The tenentist cause

Tenentes or lieutenants and senior officers of the Brazilian Army, veterans of the 1922 Copacabana Fort revolt, were the initial nucleus of subsequent revolts, including the one in São Paulo in 1924.^[8][9][10] The participation of the same individuals continued from one revolt to another,^[11][12] despite new supporters and agendas in the 1924 revolt.^[13] The rebellion also encompassed lower ranks of the army,^[14] military personnel from the Public Force of São Paulo, and civilians.^[15] The historiography addresses the lieutenants as representatives of certain sectors of society (dissident oligarchies, middle classes) and also as a result of the internal dynamics of the army.^[16] More concerned with military honor in 1922, two years later the lieutenants had already developed a political vision beyond institutional issues.^[17]

These rebels or revolutionaries are more easily defined by what they were against than what they were for.^[8] The 1922 revolt wanted to prevent Artur Bernardes from taking office as President of Brazil; when this failed, the 1924 one wanted him out of office.^[12] The issue was not so much the president himself, but what he represented:^[18][19] the hegemony of the agrarian oligarchies of São Paulo and Minas Gerais in Brazil's politics (the "coffee with milk" policy), the power of local coronelism, electoral fraud, corruption, cronyism and favoritism in public affairs, characteristics of politics in the Old Republic.^[8][20]

They were outraged by what they called Artur Bernardes' "spirit of revenge", who persecuted members of the Republican Reaction, the coalition that faced him in the 1922 election.^[8][21] The president submitted Rio de Janeiro and Bahia to federal intervention and, in Rio Grande do Sul, prevented the re-election of Borges de Medeiros as part of the Pact of Pedras Altas, which concluded the 1923 revolution. The government had an authoritarian tendency, starting the term under a state of emergency and renewing it until December 1923.^[22][23] The 1922 rebels were subjected to a rigorous and arbitrary trial.^[24]

Unlike two years earlier, the rebels of 1924 made sure to expose some proposals for the new regime in manifestos and flyers. Their ambition was the "Republic that was not", the return to an ideal that would have existed in the Proclamation of the Brazilian Republic.^[25][26][27] To do so, they would break the dominance of the oligarchies over the electorate. The third manifesto published during the revolt^{[lower-alpha 5]} advocated a reform of the Judiciary branch, giving it independence from the Executive; public education; and secret ballot with census suffrage. The goal was to eradicate illiteracy, but while that was not possible, voting would be limited to the most enlightened.^[28]

This idea was taken further in an unpublished draft,^{[lower-alpha 6]} proposing a "dictatorship" until 60% of the population was literate, and then a Constituent Assembly would be convened. This document does not necessarily represent the rebels' general opinion, but it demonstrates the influence of some authoritarian thinkers of the period, such as Oliveira Viana, for whom a strong State would be necessary to prepare the population for liberalism. Other conspirators thought of corporatism.^[29][28] There were a variety of reforms in mind, but they did not form a cohesive project.^[30] Not all participants were ideologically motivated; for some, what was important was their personal commitments, economic demands^[31][32][33] or dissatisfaction with their military career.^[8]

The choice for armed struggle

It is not known for certain when conspiracies for a second lieutenant revolt began, but in August 1922 there were already conspiracies in Rio de Janeiro, and in the same period, in Itu, in São Paulo.^[34] The atmosphere was tense and rumors circulated of further uprisings.^[35] Some rebel officers of 1922 considered the matter closed, and others, although not satisfied, were waiting for the results of the judicial trial. Meanwhile, in 1923 the revolution in Rio Grande do Sul and the reopening of the Military Club rekindled political-military discussions.^[35] Many rebels awaited their sentence away from Rio de Janeiro, in conditions to join the conspiracy.^[36]

In December 1923, Justice ruled, framing the 1922 rebels in Article 107 of the Penal Code ("to change by violent means the political Constitution of the Republic or the established form of government"). Until then, there was an expectation of amnesty;^[37] this procedure was traditional in previous military revolts. Precisely for this reason, the government wanted to discourage new revolts. The government's refusal to grant amnesty was seen as yet another vindictive move.^[38][39]

Of the 50 indicted officers, 22 were already in prison and 17, disappointed, turned themselves in. The other 11 were deserters, notably captains Joaquim Távora, Juarez Távora and Otávio Muniz Guimarães and lieutenants Vitor César da Cunha Cruz, Stênio Caio de Albuquerque Lima, Ricardo Henrique Holl and Eduardo Gomes.^[40] These and other imprisoned, exiled, or clandestine officers formed a core of professional revolutionaries, for whom armed struggle seemed the only remaining option.^[36] A new rebellion would need to be more sophisticated than the previous one, without the improvisation and simple barracks revolts.^[41] The final objective remained the seizure of power in Rio de Janeiro.^[42]

In the last months of 1923, some plotters were already sounding the possibility of an uprising in the south.^[40] In December, a plan to arrest War Minister Setembrino de Carvalho on his way through Ponta Grossa, Paraná, was discovered by the authorities.^[43] The government was already expecting a revolt, though not particularly in São Paulo.^[44] To dismantle the conspiracy, officers were arrested or transferred from garrison,^[45] which was to some extent counterproductive, spreading uprisings to distant regions.^[10][46] To demonstrate its strength, the government often placed troops at the ready, preventing officers from leaving their posts.^[35]

The choice for São Paulo

The rebellion intended by the conspirators would have a nationwide dimension, culminating in Rio de Janeiro. The starting point, São Paulo, was the circumstantial result of military planning. Therefore, the 1924 movement was not a São Paulo revolt.^[8][47] The initiative belonged to outsiders,^[48] and they cared little about São Paulo's political disputes.^[49]

In Rio, the largest military center in the country,^[50] surveillance and denunciation were constant, preventing it from being the starting point.^[51] The capital's political police, represented by the 4th Auxiliary Police Station, was well articulated, and the Chief of Police was marshal Carneiro da Fontoura, chosen by Artur Bernardes in place of the traditional law graduates.^[45] In contrast, the police apparatus was weaker in São Paulo, where the state government relied heavily on its Public Force, at the time stronger than the federal army garrison in the state. The possibility of taking the Public Force into rebellion was a decisive factor in the choice for São Paulo.^[52] The number of supporters in the army and in the Public Force, and the correlation of military strength seemed favorable.^[53]

The rapid growth of São Paulo made it difficult to identify conspirators and fugitives.^[54][55] The approximately 700,000 inhabitants in 1924 were ten times the 65,000 present in 1890.^[56][57] The city was the capital of the richest state in the country, the center of commercial and banking activities related to coffee.^[58] Initially linked to coffee growing, the accelerated industrialization attracted many immigrants, to the point that foreigners and their descendants represented more than half of the local population.^[59] Urbanism and architecture imitated European metropolises, while poor neighborhoods sprawled unplanned on the periphery.^[60]

São Paulo had the best railroad connections in the country, through which Rio de Janeiro, then the federal capital, could be reached in a few hours. Its fall would have immense national repercussions,^[8] cutting off the strong arm of the federal government and the coffee with milk policy, and guaranteeing the rebellion "enormous military, economic and political resources".^[55][61]

In state politics, dominated by the Paulista Republican Party (PRP), the moment was delicate. Governor Washington Luís had forced Carlos de Campos as his successor, to the detriment of senator Álvaro de Carvalho, generating discontent. The artificial rise in the price of coffee, which caused an increase in the cost of living, led to workers' strikes demanding wage adjustments.^[51][62] Since the 1917 general strike, the so-called "social question" was a major concern.^[58]

Conspiracy network

The clandestine conspirators worked in civilian jobs, under false identities.^{[lower-alpha 7]} To enlist new allies, including officers on active duty, they resorted to their relatives and contacts built up in the Military School of Realengo and in the barracks, prisons and neighborhoods.^[15] It was normal for the rebels to be colleagues at the Military School, and many others met each other when arrested.^[63] Leaders traveled to barracks across most of the South and Southeast to drum up support.^[64][65][66] The revolutionary central committee had a plan to enlist officers, which in the case of São Paulo began to be implemented in August 1923.^[67] The conspirators arrested in Rio de Janeiro were given considerable freedom and corresponded with their comrades in São Paulo.^[68]

Meetings were held in the barracks themselves or in private homes;^[67] festivities also provided cover for contacts.^[32] In São Paulo, the house of lieutenant Custódio de Oliveira on Vauthier Street, in Pari, served as the "Revolutionary HQ". Joaquim Távora lived there illegally, considered by João Alberto Lins de Barros as the "flag, brain and soul of the movement in its initial phase". The meetings were attended, among others, by major Cabral Velho, inspector of the 6th Infantry Regiment, from Caçapava, captain Newton Estillac Leal, head of war material for the 2nd Military Region, and lieutenants Asdrúbal Gwyer de Azevedo and Luís Cordeiro de Castro Afilhado, from the 4th Battalion of Caçadores.^[69]

