U.S._sanctions
United States sanctions
Trade restrictions levied by the United States government
United States sanctions are financial and trade restrictions imposed against individuals, entities, and jurisdictions whose actions contradict U.S. foreign policy or national security goals. Financial sanctions are primarily administered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), while export controls are primarily administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).
Restrictions against sanctioned targets vary in severity depending on the justification behind the sanction, and the legal authorities behind the sanctions action. Comprehensive sanctions are currently in place targeting Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Syria, and certain conflict regions of Ukraine, which heavily restrict nearly all trade and financial transactions between U.S. persons and those regions. Targeted sanctions specifically target certain individuals or entities that engage in activities that are contrary to U.S. foreign policy or national security goals, rather than an entire country. The U.S. also implements "secondary sanctions", which risk a sanctions designation against a non-U.S. person who transacts with sanctioned parties in violation of U.S. sanctions law, even if no U.S.-nexus existed for the transaction.[1]
The United States has imposed two-thirds of the world's sanctions since the 1990s.[2] Numerous American unilateral sanctions against various countries around the world have been criticized by different commentators.[3]
After the failure of the Embargo Act of 1807, the federal government of the United States took little interest in imposing embargoes and economic sanctions against foreign countries until the 20th century. United States trade policy was entirely a matter of economic policy. After World War I, interest revived. President Woodrow Wilson promoted such sanctions as a method for the League of Nations to enforce peace.[4] However, he failed to bring the United States into the League and the US did not join the 1935 League sanctions against Italy.[5]
Trends in whether the United States has unilaterally or multilaterally imposed sanctions have changed over time.[6] During the Cold War, the United States led unilateral sanctions against Cuba, China, and North Korea.[6] Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, United States sanctions became increasingly multilateral.[6] During the 1990s, the United States imposed sanctions against countries it viewed as rogue states (such as Zimbabwe, Yugoslavia, and Iraq) in conjunction with multilateral institutions such as the United Nations or the World Trade Organization.[6] According to communications studies academic Stuart Davis and political scientist Immanuel Ness, in the 2000s, and with increasing frequency in the 2010s, the United States acted less multilaterally as it imposed sanctions against perceived geopolitical competitors (such as Russia or China) or countries that, according to Davis and Ness, were the site of "proxy conflicts" (such as Yemen and Syria).[6]
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet and some members of the United States Congress asked the United States to suspend its sanctions regimes as way to help alleviate the pandemic's impact on the people of sanctioned countries.[7] Members of Congress who argued for the suspension of sanctions included Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and Ilhan Omar.[8]
The United States applies sanctions more frequently than any other country or nation, and does so by a wide-margin.[9] According to American Studies academic Manu Karuka, the United States has imposed two-thirds of the world's sanctions since the 1990s.[2]
- bans on arms-related exports,[10]
- controls over dual-use technology exports,
- restrictions on economic assistance
- financial restrictions such as:
- authority to prohibit U.S. citizens from engaging in financial transactions with the individuals, entities, or governments on the list, except by license from the U.S. government
- requiring the United States to oppose loans by the World Bank and other international financial institutions,
- diplomatic immunity waived, to allow families of terrorism victims to file for civil damages in U.S. courts,
- tax credits for companies and individuals denied, for income earned in listed countries,
- duty-free goods exemption suspended for imports from those countries, and
- prohibition of U.S. Defense Department contracts above $100,000 with companies controlled by countries on the list.[11]
- visa restrictions that prevent certain individuals from entering the U.S.
The U.S. does not maintain a specific list of countries that U.S. persons cannot do business with because its sanctions program varies in scope depending on the sanctions program. Although some sanctions programs are broad and target entire jurisdictions ("comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions"), most are "targeted" sanctions and focus on specific entities, individuals, or economic sectors.[12] Depending on the nature of the restriction, U.S. sanctions are announced and implemented by different executive departments, typically the Treasury Department (OFAC)[13] or the Commerce Department (BIS),[14] and sometimes in conjunction with the State, Defense, or Energy departments.[15]
Comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions
Comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions are subject to the most restrictive sanctions measures. Most transactions between a U.S. person and any person or entity "ordinarily resident" in a comprehensively sanctioned jurisdiction is restricted.[16] In addition to the general sanctions listed below, transactions involving entities or individuals from these countries on OFAC's SDN List or BIS' Entity List are also restricted.
| Jurisdiction/Region | Summary of certain restrictions |
|---|---|
 Cuba | Treasury:[17]
Commerce:[18]
State:
See also: United States embargo against Cuba |
 Iran | Treasury:[20]
Commerce:
State:
See also: United States sanctions against Iran |
 North Korea | Treasury:[23]
Commerce:[24]
State:[23]
See also: U.S. sanctions against North Korea |
 Russia | Treasury:[25]
Commerce:[26]
|
 Syria | Treasury:[27]
Commerce:[22]
State:
See also: International sanctions against Syria |
 Ukraine (Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea only) | Treasury:[28]
Commerce:[29]
|
Targeted sanctions
In jurisdictions not subject to comprehensive sanctions measures, only transactions related to specific parties are prohibited.[16] Jurisdictions that face targeted sanctions may continue to do business with the United States, with restrictions only placed on specific categories of individuals or entities, and anyone worldwide who materially supports or provides financial, logistical, or technological support for them.
