William Cranch

Starting with the 5th volume of U.S. Reports, the Reporter of Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States was William Cranch. Cranch was Reporter of Decisions from 1801 to 1815, covering volumes 5 through 13 of United States Reports which correspond to volumes 1 through 9 of his Cranch's Reports. As such, the dual form of citation to, for example, Wells v. United States is 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 22 (1812).

United States v. Hudson

In United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812), the Court held that Congress must first enact a constitutional law criminalizing an activity, attach a penalty, and give the federal courts jurisdiction over the offense for a federal court to render a conviction.

The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon

In The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), the Court considered the jurisdiction of federal courts over a claim against a friendly foreign military vessel visiting an American port. The court interpreted customary international law to determine that there was no federal jurisdiction.

Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee

Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813), was a case arising out of the acquisition of land in Virginia. For the Court, Justice Joseph Story refused to accept as final the Virginia Court of Appeals' interpretation of Virginia law. He found that precedents in Virginia law itself upheld the titles in question. Story's decision to "look into" Virginia law was a vital step in securing federal supremacy. Otherwise, the federal courts could be effectively blocked, by a state court's decision, from addressing a federal question — in this case a British national's rights under treaties with Britain.^[3]

Queen v. Hepburn

Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290 (1813), was a case in which a Maryland slave sued for her freedom. In support of her claim, her attorney offered several depositions containing testimony favorable to her. Chief Justice Marshall, who was a slave-owner, affirmed the lower court's judgment against the woman on the basis that the deposition statements were hearsay, and so were properly excluded from evidence. Dissenting, Justice Gabriel Duvall of Maryland, although also a slave-owner, pointed out that under Maryland law certain hearsay can legitimately be admitted to establish land boundaries, and that hearsay in cases involving freedom should be admitted as well.

Duvall wrote:

"It appears to me that the reason for admitting hearsay evidence upon a question of freedom is much stronger than in cases of . . . the boundaries of land. It will be universally admitted that the right to freedom is more important than the right of property. And people of color from their helpless condition under the uncontrolled authority of a master, are entitled to all reasonable protection. A decision that hearsay evidence in such cases shall not be admitted, cuts up by the roots all claims of the kind, and puts a final end to them, unless the claim should arise from a fact of recent date, and such a case will seldom, perhaps never, occur."^[4]