Other articulations took place in Travessa da Fábrica, in Sé, the residence of the deserters Henrique Ricardo Holl and Victor César da Cunha Cruz.^[70] A barracks of intense activity was the 4th Regiment of Mounted Artillery (RAM), from Itu, commanded by major Bertoldo Klinger, an officer of great prestige, who even agreed to assume a role in the revolutionary general staff.^[32] On 23 December 1923, his superior, general Abílio de Noronha, from the 2nd Military Region, questioned the news of a secret meeting in the barracks; in response, it was assured that all officers were dispersed for the Christmas and New Year holidays.^[71] The general, out of exemption, did not want to pursue fugitive officers living clandestinely within his jurisdiction.^[72]

Since 1922, tenentism had already influenced the officers of the Public Force, who added their own guidelines to the movement, such as the equalization of salaries with that of army officers. The great asset of the conspirators in São Paulo was the support of major Miguel Costa, inspector of the Cavalry Regiment of the Public Force. Costa provided blueprints for barracks and public buildings, taking an active part in planning the occupation of the city.^[73]

To lead the revolt, the prestige of an older officer was needed; this role was played by marshal Hermes da Fonseca in 1922.^[74] Due to the post-1922 purges, the high-ranking officer corps on active duty no longer had rebellion sympathizers. The person found was a retired officer, general Isidoro Dias Lopes, fulfilling the conditions: he was prestigious, had the political ability to attract the trust of civilians and was not involved in 1922. Other names considered were the retired officers Augusto Ximeno de Villeroy, Odílio Bacellar Randolfo de Melo and, on active duty, Bertoldo Klinger and Miguel Costa.^[75] The conspirators in Rio de Janeiro considered Isidoro to be oblivious to the situation and preferred Klinger.^[76]

Low ranking officers and civilians

The historiography highlights the lieutenants and senior officers in the revolt,^[14] stating, for example, that revolutionary propaganda was only made among the officers; from then on, the sergeants, corporals and soldiers would only need to obey.^[77] However, the criminal trials opened after the 1924 revolt show the presence of sergeants within the conspiratorial nucleus.^[78] In this trial, sergeants were the majority of the military personnel indicted (59%) and convicted (47%); lieutenants are in second place. On the other hand, for Justice, the lower ranks were accomplices, not heads of the plan.^[79] The sergeants' defenses justified participation in the rebellion as simple obedience to commanders' orders, sometimes by coercion, but promotions received by many within the revolutionary army suggested their active participation.^[80]

The movement was a military one, articulated in the barracks, but because it aimed at power, it was of interest outside the barracks. The conspirators made contact with a number of civilians, counting on their support soon after the uprising began. There was difficulty, as plotting outside the barracks was more risky and there were prejudices against civilians. For the defenders of this approach, the presence of civilians is what would give legitimacy to the movement, distinguishing it from a mere barracks uprising.^[81][82]

Despite the tenentists' criticism of professional politicians, there was an alignment of interests with the Republican Reaction, whose leader, Nilo Peçanha, defended the 1922 rebels and had several meetings with Isidoro.^[83][84] An attempt was made to co-opt some dissidents from the São Paulo elite, such as Júlio de Mesquita and Vergueiro Steidel, but they did not want a revolution, much less one made by elements foreign to their class.^[8][85] To garner support among the workers, Isidoro used Maurício de Lacerda and Everardo Dias as intermediaries.^[86] The conspirators approached the anarchist José Oiticica, the socialist Evaristo de Morais and the Brazilian Cooperative Syndicalist Confederation.^[87]

Military planning

Despite the improvisations in its execution, the 1924 uprising was planned in detail and at length.^[88] The conspirators took stock of the support in the barracks and, on the maps, classified the units into "friendly", "that will help us", "easy to join" and "enemy" forces. Complying with strict deployment schedules, these forces would concentrate at strategic points, controlling or destroying rail, telegraph, and telephone connections. The war would be violent and decisive; according to the plan, "cunning and mobility will be the preferred weapons".^[89] As long as the forces were outnumbered, they would avoid direct combat.^[90]

Outside São Paulo, the movement was expected in Minas Gerais, Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul, with isolated support in Mato Grosso, Goiás and Rio de Janeiro.^[91] In Paraná, Juarez Távora estimated the adhesion of 80% of the garrison, with enough officers to dominate the state, sympathy from the soldiers and civil support.^[92] The 1st Military Region as a whole, in Rio de Janeiro, was considered hostile,^[42] but there were written orders for the Valença unit.^[90] For logistical reasons, there was no plan to revolt in northern Brazil.^[93]

The plan stated that "the revolutionary movement will begin with the military overthrow of the city of São Paulo, which must necessarily be consummated in a few hours". The participating units would be few, all from the city and the surroundings, to allow a quick and unexpected coup, leaving the loyalists without reaction.^[94][95]

The next major objective would be Barra do Piraí, in the interior of Rio de Janeiro,^[96] where the vanguard commanded by Joaquim Távora would run from before dawn.^[97] It would consist of a battalion of 550 men from the 6th Infantry Regiment, from Caçapava. Reinforcement platoons would stay at the Cruzeiro and Barra Mansa junctions. One company would be deployed beyond Santana station, and another to Entre Rios. With the help of civilian elements, telephone and telegraph connections to Petrópolis and Além Paraíba would be cut. In 24 hours, the rebels gathered 3,870 men in Barra do Piraí; in 36 hours, that would be 5,494. They would be in control of the Serra do Mar gorges, through which the Central, Auxiliar, Leopoldina and Oeste railroads passed. The Federal District would be isolated, but the plan did not clarify how it would be occupied.^[98]

On other fronts, rebel units were expected to reinforce the offensive against Rio de Janeiro,^[99] or at least distract the government.^[91] To avoid a loyalist amphibious invasion, it would be necessary to occupy São Francisco do Sul, Paranaguá and Santos, or at least the Serra do Mar between Santos and São Paulo. In Rio Grande do Sul, the objective would be to prevent loyalist reinforcements from Porto Alegre to São Paulo.^[51][99]

Date setting

In 1924 the leaders of the conspiracy met several times in Jundiaí and São Paulo to set starting dates for the movement. That definition, and the compromises of who would go first, were complicated.^[55] On 24 February, a faction led by Joaquim Távora advocated a quick start, while another faction, represented by Bertoldo Klinger, considered the action premature. Távora's faction prevailed.^[100]

The chosen date, 28 March,^[101] would allow reacting to the imminent federal intervention in Bahia, where it even had the support of governor J. J. Seabra.^[51] But the discussion of collective decisions was very difficult, either because of inexperience or fear of repression.^[15] The plan had to be postponed due to Klinger, who withdrew from the conspiracy, and doubts about the membership of the 4th Infantry Regiment.^[102] To make matters worse, Klinger wrote a letter to Curitiba denying his participation and saying that there was nothing concrete in São Paulo. This was a disaster for the conspiracy in Paraná; according to Juarez Távora, the damage was doubled, as troops from Paraná would later come to fight the rebels.^[92] Seabra lost the government of Bahia and Nilo Peçanha died on 31 March, giving yet another dismay to the conspiracy.^[103] Without being able to rely on the south, efforts were concentrated in São Paulo.^[104]

By this time, rumors of the revolt had already reached general Noronha,^[71] who demanded pledges of loyalty from his commanders.^[55] For months now, confidential reports on the conspiracy had been read by the President of the Republic.^[105] Meanwhile, the conspirators set new dates, but did not use any due to lack of guarantees from either unit.^{[55][lower-alpha 8]} In desperation, they set 5 July, taking advantage of the symbolism of the anniversary of the 1922 Copacabana Fort revolt.^[55] The conspirators almost lost two units, the 2nd Group of Mountain Artillery and the 5th Battalion of Caçadores, as the removal of their commanders was requested by Abílio de Noronha to the Ministry of War on 28 June. Before it was carried out, the revolt broke out.^[106]

On 30 June, Joaquim Távora put the conspirators in São Paulo on alert, warning them of the imminent arrival of "Severo" (Isidoro).^[85] On 2 July, there were rumors of an uprising in Rio de Janeiro, but these were only inspections and transfers of military personnel to dismantle the conspiracy.^[87] Isidoro was expected on the morning of 4 July, but arrived 20 hours late, disrupting the execution.^[107]

Execution of the plan

At 04:30 in the morning of 5 July, general Noronha was notified that officers outside the garrison had moved 80 men from the 4th Battalion of Caçadores (BC), in Santana. The news was relayed to the state government and the Ministry of War.^[111] The rebel troop was led to Luz, headquarters of the main barracks complex of the Public Force, which was occupied, without resistance, with the internal action of Miguel Costa. General Isidoro installed the revolutionary command in the general headquarters of the Public Force, and the command of that corporation was with Miguel Costa.^[112][113] Detachments of the Public Force occupied the Sorocabana, Luz, Norte and Brás railway stations.^[114]

