Security, development and institutional transformation

Security and development share a close but complex connection and successful international humanitarian and development stakeholders in fragile states must understand and engage the security issues in areas they operate.^[5] Such an understanding has been reached by donors such as DFID, the United Nations, the European Union and USAID and they have all been involved in security sector reform and efforts to improve justice, from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Liberia, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste.^[5] Yet these efforts have often been limited in their success as a balance security and development is difficult to achieve.^[5] The UK government supported reforms in Sierra Leone along the principle of "security first" over the last decade, which is believed to have improved security, increased access to and the quality of justice, decreased corruption and positively reformed public service.^[5] Since the end of the civil war in 2002, there has been no major violence, peaceful elections were held in 2007 and there has been enough stability to help build sustainable institutions.^[5] Yet Sierra Leone suffers severe underdevelopment and ranks third to last on the UN Human Development Index for 2010. This in turn has created frustration and disappointment amongst the younger generation and poses a significant risk of a return to violence.^[5]

The role of informal actors and the changing nature of violence

Violence does not end simply with the signing of a peace agreement and often the rates of criminal and domestic violence have actually risen afterwards.^[5] Addressing national issues that led to conflict or that might trigger conflict again and efforts to improve the state's own security capacity is only two factors in achieving citizens’ security and social cohesion.^[5] The peace process itself may lead to insecurity as demobilisation of armed groups leave armed, social excluded and frustrated individuals free to continue violence informally. Insecurity can be increased by informal actors, as well as regional and international drivers of instability, such as organised crime, drug smuggling and Illegal arms trafficking.^[5] Organised crime's capacity to undermine state authority and basic law enforcement is well known in Latin America.^[5] In Guatemala, impunity provided as part of the peace process since 1996, following a 30-year civil war, has allowed former members of the state security apparatus in charge of repression new opportunities for criminal activity.^[5] Mexico suffers critical levels of drug-related violence that has led to over 10,000 gang killings in 2010, up from just under 6,600 in 2009; the gangs often command more resources than the state. Building state-society relations and trust are central to the process of combating such violence.^[5]

The political dimension

Each state and society emerging from conflict have their own specific interplay of sub-national, national, regional and international drivers of insecurity and effective international engagement in fragile states requires a comprehensive understanding of local politics.^[5] Political economy and conflict analysis are increasingly used as a starting point for development and humanitarian strategies. Inclusive political settlements to conflict require agreements to be reached between both elites and their constituencies.^[5] This process may be complicated not only by an interest in continuing conflict by particular groups and that the elites may be part of the reason for the conflicts initiative (for instance, by marginalising particular groups in their constituency), but also that key political leaders are necessary to ensure effective dialogue.^[5] Stabilisation is not a linear process from conflict to peace and rather represents a lengthy and extensive process that is characterised by power struggles and elite bargaining. Elections and the development of democratic institutions requires a lengthy process for the development of political parties and independent electoral commissions and international community expectations for quick wins or 'ideal' governance reforms must be accordingly tempered.^[5]

The process of stabilizing fragile states is often tied with good governance and public service delivery for constituents and international development partners. Post-conflict states face higher challenges in delivering public service and good governance when compared to non-post-conflict counterparts due to reduced state capacity in reform implementation, the absence of human capital, the presence of donor organizations, and legacy local governing systems. For example, in post-conflict Sierre Leonne, public service delivery bypassed weak civil service institutions through donor-led aid projects in fields such as healthcare delivery. The resulting formation of parallel mechanisms arrives at the cost of building state capacity and citizen accountability.^[6] Pre-conflict governance structures with traditional or administrative authority, such as the control held by Afghan warlords, historically weaken the delivery of public service and good governance in local regions with a De Jure-De Facto Gap.^[6] Alternatively, well-meaning international attempts to enable good governance can be manipulated by governing regimes to potentially prompt further disorder toward neighbors and citizens.^[7]