Meroni_doctrine

<i>Meroni</i> doctrine

Meroni doctrine

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In European Union (EU) law, the Meroni doctrine, which arose from cases C-9/56 and C-10/56 (Meroni v High Authority [1957/1958] ECR 133), relates to the extent to which EU institutions may delegate their tasks to regulatory agencies.[1] The doctrine is controversial,[1] notably because it would be anachronistic in view of the growing complexity of EU competences.[2]

In the view of some,[3][4] the Meroni doctrine no longer holds since the 2014 European Court of Justice judgement in the UK v Parliament and Council case on the Short Selling Regulation, where the Court upheld most of the provisions that were delegated to the European Securities and Markets Authority by the co-legislators.

References

  1. [1]
    Lelieveldt, Herman; Princen, Sebastiaan (2011). The Politics of the European Union. Cambridge University Press. p. 271. ISBN 978-1139498395.
  2. [2]
    Hatzopoulos, Vassilis (2012). Regulating Services in the European Union. Oxford University Press. p. 325. ISBN 978-0199572663.
  3. [3]
    van Rijsbergen, Marloes & Scholten, Mira. (2014). The ESMA-Short Selling Case: Erecting a New Delegation Doctrine in the EU upon the Meroni-Romano Remnants. Legal Issues of Economic Integration. 41. 389–406.
  4. [4]
    "The legal limits to 'agencification' in the EU? Case C-270/12 UK v Parliament and Council". 27 January 2014.
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