In the early hours of this movement, rioting officers won several victories without firing a shot, but to their surprise, the loyalists did the same. General Noronha went to the headquarters of the 4th Battalion of the Public Force (BFP), in Luz, where he dismissed about 30 soldiers from the 4th BC — and they obeyed. Loyalist officers who were imprisoned were released. General Noronha was arrested by the rebels on his way back to his barracks. But the damage was done: Joaquim and Juarez Távora, Castro Afilhado and other rebels, not realizing that the battalion had changed sides, entered the building and were arrested.^[111][115]

A series of other setbacks scuttled the plan.^[116] The 4th Infantry Regiment (RI), from Quitaúna, was supposed to reinforce the movement in the capital, but was not moved by the absence of internal contact, lieutenant Custódio de Oliveira, who a few hours earlier injured his foot on a cannon wheel.^{[lower-alpha 9]} The conspirators forgot to cut telegraph and telephone communications, and the National Telegraph Bureau was occupied late and briefly. Lieutenant Ari Cruz, responsible for occupying the building, changed the guard to a company of the Public Force, not realizing that these "reinforcements" were loyalists.^[117]

In Santos, those involved were left without guidance.^[118] There were telegrams with orders for captain lieutenant Soares de Pina, commander of the School of Sailor Apprentices and of Naval Shooting in Santos, and for lieutenant Luis Braga Mury, of the 3rd Coast Artillery Group of Itaipu Fort, both in the Baixada Santista. The telegrams were intercepted, and the leaders of the uprising were arrested before they even received them.^[107][119]

To occupy the Campos Elíseos Palace, the state president's residence, the conspirators relied on lieutenant Villa Nova — in reality, a government informant.^[120] There were only 27 men defending the palace, but they were already warned and managed to repel a first occupation attempt, at 7:30 am.^[121] A few hours later the rebels bombed the palace and, in the process, missed several shots and killed civilians in the vicinity.^[122] Carlos de Campos insisted on staying in place, even when targeted by the enemy, and received a large number of visits.^[8][123]

Results of the plan's failure

After these setbacks, the rebel command decided to concentrate on fighting inside São Paulo.^[108] This gave the federal government time to close the Itararé rail branch, the Baixada Santista and the Paraíba Valley. On 6 July, a Navy task force headed by the battleship Minas Geraes docked in Santos.^{[lower-alpha 10]} On the following day, loyalist reinforcements from Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro led by general Eduardo Sócrates gathered in Barra do Piraí. Sócrates established his headquarters in Caçapava, later transferred to Mogi das Cruzes, with a command post further on in Guaiaúna.^[124] Army loyalists occupied São Caetano, between Santos and São Paulo.^[125]

The fighting spread in São Paulo,^[126] approaching the center, where the Anhangabaú valley and the Paissandu, Santa Ifigênia and São Bento squares were fought over. Scattered groups of fighters fought across the tops of buildings and hills.^[127] In the 4th BFP, forty loyalists were still under siege.^[123] Positions were won and lost, and the situation remained indefinite.^[128] On 7 July, 70 loyalists attacked the southeastern flank of the revolutionary forces' heartland, the barracks of Luz. They were repulsed and were besieged at the Light plant, where they were still a threat.^[129]

By the morning of 5 July, both sides had approximately 1,000 fighters.^[130] Unit adhesions outside São Paulo, with a direct effect on the struggle, only occurred in some corps of the 2nd Military Region, and even then, belatedly.^[131] On the 6th, the loyalists received reinforcements from the army, but part of them (the 6th Infantry Regiment and a company from the 5th Infantry Reigment) joined the revolt. On 7 July, the loyalists received new reinforcements from the army, the Public Force and a contingent of sailors. Neither side achieved decisive numerical superiority.^[130]

Consequences for the population

The morning of 5 July began like any other for civilians, but the sound of gunfire soon scared the inhabitants of the center. Going out into the street in hot spots was too dangerous, and for safety reasons, its inhabitants stayed at home. Many were unable to reach their destination because of the fighting.^[132] Trenches proliferated across the landscape;^[133] in all, 309 were built in the city.^[134] The population was unaware of the leaders and objectives of the revolt,^[135] and it was difficult to identify the fighters on both sides; the uniforms of the Army and the Public Force were of different colors, but there were rebels and loyalists in both corporations.^[136] The war environment in the center on 8 July was described by journalists Paulo Duarte and Hormisdas Silva as follows:^[8]

We could not go down the slope of São João, towards the Red Cross, on Rua Líbero, because of the firefight that the forces of captain Guedes da Cunha sustained, from the top of the slope, in Praça Antônio Prado, with the rebel forces in Largo do Paissandu. Through São Bento square, impossible to pass. The fusillade there was more intense. We left the car in front of the State office and, close to the walls, we ventured down the slope. A few bullets whistled around us.

Raw materials for the factories and foodstuffs from the interior could hardly arrive, as the train stations were busy. As a result, factories came to a standstill and the distribution of goods was disorganized.^[137][138] Almost everything stopped — most businesses, trams, schools and government offices. The phones and power supply still worked, but poorly.^[8] Private vehicles were in demand on both sides.^[139] Few newspapers circulated, as paper, energy, and even employee movement were limitations. Both the government and rebels censored the press.^[140][141]

By 9 July, food shortages were already being felt.^[142] Bakeries could not get flour, and milkmen turned back when they found trenches.^[143] Bars, restaurants, and cafes operated behind closed doors for fear of stray bullets.^[135] The population tried to stock as much food as possible,^[143] but the warehouses only accepted payment in cash,^[142] and the federal government, fearing a run on the banks, declared a holiday until the 12th.^[144]

Withdrawal of the state government

In Campos Elíseos, the rebels conquered positions closer to the government's palace on 7 July and the next day they carried out a new bombardment, this time more effective. Advised by general Estanislau Pamplona to withdraw to a safer location, governor Carlos de Campos went to the Pátio do Colégio complex of government buildings, where police and sailors were concentrated.^[127] This place was equally harassed by the rebel artillery, which did not know of the governor's decision, but noticed the concentration of high-ranking officers. Oswald de Andrade mocked the situation: "for the first time in military history, instead of the bullet looking for the target, it was the target that looked for the bullet".^[145]

The governor again withdrew, this time to the Guaiaúna railway station, in Penha, the last of the Central do Brasil that still communicated with Rio de Janeiro. There were also loyalist reinforcements commanded by general Eduardo Sócrates.^[8] The governor was housed in a special locomotive belonging to the railroad administration,^[146] serving at the same time as the mobile headquarters and provisional seat of the state government.^[147]

By this time morale in the rebel leadership was at an all-time low. General Isidoro, noting the troop's exhaustion and fearing mass desertions, wanted to withdraw the entire revolutionary army to Jundiaí. Miguel Costa insisted on continuing the fight in the urban terrain to which the troops were accustomed. Isidoro ordered the withdrawal for the morning of 9 July, but Miguel Costa spent the night organizing the defenses. He wrote a letter to the governor, taking full responsibility for the uprising and asking for amnesty in exchange for his surrender. If his conditions were not accepted, he would fight to the end. But there was no one to receive the letter; on the morning of the 9th, the government's palace was empty. Its ruins soon filled with curious folk.^[145][148]

Not only the governor, but also the loyal forces abandoned their positions or surrendered.^[137][149] Isidoro, even victorious, considered resigning, resentful of Miguel Costa's insubordination, but the latter convinced him to remain at the head of the movement.^[150] The rebels celebrated this turn of events,^[145] considered by Isidoro to be a work of chance rather than a military feat.^[150] Many years after the conflict, the decision to withdraw was still controversial; the rebels "were so certain of defeat, and yet they received, on a silver platter, the target that they considered unattainable".^[151] According to Abílio de Noronha, the leaders abandoned the troops, causing a disorderly retreat.^[152]

Power vacuum

General Isidoro proclaimed himself head of a "provisional government".^[156][157] The state government was expelled from its headquarters, but this was not the original objective of the revolutionaries; if the Campos Elíseos Palace had been occupied without resistance, they would possibly have kept Carlos de Campos in power. General Isidoro declared in a manifesto that the revolution had no regional or personal objectives; the movement was solely against the federal government. Thus, mayor Firmiano de Morais Pinto was kept in office.^[158] His responsibilities increased, filling the gap left by the state government.^[159] This attitude contrasted with that of the municipal legislature: the councilors did not meet at any time during the conflict.^[160]

Respecting the mayor's mandate showed weakness, but allowed the rebels to focus their attention on the military front.^[161][162] This decision went beyond a tactical maneuver and demonstrated consistency.^[163] Firmiano Pinto was in charge of offering Fernando Prestes de Albuquerque, vice-president of São Paulo, to take the place of the expelled governor of Campos Elíseos. Prestes replied that "he would accept the government transmitted by Dr. Carlos de Campos by his own free will and never by the hands of the revolutionaries"; the mayor agreed. This refusal was no surprise; the vice-president was a powerful colonel from Itapetininga, with a known allegiance to the Paulista Republican Party, and he was organizing a loyalist resistance in the interior. The rebels then offered the government to José Carlos de Macedo Soares, president of the Commercial Association of São Paulo, in a triumvirate with lieutenant leaders, but he refused.^[164][165]

