achieved limited government through a separation of powers: "horizontal" separation of powers distributed power among branches of government (the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary, each of which provide a check on the powers of the other); "vertical" separation of powers (federalism) divided power between the federal government and the state government). James Madison, one of the authors of the Federalist Papers, noted that the Framers of the American Constitution sought to create a government that was capable of both being controlled and of exercising control. Madison wrote in Federalist No. 51 that "the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others."
The 1793 French Constitution, on the other hand, enshrined legislative supremacy and was based on the idea (influenced by Rousseau), that limited government was best reached through a "rational democratic self-government seeking to give expression to the general will ... as the optimal antidote to the arbitrary rule of absolute monarchy."
Magna Carta and the U.S. Constitution also represent important milestones in the limiting of governmental power. The earliest use of the term limited government dates back to King James VI and I in the late 16th century. Scholar Steven Skultety argues that although Aristotle never developed principles and tactics of constitutionalism, Aristotle's political philosophy in some ways anticipated the idea of limited government, primarily as a tool for limiting civic distrust and enhancing stability.
Scholar Jennifer Nedelsky argues that the American conception of limited government changed during the period 1787 and 1830 and was based on a number of different strains of thought, but was primarily based on the Federalist perspective, which emphasized private property.
Amy Gutmann notes that negative liberalism, positive liberalism, and democratic liberalism all advance different conceptions of the proper limits to government. Gutmann connects the first two categories to Isaiah Berlin's notions of negative liberty and positive liberty, respectively. Gutmann defends the third category, democratic liberalism, writing that under this view, "a liberal government should be no more nor less limited than is needed, first, to secure basic liberties and opportunities for all individuals, and second to respect the outcomes of fair democratic procedures as long as they are consistent to the constitutional constraints of securing basic liberties and opportunities for all."
- Amy Gutmann, "How Limited Is Liberal Government" in Liberalism Without Illusions: Essays on Liberal Theory and the Political Vision of Judith N. Shklar (University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 64-65.
- Michel Rosenfeld, "Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay Between Identity and Diversity" in Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives (ed. Michel Rosenfeld: Duke University Press, 1994) pp. 11-12.
- John Samples, "Introduction" in James Madison and the Future of Limited Government (Cato Institute, 2002), p. 1.
- Madison, James. Federalist No. 51. p. 268.
- "limited government". Oxford Dictionaries. Oxford University Press. Retrieved June 27, 2016.
- Steven Skultety, Conflict in Aristotle's Political Philosophy (State University of New York Press, 2019), pp. 160-61.
- Cima, Lawrence R.; Cotter, Patrick S. (1985). "The Coherence of the Concept of Limited Government". Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. 4 (2): 266. doi:10.2307/3324630. JSTOR 3324630.
- Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and It's Legacy (University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 3-4.