According to OFAC, there are approximately 12,000 names on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN) list,[13] which is the most restrictive category of targeted U.S. sanctions, targeting U.S.-designated terrorists, officials and beneficiaries of certain authoritarian regimes, and international criminals (e.g. drug traffickers) by blocking their U.S. assets and restricting U.S. persons from engaging in any transactions with them.[30]
The following jurisdictions have been designated a specific sanctions program used by OFAC to determine SDN designations targeting individuals or entities engaging in sanctionable activities related to the targeted sanctions restrictions placed on that jurisdiction:[31]
| Jurisdiction/Region | Summary of certain restrictions |
|---|---|
 Belarus | Persons the US government believes to be undermining Belarus' democratic processes or institutions, committing political repression activities, and/or misusing public assets and public authority[32] |
 Central African Republic | Persons the US government believes is responsible, complicit, or have engaged in actions that threaten peace, security, or stability of the Central African Republic, including actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions, threaten the political transition process, target civilians, or UN and other peacekeeping operations through the commission of acts of violence, use of children in armed groups, or obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance[33] |
 Democratic Republic of the Congo | Persons the US government believes is a political or military leader of an armed group operating in the DRC that impedes the peace, security, or stability of the DRC, including actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions, threaten the political transition process, target civilians, or UN and other peacekeeping operations through the commission of acts of violence, use of children in armed groups, or obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance[34] |
 Ethiopia | Persons the US government believes is responsible for or complicit in actions that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Ethiopia, including expanding the crisis in northern Ethiopia or obstructing the peace process, or engaging in actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions, including corruption or serious human rights abuses, to obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance, target civilians through violence, or committing attacks against UN or African Union personnel. Entities the US government believes is a military or security force operating in northern Ethiopia after November 1, 2020, or has engaged in activities that have contributed to the crisis in northern Ethiopia[35] |
 Hong Kong | Persons the US government believes is responsible for developing, adopting, or implementing the Hong Kong national security law, or be responsible or complicit in actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions in Hong Kong, or threaten the peace, security, stability, or autonomy of Hong Kong, including censorship, extrajudicial rendition, arbitrary detention, or torture of any person in Hong Kong[36] |
 Iraq | Persons the US government believes has committed acts of violence that threaten the peace or stability of Iraq or the government of Iraq, undermine efforts to promote economic reconstruction and political reform in Iraq, or obstruct the provision of humanitarian assistance[37] |
 Lebanon | Persons the US government believes has taken action to undermine Lebanon's democratic processes or institutions, contributed to the breakdown of the rule of law in Lebanon, support the assertion of Syrian control or influence in Lebanon, or infringing or undermining Lebanese sovereignty[38] |
 Libya | Persons the US government believes is responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Libya, obstruct, undermine, delay, or impede the political transition process, misappropriate state assets, or threaten state financial institutions, or planning, directing, or committing attacks on Libyan state facilities or civilian facilities, or illegally exploit and export Libyan natural resources[39] |
 Mali | Persons contributing to the Conflict in Mali including Government officials tied to Wagner Group such as Malian Defense Minister Colonel Sadio Camara, Air Force Chief of Staff Colonel Alou Boi Diarra, and Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Adama Bagayoko[40][41] |
 Myanmar | Persons the US government believes operates in the defense or other critical sectors of the Burmese economy, or are responsible for actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions or threaten the peace, security, or stability of Myanmar, or limit the exercise of freedom of expression or assembly, or arbitrary detention or torture, or is a leader of the military or security forces of Myanmar, or the government of Myanmar after February 2, 2021[42] |
 Nicaragua | Persons the US government believes is responsible for serious human rights abuses, actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions or threaten the peace, security, or stability of Nicaragua, or engaged in corrupt transactions related to the misappropriation of public assets[43] |
 Somalia | Persons the US government believes has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia including threatening the peace process, misappropriating public assets, or engaging in acts of piracy, or obstructed the delivery of humanitarian assistance, engaged in acts of violence targeting civilians, recruited children in armed conflict, or imported or exported charcoal from Somalia[44] |
 South Sudan | Persons the US government believes has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of South Sudan, including actions that threaten the peace process, expanding the conflict in South Sudan, committing human rights abuses and violence against civilians, or attacks against UN or other international peacekeeping operations[45] |
 Sudan | Persons the US government believes has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Sudan, including undermining the peace process and the democratic process or institutions of Sudan, or engage in censorship, corruption, misappropriation of state assets, serious human rights abuses, acts of violence against civilians, or obstruction of or attacks against UN peacekeeping missions[46] |