Looting of stores

Living conditions continued to deteriorate:^[166]

Countless dead and wounded enter the blood hospitals. Garbage accumulates in the streets. Filth reigns. Despite the reduced price list, for foodstuffs, hunger prevails, like an immobilizing plague. (...) In various parts of the city, dead and abandoned horses are displayed. A pestilent smell invades the air, foreshadowing an epidemic, and tortures the nose...^[167]

Starving, working-class families noticed the lack of policing.^[168][169] On 9 July, a wave of popular looting of commercial establishments began in the farthest neighborhoods (Mooca, Brás and Hipódromo), later reaching the center.^[170] The city's government recorded 61 looted establishments, 6 looted and set on fire, and 6 robbed throughout the month.^[171] Almost all shops, emporiums, and warehouses were attacked.^[170] The most affected companies were Sociedade Anônima Scarpa, Matarazzo & Cia, Ernesto de Castro, Nazaré e Teixeira, Motores Marelli, Maheifuz & Cia, Moinho Gamba, Moinho Santista, Reickmann & Cia and J.M. Melo.^[172]

Oxen loaded onto a Central do Brasil train were released, slaughtered and quartered in the street.^[170] In the factories and mills of the Matarazzo family, in Brás, Italian orators spoke during the sacking, calling the owners "usurers and exploiters of the people".^[170] About this case, José Carlos de Macedo Soares reported that the crowd "carried every last board of the shelves, breaking the glass, making the scales, cabinets, display cases and counters unusable, everything was broken and carried away".^[173]

The looting had a moral dimension, expressing popular indignation at rising prices and previous discontent with their bosses.^[174] Some of the industries that suffered the greatest looting, such as Matarazzo and Gamba, had experienced strikes in January and February of the same year.^[175] Looting was also a way to satisfy hunger and, for some, to make easy profits. Witnesses saw all sorts of goods being carried, such as crockery, silk stockings, typewriters, and electrical wires, not just food.^[176][173] Even the journal A Plebe, a periodical with a less negative view of the looting, noted "many people who took advantage of the occasion without being in need, as well as a lot of wastage and damage to food".^[177]

Both men and women participated, and little coordination and planning was required.^[178] It is not known for sure who started the lootings; they may have been a spontaneous movement, but some sources attribute their initiation to João Cabanas, a lieutenant in the revolutionary army.^[179] In his account, Cabanas claimed to have shot two looters caught in the act.^[180] Finding the Municipal Market surrounded by an angry crowd, he ordered the doors to be broken down and the goods distributed to the poor, taking care only to avoid abuse, which was not entirely possible. According to the judicial trial, the rebels began looting to supply their troops, and the people seized the opportunity.^[181] There is also a report of a popular sack supported by the loyalist army in Vila Mariana.^[182]

In this sense, there was acquiescence from the rebels with the attacks on commercial buildings,^[181] but the leaders distanced themselves from any looting or depredations,^[183] promising to arrest the rioters, and at the same time, demanding that merchants not exaggerate in prices.^[182] Cavalry from the Public Force patrolled the streets, and Army soldiers guarded banks, large export companies, and diplomatic representations.^[184] The Revolutionary Police Headquarters, commanded by major Cabral Velho, demanded the return of the looted items, threatening to arrest those responsible based on photographs and denunciations.^[185]

Restart of the fight

Much of the country's combat power was sent to São Paulo. Loyalist reinforcements from the Army and the Public Forces, coming from several states, expanded the loyalist army to 14–15 thousand men by mid-month, armed with the most modern equipment of the Armed Forces. By comparison, the rebels had at most 3 to 3,500 effective fighters, being outnumbered by five to one. The loyalists organized themselves into a division commanded by general Sócrates and consisting of five infantry brigades and one divisional artillery brigade.^[186][187] The rebels divided into four defensive sectors and two flankguards.^[188]

The loyalists came from Rio de Janeiro, via the Central do Brasil railway, and from Santos via the São Paulo Railway, conditioning their distribution in a semicircle extended from Ipiranga, to the south, to Vila Maria, to the east.^[189] The front line then fell to the working-class neighborhoods on the periphery.^[190] According to general Sócrates, the enemy defensive positions were strong. General Noronha had the opposite opinion, emphasizing the precariousness of the street barricades.^[191] But several sources emphasize the defensive value of some points, notably factories.^{[lower-alpha 11]}

At Ipiranga, the Arlindo brigade left its left flank exposed to an attack from Cambuci and Vila Mariana on 10 July, but managed to repel the offensive.^[192][193] With its right flank secured by advances from the Tertuliano Potiguara brigade in Mooca, the Arlindo brigade occupied positions in Cambuci and Liberdade on 14 July.^[194] Meanwhile, on the banks of the Tietê River, the Florindo Ramos brigade had its advance blocked by the defenders of the Maria Zélia Factory.^[195]

According to Abílio de Noronha, coordination between the loyalist brigades was very precarious, leaving flanks exposed to rebel attacks. These, applying the principle of concentration of forces, kept a large part of their staff as a motorized reserve.^[187][196] Thus, on 14 July, the Potiguara brigade advanced too far, exposed its flanks and was forced to retreat. This exposed the flanks of the Telles brigades, on their right, and Arlindo, on their left. By 16 July, the Arlindo brigade's gains were reversed.^[194][197] During this counteroffensive, the rebels suffered a great loss: Joaquim Távora was mortally wounded in the attack on the barracks of the 5th BFP, in Liberdade.^[198]

Loyalist bombardment

Artillery fire was the main cause of death in the conflict.^[199] The government had the material advantage in this armament. It had numerous, more modern and larger caliber cannons. Against about 20 Krupp guns of 75 and 105 millimeters, the loyalists had more than a hundred guns from Krupp, Schneider and Saint-Chamond, including 155 millimeter cannons. The insurgents' artillery could not compete with the longer-range guns of the government, well positioned on the ridges around the city.^[5][200]

On 8 to 9 July, loyalist artillery attacked Luz, where the revolutionary headquarters was located, and Brás. The bombardment intensified from the 10th to the 11th, also hitting Mooca and Belenzinho. Many other neighborhoods were hit throughout the month, such as Liberdade, Aclimação, Vila Mariana,^[201] Vila Buarque, Campos Elíseos,^[202] Paraíso^[203] and Ipiranga.^[204] Hardest hit were Luz and the working-class neighborhoods of the east,^[205] but the wealthier residential neighborhoods, while much less affected, were not spared.^[206] The bombardment was continuous, day and night;^[207] on 22 July, 130 artillery shells were fired per hour.^[208]

Densely populated areas devoid of military targets were hit. The shells collapsed walls and roofs, destroying the houses. Terror dominated the population, who took refuge in cellars.^[209] Civilians were the majority of those killed.^[201][210] An emblematic case was the Teatro Olympia, in Brás:^[211] although located half a kilometer from the nearest trench, it was hit on the 15th, burying dozens of homeless families.^[212][213] The government did not seem to mind the collateral damage.^[214] The rebels also showed little regard for civilian casualties,^[215] but caused much less damage.^[216]

Many industries were damaged, such as Companhia Antarctica Paulista, Biscoitos Duchen, and Moinhos Gamba.^[217] Most shocking was the symbol of São Paulo's industrial power, the Cotonifício (Cotton Factory) Crespi,^[218] which housed rebel troops and displaced families. It was set on fire as many as five times and partially destroyed.^[211][219] By the 22nd, plumes of smoke were visible for miles around.^[220] Fires consumed several parts of the city, attributed to both bombing and looting.^[137] The Criminal Court was also set on fire, which may have been a destruction of records, unrelated to the bombing.^[185]

Militarily, bombing may have been a way to progressively wear down the enemy and spare the troops themselves.^[221][222] However, it had little effect on the defenses;^{[lower-alpha 12]} Abílio de Noronha evaluated it as an attack at random, without regulation and correction of fire, disobeying the principles of artillery use.^[223] The Minister of War condemned his enemies for "fighting under the moral protection of the civilian population",^[224] but promised that he would not cause unnecessary material damage.^[225] Carlos de Campos was tougher in his rhetoric: "São Paulo would rather see its beautiful capital destroyed than legality in Brazil destroyed".^[226]

Historians discuss the bombing as deliberate violence to the civilian population, a "terrorizing bombing" or "German-style bombing".^{[227][201][228][229][230]} This could be a way to pressure the rebels to leave the city, hastening a capitulation,^[231][229] a return to the brutal methods used in the Canudos and Contestado wars,^[232] and/or a punishment of the workers for their association with the rebels,^[233][213] or for the looting.^[234]

International law of the period condemned indiscriminate bombing, without regard for civilians, as a war crime. In the years after the revolt, the legality of the decision was hotly debated among jurists.^[235][236]

Population exodus

Fleeing the violence, the population, especially in the most bombed regions, moved en masse to neighborhoods farther from the center, such as Casa Verde, Lapa, Perdizes and Santo Amaro, and to the interior of the state.^[237] The prefecture registered 42,315 people sheltering in hospitals, schools, churches and other institutions.^[238] Many other evacuees stayed in tarpaulin barracks.^[8]

257,981 refugees were counted by the prefecture, about a third of the city's 700,000 inhabitants;^[143] some figures go up to 300,000 refugees.^[166] Comparing the population of the municipality in the 2010s, with 11 million inhabitants, there would be 4 million refugees.^{[lower-alpha 13]} The main destination was Campinas, with smaller flows to Jundiaí, Itu, Rio Claro and even more distant municipalities such as Bauru.^[239][240] The rich preferred their farms or Santos.^[241] Cities such as Campinas began to have supply problems.^[242]

The main means of transport was the railroad, used by 212,385 refugees, according to the prefecture.^[143] Rail connections with the interior were re-established on 12 July, but they were irregular and risky.^[242] Families crowded into the Luz and Sorocabana stations, and the trains left with refugees hanging from the railings outside the wagons.^[243] Refugees left by any means possible: in automobiles, carts, wagons or on foot.^[244]

Relations with society

Humanitarian measures

Public charity ensured the subsistence of part of the population.^[298] Even before the creation of the Public Supply Commission, the Red Cross, the Nationalist League and other institutions already provided services to the population. The City Commission checked food, fuel and firewood stocks, set prices and organized the transport of food and population to safer areas of the city. The prefecture identified 182 aid stations, where 581,187 meals were distributed.^[299] A representative traveled to Santos, but admiral Penido, who commanded the city, vetoed any food purchases.^[300]

Medical care took place at the Umberto Primo and Samaritano Hospitals, and Santa Casa de Misericórdia.^[301] The City Hall's Directorate of Hygiene organized the burials, while the public cleaning sector buried or incinerated the dead animals.^[299] While the fires were burning, the Fire Department was dismantled, as its members fought in the loyalist army and, after the withdrawal of the state government, they left the city or remained as prisoners. At the request of Macedo Soares, general Isidoro released these prisoners, and the City Hall managed to reorganize the service on 25 July.^[250][302]

Interior of São Paulo

87 municipalities in São Paulo had a record of revolt, and another 32 had demonstrations of support. Of the municipalities with revolt, in 21 it started with the initiative of civilians. Local political elites, belonging to the Paulista Republican Party, tended to support the government, to the point of organizing patriotic battalions to fight the revolt. But the municipalities were very dependent on the central power, which left them helpless. The opportunity was great for local dissidents, many of whom joined the revolting military. The mayors and delegates of 35 municipalities joined the revolt or were replaced by "governors" appointed by the military.^{[303][304][305]}

On 9 July, the rebels already controlled Itu, Jundiaí, Rio Claro and Campinas; the first three municipalities were dominated by local army units when they joined the revolt.^[306] By itself, Campinas already had great value as a railway junction and economic base.^[307] Alderman Álvaro Ribeiro, head of the municipal opposition, was appointed governor of the city and given authority to intervene in others.^[308]

Three loyalist brigades were sent to cut the rebels' rearguard: general Azevedo Costa came from Paraná, João Nepomuceno da Costa from Mato Grosso, and Martins Pereira from Minas Gerais. In response, on 17–19 July the revolutionary command sent three detachments to the Sorocabana, Mogiana, Paulista and Noroeste railways.^[309] In addition to these three, smaller groups of sergeants and civilian allies occupied several municipalities.^[310] At the end of the month, the rebels occupied the triangle between São Paulo, Campinas and Sorocaba, as well as a cone towards Bauru and Araraquara.^[309]

The most valuable objective was Bauru, an almost obligatory railway junction on the way to Mato Grosso, and where there was also strong local opposition.^[311] On 18 July, the city was occupied by captain Muniz Guimarães and his improvised column, made up of volunteers enlisted along the way. There were no exhausting fights. 300 soldiers from the Public Force could have defended the city, but they had been sent away amid panic and rumors about Carlos de Campos leaving the center of the capital.^[312] The Mato Grosso brigade, which could also have defended Bauru, would only arrive the following month, delayed by the precariousness of mobilization and the revolutionary sympathies of the officers.^{[313][314][315]}

At Mogiana, lieutenant João Cabanas led an initial force of 95 men against general Martins Pereira's nearly 800 regulars.^[316] But the loyalists spread their forces too thinly and acted passively, while Cabanas had an experienced troop, which they kept focused and constantly on the move, using psychological warfare to mislead the opponent as to their direction and manpower.^[317][318] His contingent, which was nicknamed the "Death Column", was victorious in Mogi Mirim, on the 23rd, and Espírito Santo do Pinhal, on the 26th, frustrating Martins Pereira's intention to advance against Campinas.^[319]

Only in Sorocabana were the loyalists victorious. Captain Francisco Bastos left the rebels in a defense of position, giving the loyalists plenty of time to organize.^[320] General Azevedo Costa was reinforced at Itapetininga by three patriotic battalions organized by Fernando Prestes. On 19 July, he organized the Southern Operations Column or Southern Column, with which he sent a vanguard to Itu and another to São Paulo. En route to São Paulo, the second vanguard defeated strong resistance at Pantojo and Mairinque on 26–27 July.^[321][322]

Parallel uprisings

The São Paulo revolt was the propagating focus of a series of tenentist uprisings in other regions of Brazil,^[323] collectively referred to as the "1924 uprisings"^{[lower-alpha 14]} or "1924 revolts".^[324][325] Each had its own particularities.^[326] These were not, however, the support expected by the São Paulo conspirators, but few, dispersed and unsuccessful outbreaks of rebellion.^[327]

The parallel uprisings were the way to divert government reinforcements on their way to São Paulo, relieving pressure on the São Paulo rebels.^[328] Several battalions of caçadores from the current North and Northeast regions received orders to embark for Rio de Janeiro, but only the 19th, from Salvador, got to fight in São Paulo.^{[lower-alpha 15]} The 20th, 21st, 22nd and 28th, respectively from Maceió, Recife, Paraíba (now João Pessoa) and Aracaju, were preparing to embark when the 28th rebelled on 13 July, and the others were redirected to fight it in Sergipe.^[329] On the same day, the order to board the 24th, 25th and 26th, respectively from São Luís, Teresina and Belém, was cancelled.^[330] New embarkation arrangements were made with the 26th and 27th, from Manaus, but these also rebelled, respectively, on the 26th and 23rd of July.^[331]

An uprising in Pará quickly failed in combat with the State Military Brigade.^[332] The Sergipe and Amazonian uprisings went further than the São Paulo one, installing new state governments.^[333][334] Both movements were defeated in August, after the loyalist victory in the city of São Paulo.^[335][336] In the case of Amazonas, the federal government had to send 2,700 soldiers to the North,^[337] from battalions in the Northeast, Espírito Santo and Rio de Janeiro.^{[lower-alpha 16]}

Only in Mato Grosso did the plans of the conspiracy in São Paulo have a concrete result. The commander of the 1st Mixed Brigade himself, lieutenant colonel Ciro Daltro, may have delayed the movement to São Paulo to benefit the rebels. On 12 July, the 10th Independent Cavalry Regiment, in Bela Vista, revolted, but it was contained by the unit's sergeants.^[338]

Last combats

Each side resorted to novelties in military technology. Loyalist Military Aviation began flying over the city on 19 July. It operated little, but its bombings had a psychological impact. Naval Aviation stayed with the fleet in Santos. The rebels used requisitioned civilian planes, but only for reconnaissance and propaganda distribution.^[340][341]

The Assault Car Company, with eleven Renault FT-17s, attacked the rebels in Belenzinho from the 23 July; there are reports of initial success, later mitigated by the lack of infantry support for these tanks.^[342] Brazil's first attempt to build armor took place in workshops in rebel territory, but the resulting two cars were too heavy to move.^[343] There was more success with an armored train, used in raids on loyalist positions in Central do Brasil until 26 July, when it was derailed by an artillery ambush.^[344] On the São Paulo Railway, the Navy improvised a railway artillery with cannons from the ships.^[345]

On 23 July, after days of intense combat, the loyalists captured two strongholds in the enemy defense, Largo do Cambuci and the Antarctica Factory, in Mooca; on the other hand, the offensive at Vila Mariana was defeated.^[346][287] The general loyalist offensive was resumed on 25 July, when the Military Brigade of Rio Grande do Sul approached another redoubt, Cotonifício Crespi.^[347] The following day, the Public Force of Minas Gerais dominated the Hipódromo da Mooca, and on the next the Central do Brasil warehouse, already preparing to occupy the North Station.^[348] In Brás, Cambuci and Liberdade, the defensive sectors retreated.^[349]

On 26 July, loyalist planes distributed bulletins from the Ministry of War over the city urging the population to leave the city as "to spare themselves the effects of military operations, which, in a few days, will be carried out". The mood of panic increased; in the interpretation of Macedo Soares, that was "the threat of a general bombardment, of complete destruction of the city, indistinct, without respite, over the built area". Even worse, for him, the 400,000 inhabitants left in the city had no way to get out.^[224][350]

Negotiation attempts

Since the start of the loyalist bombing, welfare institutions, representatives of merchants and industrialists, and foreign diplomats had tried to negotiate a ceasefire. This intervention had humanitarian motives and, equally, interests at stake.^[351][352] On 12 July, Macedo Soares, Júlio Mesquita, Dom Duarte Leopoldo e Silva, the Archbishop of São Paulo, and Vergueiro Steidel, president of the Nationalist League, sent the following telegram to the President of Brazil:^[353]

We ask Your Excellency for charitable intervention to stop the bombardment against the defenseless city of S. Paulo, since the revolutionary forces agreed not to use their cannons to the detriment of the city. The commission does not have any political intention but exclusively compassion for the population of São Paulo.

Minister of War Setembrino de Carvalho replied that the moral damage caused by the revolt was much worse than the material damage to the city. He proposed that the rebels spare the population, leaving the city to fight in the open.^[214][354] Another response came from general Sócrates, when asked by the consuls of Portugal, Italy, and Spain: he would spare the civilian areas, as long as the rebels indicated where their troops were.^[191][355]

On 16 July, Macedo Soares communicated with general Noronha, a prisoner of the rebels, asking him to intercede with the president. The general agreed to be a go-between for an armistice and the next day he read Isidoro's demands. The first: "immediate handover of the Federal Government to a provisional government composed of national names of recognized probity and confidence of the revolutionaries. Example: Dr. Venceslau Brás". Noronha dismissed it completely; the resignation of Artur Bernardes, under these conditions, would be for him a "blow to national sovereignty by the edge of bayonets".^[356]

In a new proposal on 27 July, the rebels, already on the verge of being defeated, had a single demand, amnesty for the rebels of 1922 and 1924.^[357] Macedo Soares wrote a letter to general Sócrates, arguing that "the victory of any of the fighting parties, if it is not immediate, will no longer save the State of S. Paulo and, therefore, Brazil, from the most desolate ruin". For him, the danger of social unrest was more serious than military rebellion, and so he requested a 48-hour armistice so that Abílio de Noronha could negotiate. Journalist Paulo Duarte delivered the letter in Guaiaúna, where it was read by Carlos de Campos. The governor, irritated, accused the negotiators of making common cause with the rebels and promised to increase the bombings.^[358][359]

Rebel withdrawal from the city

On 27 July, the revolutionary high command took an unforeseen decision, but which seemed to be the only way to prolong the movement: withdraw the army from São Paulo, waging a war of movement in the interior.^[360][361] In Mato Grosso, they still hoped to reinforce the movement with local sympathizers, or, at worst, to go into exile in Paraguay or Bolivia.^[362]

The only road to Campinas was about to be cut, which would trap movement within the capital.^[363][364] The fighting in the capital would only result in the destruction of the rebels themselves and the population.^[46] The negotiations were a failure,^[365] and the only possibility of victory would be with the outbreak of uprisings in Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais. The fighters were worn out, many of them wounded;^[366] there are conflicting reports about troop morale.^{[lower-alpha 17]}

Pressure from the loyalist division was supposed to lock the rebels in combat, preventing a retreat, which is a laborious and risky military operation. The shipment of ordnance began at 14:00, but the troops withdrew at night, and the loyalists had no night patrols or contact with enemy infantry. The revolutionary army escaped largely intact, with all its supplies; only a few elements of the southern detachment were left behind. The loyalists did not realize the withdrawal until the morning of 28 July. In Jundiaí, the South Column cut the road to Campinas at noon, but at 07:00 the last train had passed through Itirapina. A day's difference would have prevented the escape.^{[367][368][369]}

At 10:00 on the 28th, Carlos de Campos resumed his office at the Campos Elíseos Palace.^[370] The evacuation of the city was celebrated with fanfare and military parades through the downtown streets.^[371] According to Macedo Soares, the population received them coldly;^[372] Monteiro Lobato compared the loyalist parades with the "German army entering Paris".^[296]

Several newspapers criticized the behavior of soldiers during the reoccupation,^[373] and the anarchist press accused the occurrence of rapes.^[374] There are reports of looting of commercial stores by soldiers from the Public Forces of Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais.^[375] Due to these accusations, the Public Force of Minas Gerais expelled 17 soldiers, but incorporated them again when an investigation concluded that they were innocent or inculpable.^[376]

By the beginning of August, industries and services were back in business, numerous workers were clearing the rubble and the damaged buildings were being rebuilt. Scouts looked for corpses buried in backyards, squares and gardens, and families from the countryside, out of curiosity, visited the abandoned trenches.^[377]

From São Paulo to the Paraná River

The revolutionary army arrived in Bauru on 28 July, where it was reorganized into three brigades commanded by Bernardo de Araújo Padilha, Olinto Mesquita de Vasconcelos and Miguel Costa.^[379] The passage of the Noroeste Railroad to Mato Grosso, in Três Lagoas, was already barred by the loyalists, leaving the Sorocabana branch as the only option, which, passing through Botucatu, led to Presidente Epitácio.^[369] A detachment was sent to Araçatuba, in the Northwest, to delay the Mato Grosso brigade. The battalions of Juarez Távora and João Cabanas were defending the rear during the passage through Botucatu, when they were attacked at the top of the mountain range by the loyalist vanguard. General Malan d'Angrogne recorded heavy losses on the defenders (73 prisoners), but they ensured the escape of the bulk of their army.^[380]

The rebel vanguard stopped in Assis on 5 August, when a ceremony celebrated one month of the revolt and the newspaper O Libertador was published.^[381] The following day it occupied Porto Tibiriçá, in Presidente Epitácio, on the banks of the Paraná River, imprisoning several vessels and a small loyalist contingent.^[382]

Rearguard actions would still take 42 days along the 1,200 kilometers of road, on which several battles were still fought against loyalist columns of persecution, notably in Santo Anastácio. This mission fell to the "Death Column", which systematically destroyed the railway infrastructure on the way to delay the loyalist advance. This was a military necessity, but created controversy in the press.^[383] João Cabanas became famous and infamous, being accused of numerous depredations, threats and murders in the police investigation of the rebellion. Cabanas, in his writings, prided himself on the terror his name created in his opponents, but claimed to have harshly punished, even with shootings, crime among soldiers.^[384]

Battle of Três Lagoas

On the banks of the Paraná river, the revolutionary command was divided over strategy: colonel João Francisco wanted to go down the river and, in western Paraná, connect with officers committed to the movement in Rio Grande do Sul. Isidoro preferred to go up to Três Lagoas and invade Mato Grosso.^[385][386] There, João Cabanas believed in the viability of a "Free State of Brasilândia", financed by tariffs on the export of yerba mate. Easily defended by the Paraná River, the rebels would have time to rebuild their forces and reconquer São Paulo,^[387] or at least force the government to negotiate.^[388]

The invasion force landed on 17 August, under the command of Juarez Távora,^[389] with 570 men, including a shock force composed mainly of foreigners.^[390] But Três Lagoas was better defended than they thought. The Mato Grosso loyalists had withdrawn the troops sent to Bauru to defend their own territory, and were reinforced by general Malan d'Angrogne and his column from Minas Gerais.^[391][392] On 18 August, what was referred to as the bloodiest battle of the São Paulo revolt took place, in which the invaders were defeated, with heavy losses, by the 12th Infantry Regiment and the Public Force of Minas Gerais.^[393][394] However, the loyalists had concentrated too much forces to the north, and the way to Paraná was left open.^[395]

Link with the Rio Grande do Sul rebels

The rebel vanguard entered Paraná's territory in the town of São José, on 31 August.^[396] When the loyalists reoccupied Porto Tibiriçá, on 10 September, all the rebels had already embarked and gone down the river. This region was sparsely populated and little connected, to the point where the government did not initially know where rebels were.^[397] The crossing was slow; in September the vanguard reached Foz do Iguaçu, while the rearguard was still between the Mato Grosso and São Paulo banks.^[398] João Cabanas described the moral state after leaving Porto Tibiriçá:^[397]

I had the intuition that we had reached the beginning of failure, and that we were going to enter the guerrilla regime, the last resort of revolutions that did not win in their first impetus. In fact, we could hold the banner of the revolution high in the bosom of that exuberant nature for months. But later on, tiredness and a cooling of enthusiasm would appear, due to the monotony of the days that followed. A hope still gleamed in the midst of these painful considerations, strengthening morale: the fulfillment of the promises of the uprising of military garrisons from various states.

New revolts broke out in October and November in the battleship São Paulo and in the garrisons of Rio Grande do Sul, both of which were defeated. The remnants of the Rio Grande do Sul revolt, led by Luís Carlos Prestes, began a journey north to reach the rebel territory in Paraná,^[399][400] between the Paraná, Piquiri and Iguaçu rivers. The Paraná campaign turned into trench warfare in the Catanduvas region, marked by logistical and movement difficulties and diseases that killed far more than combat wounds. Without reinforcements and any regular resupply, the rebels were exhausted by general Cândido Rondon's numerous troops.^[401][402]

At the end of March 1925, the last defenders of Catanduvas surrendered to the loyalist offensive. The other São Paulo rebels retreated towards the Paraná River and joined the revolting ones from Rio Grande do Sul who finally arrived in Paraná. The 1st Revolutionary Division, formed at this junction, became known as the "Miguel Costa-Prestes Column". General Isidoro went into exile, due to his old age, while the division escaped the siege by entering Paraguayan territory and returning to Brazil through Mato Grosso. This column prolonged the revolt until 1927, marching through 36,000 kilometers of Brazil's territory.^{[403][404][405]}

Material and human damage

Due to the number of deaths, the conflict has already been called the "greatest urban massacre carried out during republican governments".^[406] The city hall report counted 503 dead and 4,846 injured in the conflict.^[407] These numbers are still contested today; some sources point to 800 dead and 5,000 wounded.^[110] International agencies estimated 1,000 dead.^[406] According to Santa Casa records, 723 civilians were killed; the conflict reportedly averaged 30 dead and 100 wounded per day.^[408] The prefectural count does not include casualties outside the city,^[216] and likely omitted large numbers of corpses buried outside cemeteries.^[409] On 29 July, one newspaper reported hundreds of dead bodies found on land in Belenzinho and Mooca, and in August, another mentioned 500 bodies on the outskirts of the city.^[410] Artur Bernardes is accused of having ordered the counting to be suspended.^[409]

Loyalists are accused of summary shootings and burial in mass graves.^[409] Abílio de Noronha mentioned these accusations against one of the brigadier generals, but defended general Sócrates, saying that, if they occurred, they did not have his approval.^[411] A well-known case is the execution of three civilians accused of espionage by the Public Force of Minas Gerais; their families were taking refuge under the stands of the Hipódromo da Mooca.^[412]

The Public Force of Minas Gerais registered six dead and seven wounded in the fighting in the capital, two dead and five wounded in Espírito Santo do Pinhal, and three dead and seven wounded in Três Lagoas.^[413] Prior to 10 July, the Navy had 83 killed, wounded, and lost.^[221] The Military Brigade of Rio Grande do Sul accounted for 26 dead and 30 wounded in all its operations in the state of São Paulo.^[414]

According to the city hall, 1,800 buildings were damaged by shells and bullets. 103 commercial and industrial establishments were damaged by fires, looting, bombings, robberies and requisitions by the rebels, with a total loss of 30,000:000$000 réis.^[171][251] In general, the population rebuilt their homes without government assistance. The state government's main measure to aid reconstruction was Law No. 1,972 of 26 September 1924, aimed at "assisting the victims of the recent military rebellion, assisting charitable institutions and contributing to the reconstruction of damaged temples"; 200 families, 33 hospitals and the Brazilian Red Cross were compensated. Some civil society entities and private collaborators also contributed resources. The widows and orphans of loyalist soldiers killed in combat were supported by the city hall.^[415]

Light and Companhia Antarctica Paulista filed lawsuits to ask the government for compensation for damages to their capital. Light also wanted damages for "lost profits" and "forced expenses".^[416] In the legal system at the time, the State's civil liability was subjective, that is, the victims had to prove guilt for the damage in order to be compensated.^[417] In 1937, after thirteen years of the Light lawsuit, Decree-Law No. 392 opened a credit for "looting and damage caused by the bombing of the capital of São Paulo during the 1924 movement".^[418]

Repression and political control

The government's response to the 1924 uprisings inaugurated a period of more intense political repression than that which had occurred in 1922,^[419] and the apparatus of social control created under Artur Bernardes' government was a harbinger of the repression carried out in the following decades by the Estado Novo and the military dictatorship in 1964.^[420][421] In December 1924, the São Paulo police began to have its own body specialized in this function, the Department of Political and Social Order (Deops), equivalent to what the police in the federal capital had had since 1922.^{[268][422][423]}

During the revolt, the press in Rio de Janeiro was censored. The newspapers received news from the Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic, while the police condemned the actions of the "rumor spreaders" on the streets.^[424] The state of emergency was renewed at the end of the struggle in the capital of São Paulo, and repeatedly throughout Bernardes' government.^[268] Initially planned for the Federal District and the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, it was extended to Mato Grosso, Bahia, Sergipe, Pará and Amazonas as new rebel foci appeared; in September, it was applied in Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul. The extensions continued until the end of Bernardes' term.^[425] In São Paulo, civil servants and military officials of the Public Force involved in the revolt were expelled.^[426] The newspapers Estado de S. Paulo and Folha da Noite were punished with temporary suspensions.^[8][427]

The Brazilian Army and the Public Force of São Paulo adopted stricter regulations, seeking to avoid a new uprising.^[428] The São Paulo government lost confidence in its "state army". Some battalions from the capital were transferred to the interior, and the Civil Guard was created to police the city. Civil Police chiefs began to manage Public Force enlisted personnel in the policing service, while Public Force officers were transferred to administrative functions.^[429][428]

Prisons

After the loyalist military victory, "the most unpleasant and thankless phase begins for the Government, which is the 'liquidation' of the revolt", in the words of Secretary of Justice Bento Bueno.^[430] Political repression took prisoners from all social classes: military (from marshals to enlisted men) and civilians, supporters of the revolt, workers, deputies, journalists and merchants.^[419][431] Many were not guilty, and some were only the relatives of enemies of the state.^[419][431] These political prisoners were deliberately mixed with common criminals.^[432]

In Rio de Janeiro, repression began from the first days of July. Under the authority of marshal Lopes da Fontoura, Chief of Police of the Federal District, journalists such as Mário Rodrigues and Edmundo Bittencourt, from Correio da Manhã, Diniz Júnior, from A Pátria, and Roberto de Toledo Lopes, from O Jornal, were arrested; anarchist leader José Oiticica; the communist Otávio Brandão; military and others. Due to the lack of prison cells, Ilha Rasa and the ship Campos were used as prisons.^[424] The action was a preventive one, and those arrested were not necessarily suspected of involvement in the sedition.^[433] Foreigners in the capital, especially Russians, were investigated for a possible connection with the Russian Bolshevik movement.^[424]

In São Paulo, mass arrests began as soon as the government reoccupied the city.^[422] Lourenço Moreira Lima, arrested in Capão Bonito, estimated the number of prisoners at 10,000. Most were collaborators or supporters of the revolt, and even minors were imprisoned.^[434][435] Rich prisoners from the interior became sources of income for the "prison door attorneys".^[436] Organized workers, especially anarchists, were hounded for their moral support for the rebellion.^[437] Some trade unionists, anticipating repression, still managed to hide before the arrival of the government, but by the end of the year, trade union activity in São Paulo had been dismantled.^[422]

There was torture in prisons and police stations: "the rubber pipe, cold water, isolation, malnutrition and ill-treatment, all the time".^[438][439] The worst fate was that of the 408 São Paulo rebels who surrendered on the battlefields of Catanduvas in 1925. Along with prisoners from Rio de Janeiro and Amazonas, they were part of the 946 prisoners sent to Clevelândia do Norte, on Brazil's border with French Guiana, where more than 400 died of dysentery and other diseases.^[440][441]

The "conservative classes" also had several representatives arrested, especially Macedo Soares and Júlio de Mesquita, chosen to serve as an example for their negotiations with the rebels. Mayor Firmiano Pinto was also the target of the accusations, but he was never arrested. In December, Macedo Soares managed to go into exile.^[442][443] He and Firmiano Pinto were denounced by the Public Prosecutor's Office, but did not respond to the lawsuit.^[82][444] The Nationalist League, whose first treasurer was Macedo Soares, was closed for six months.^[445][446]

In the conspiracy centers and at the Luz HQ, the police seized bulletins, maps, confidential reports, command orders, encrypted messages, secret codes and private correspondence that incriminated hundreds of military and civilians.^[447] 667 defendants were accused of the political crime defined in Article 107 of the 1890 Penal Code of Brazil, "attempting, directly and by deed, to change the political Constitution of the Republic, or the established form of government, by violent means".^[448] Some of the defenses presented the revolt as a simple reaction to the arbitrary and unconstitutional acts of the Executive branch, with no intention of changing the constitution.^[449] At the end of the trial, in 1929, 176 were convicted under article 108 ("attempting, by the same means, to change any of the articles of the Constitution"), with sentences of up to four years in prison. But many of those arrested and punished did not go through due process of law, and are outside the universe of indictees.^[448]

International repercussion

At least eighteen countries had diplomatic representatives in São Paulo, due to its economic, political, and social importance.^[352] Important parts of the city's economy were controlled by investors from France, the United States, and especially the United Kingdom.^[450] Brazilian consulates received criticism and requests for neutrality towards foreign citizens, but these were often ignored. The authoritarianism of the Bernardes government harmed the international image of Brazil, which was seeking a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations.^[451] Concerned about its image abroad, the Brazilian government even censored telegrams from international news agency correspondents. United Press International and Associated Press were banned from sending any news to the United States, and an American correspondent was even arrested for a few hours. This provoked protests from the U.S. Embassy.^[452]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up an intelligence service to monitor the tenentists in Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. Active since the capture of São Paulo, it acted systematically from the period of the Miguel Costa-Prestes Column.^[453]

Political fate of those involved

With the revolt defeated, the Paulista Republican Party seemed to have confirmed its hegemony in state politics. The oppositionists were all underground or apparently in the midst of the situation. But when Washington Luís took became president of Brazil in 1926, the press, freed from the state of emergency, revealed a degree of prestige accumulated by the tenentists. In São Paulo, the Democratic Party (PD) contested the hegemony of the PRP and explicitly associated its cause with that of the tenentists.^[454] Artur Bernardes, on the other hand, gained the reputation of destroyer of São Paulo; most books on the subject take a negative view of his bombing of the city.^[455]

Washington Luís released political prisoners, but did not grant amnesty to those responding to the trial.^[456][457] The first phase of tenentism came to an end in 1927. A third armed movement began to be articulated, this time associated with civil political dissidents. Tenentism suffered an internal split, but was finally victorious in the Revolution of 1930.^[458][459] Both Artur Bernardes and part of the tenentists supported the revolution that brought Getúlio Vargas to power and ended the Old Republic.^[460]

Under the new Vargas regime, Miguel Costa became Commander of the Public Force of São Paulo and Secretary of Security. He founded the Revolutionary Legion of São Paulo, while the PRP and PD united against Vargas, forming the Frente Única Paulista. Miguel Costa's organization fired back at a demonstration at its headquarters, precipitating the Constitutionalist Revolution of 1932. The constitutionalists arrested Miguel Costa, but received the support of Isidoro Dias Lopes. Artur Bernardes also sided with the constitutionalists and tried to rehabilitate his image in São Paulo. The movement failed to overthrow Vargas.^[461][460] Later, several people involved in the 1924 uprisings moved closer to socialism, such as João Cabanas and Miguel Costa, one of the founders of the Brazilian Socialist Party in 1945.^[462] Isidoro condemned the 1937 coup d'état, but by that point he had withdrawn from public life.^[463]

Photographs

The São Paulo Revolt was much photographed,^[464] especially the destruction of houses and industries. Many of the photographs were gathered by Light, precisely because of the need to document the company's damage. The shocking images of the destruction fueled debate between supporters and enemies of the uprising.^[465] Some pictures reveal the physical proximity of the photographers to the military, and even the movement of the population through the trenches,^[466] and an apparent indifference of the people.^[467][468] Most photographs have no known authorship; professional photojournalism was in its infancy at the time. Among the few known photographers are Aniceto de Barros Lobo and Gustavo Prugner.^[469]

The photographs are almost always open shots.^[466] In the 21st century, the original landscape is almost unrecognizable; most of 1924 São Paulo has already been demolished and rebuilt. The old city did not have the big avenues and skyscrapers; its profile was horizontal and there were many empty spaces with farms and floodplains between the neighborhoods.^[470]

Writings of the period

The criminal trial opened in court was one of the largest in the history of São Paulo, with 171 volumes and 18,715 sheets.^[471][472] Letters exchanged between revolutionaries are also relevant documents.^[472][473] A collection called "Letters from the Revolution of 1924", under the custody of the Public Archive of the State of São Paulo, dates mainly from the exile of the Miguel Costa-Prestes Column and not from the São Paulo revolt.^[474] Another set of letters are those addressed by the population affected by the conflict to archbishop Duarte Leopoldo Silva, president of the commission responsible for compensation claims.^[475]

Memorialists and chroniclers published at least 20 books about their experiences in the conflict, among which Justiça, by José Carlos de Macedo Soares, Sob a metralha, by Ciro Costa and Eurico de Góis, Agora Nós, by Paulo Duarte, 1924: episódios da revolução de S.Paulo, by Antônio dos Santos Figueiredo, Férias de Julho, by Luiz Marcigaglia, Aventuras de uma família durante a Revolução de 1924, by Henrique Geenen, and Dias de pavor, by Aureliano Leite.^[476] Ciro Costa, Eurico de Góis and Aureliano Leite are among the few to defend the government to the point of justifying artillery bombardment.^[477][478]

For the São Paulo intellectual class, the revolt was the evidence of a national malaise, a risk that Brazil would have a policy as militarized as Latin American countries. A cosmopolitan, dynamic and civilized capital was the scene of excessive violence, especially from the government. The population practiced looting and was indifferent to the loyalist cause. According to Diario da Noite, the revolt shattered the illusions of democracy in Brazil.^[479] For Mário de Andrade, the psychological damage was worse than the material one.^[8] Monteiro Lobato exchanged letters with Artur Bernardes, alerting him to the divorce between politics and public opinion.^[295][296] In general, intellectuals contemporary to the revolt noted a moral, political, social and economic crisis, for which they expected an elitist solution, which would not come from the people.^[480] Lobato, Antônio de Sampaio Dória, Jorge Americano, Júlio de Mesquita Filho and others made diagnoses and proposed reforms. Even PRP supporters recognized the crisis.^[481]

Among the military participants, the loyalist Abilio de Noronha published Narrando a Verdade and O resto da verdade,^[476] defending himself against accusations of leniency towards the conspirators when he commanded the 2nd Military Region.^[482] Noronha made a harsh military criticism of the conduct of operations by general Sócrates and his subordinates.^[483] The memories of the revolutionaries are represented by works such as À guisa de depoimento, by Juarez Távora, and A Coluna da Morte, by João Cabanas.^[484]

The most influential newspapers in São Paulo at the time were Correio Paulistano, an organ of the PRP, and its rival, O Estado de S. Paulo.^[8] Correio Paulistano only returned to circulation on 28 July,^[485] while Estado de S. Paulo was the only one to circulate every day, and even then, it was reduced to two pages and controlled by rebel censors.^[8] The aftermath of the revolt took up most of the sheets' space.^[486] The editorial lines of Estado de S. Paulo and Correio Paulistano were polar opposites: the latter referred to the lieutenants as "bandits" and "bands of unpatriots", and the former as "rebels" and "revolutionaries".^[485] Estado de S. Paulo was officially neutral but had some sympathy for the movement.^[487]

Memory and oblivion

One of the names of the 1924 revolt is the "Forgotten Revolution".^[488] Its eyewitnesses still had many memories decades after the event,^[489] but in São Paulo, "revolution" is synonymous with the Constitutionalist Revolution of 1932. While the 1932 movement is commemorated with a state holiday, honored with monuments and street names, and assimilated as part of São Paulo's identity, the 1924 revolt was left without public references.^[490][491] In the press, 1924 occasionally appears in commemorative jubilees.^[492] In historiography, the revolt is not forgotten, but it is absorbed as just one of the chapters of tenentism,^[493][494] which, in turn, has its revolts of the 1920s overshadowed by the Revolution of 1930.^[495] Even so, the relevance of 1924 is recognized by the dimension of the conflict and its material and human losses, the contribution to the fall of the Old Republic, a few years later, and to the construction of the apparatus of social control of the Brazilian state.^[421]

During the Old Republic, the São Paulo Executive and Legislative branches did their best to execrate the image of the revolt,^[496] describing it in terms of "treason", "crime" and "disgrace", an "affront to our culture and our civilization".^[497] Even after the 1930 Revolution, the movement was not celebrated and continued to fall into oblivion. In 1932, the constitutionalist Leven Vampré recalled 1924 as an example of the federal government's disregard for São Paulo, but did not defend the movement, as its objectives were opposite to those of the Constitutionalist Revolution.^[498]

Several reasons have already been proposed for the revolt's fall into oblivion. Brazilian historiography emphasizes the great moments of rupture in the political order, and thus, 1930 takes up much more space than 1924. Even though militarily more relevant, the 1924 movement failed in its political objective.^[494] Unlike the Constitutionalist Revolution, led by the São Paulo elite, the lieutenant uprising was led by outsiders and low-ranking military personnel, with the support of foreign workers.^[48][406] Its consequences were disastrous for both sides, and even more so for the population; the most remembered aspect of the conflict is the destruction of the city.^[499]

Terminology

In 1924, supporters of the movement labeled it a "revolution", a term of great symbolic value, and its opponents, a "subversive movement", "riot", "uprising" and "revolt". By defining the word "revolution" as a profound transformation in society, there are arguments against its use for the 1924 uprising, as it still had a commitment to the established social order and its goals for society were modest. In addition to these terms, the São Paulo revolt also acquired characteristics of a civil war: besides the scale of the destruction, the government's sovereignty was defied by a group that also considered itself representative of the nation and sought a legitimate monopoly on violence.^[500][501]