 Venezuela | The Government of Venezuela,[47] those operating in the Venezuelan gold sector, or persons the US government believes is engaging in corrupt government programs,[48] engaged in actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions, commit significant acts of violence, or restrict the freedom of expression or peaceful assembly[49] |
| Western Balkans | Persons under open indictment by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, or has committed actions that threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of any area in the Western Balkans, including actions that undermine the democratic processes or institutions in the Western Balkans, obstructed the peace process, engaged in serious human rights abuses, or are responsible for the misappropriation of public assets for personal gain[50] |
 West Bank | Persons or entities the US government believes has enacted, implemented, or enforced policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of the West Bank, including violence targeting civilians, property destruction, seizure or dispossession of property, or has or is planning to commit terrorist attacks in the region[51] |
 Yemen | Persons the US government believes has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen, including obstructing the peaceful transition of power or the political process[52] |
 Zimbabwe | Persons the US government believes has engaged in actions to undermine Zimbabwe's democratic processes or institutions, engaged in human rights abuses or public corruption, as well as senior officials of the Government of Zimbabwe, or is a state-owned institution[53] |
Human rights abuses/corruption
Building off the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, named after Sergei Magnitsky who died in Russian custody after uncovering corruption, the U.S. can enact sanctions against any individual or entity worldwide who engages in severe human rights abuses and corruption that degrade the rule of law, perpetuate violent conflicts, and facilitate the activities of dangerous persons.[54] The following list include some jurisdictions that are frequently targeted by U.S. sanctions related to human rights abuses but are not specifically targeted under a country-specific sanctions program:
| Jurisdiction/Region | Summary of targeted individuals/entities |
|---|---|
 Afghanistan | Persons associated with the Taliban involved in the suppression of women's and girl's access to education, and the beating of protestors and unlawful detention of journalists.[54] Former Afghani officials and their companies engaged in corrupt activities and siphoning resources from the former Afghani Armed Forces[55] |
 Cambodia | Targeting government officials engaged in corruption[56] |
 China | Persons whom the US government believes are committing Genocide against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang[57][54] and Chinese government officials whom the US government believes are committing human rights abuses in Hong Kong[58] |
 Eritrea | Certain persons the US government believes are involved in the Ethiopian war, such as armed forces and government officials.[59] |
| Lebanon | Persons the US government believes undermine the sovereignty of Lebanon or its democratic processes and institutions[60] |
| Mali | Officials contributing to the Conflict in Mali including Government officials tied to Wagner Group such as Malian Defense Minister Colonel Sadio Camara, Air Force Chief of Staff Colonel Alou Boi Diarra, and Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Adama Bagayoko[40][41] |
| Myanmar | Officials associated with ethnic cleansing related to the ongoing Rohingya crisis[61] and those associated with ethnic militias including the United Wa State Army[62]: 66–67 |
| North Korea | Targeting government officials associated with state-sponsored human rights abuses and censorship[63] |
| Nicaragua | Persons associated with contributing to the repression of the 2018–2020 Nicaraguan protests.[64] |
| Russia | Persons associated with abuses against human rights activists and whistleblowers such as Sergei Magnitsky[65] |
| South Sudan | Persons the US government alleges have contributed to the conflict in South Sudan or committed human rights abuses[66] |
| Zimbabwe | Persons the US government believes undermine democratic processes or institutions in Zimbabwe[67] |
Terrorism
Some of the jurisdictions whose resident individuals or entities are frequently targeted for sanctions under counter-terrorism authorities include:
| Jurisdiction/Region | Summary of targeted individuals/entities |
|---|---|
| Gaza | Targeting persons and organizations tied to Hamas-affiliated groups[68] |
| Lebanon | Targeting Hizballah-linked facilitators and financiers[69] |
| Iran | Targeting Iranian support for terrorist organizations including Hamas,[70] Hizballah,[69] and Houthis[71] |
| Yemen | Persons who the US government claims threaten peace, security, or stability in Yemen[71] |
Drug trafficking/transnational criminal organizations
Some of the jurisdictions whose resident individuals or entities are frequently targeted for sanctions under anti-drug trafficking or transnational criminal organizations-related authorities include:
| Jurisdiction/Region | Summary of targeted individuals/entities |
|---|---|
 Italy | Targeting the organizational structure and prominent leaders of the Camorra[72] |
 Japan | Targeting the organizational structure and prominent members of the Yakuza, such as the Yamaguchi-gumi[73] and Inagawa-kai[72] |
 Laos | Targeting the organizational structure and prominent members of Zhao Wei's criminal enterprise engaging in drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, bribery, and wildlife trafficking, much of which is facilitated through the Kings Romans Casino in Laos.[74] |
 Mexico | Targeting the organizational structure and prominent members of drug cartels, including the Sinaloa Cartel,[75] Los Zetas,[72] and Beltrán-Leyva Organization,[76] as well as human smuggling rings.[77] |
| Russia | Targeting the organizational structure and prominent members of the Brothers' Circle[72] |
Jurisdictions subject to military/arms related export controls
Department of State Arms Embargo
The U.S. government maintains a policy of denial for any exports of defense articles or defense services to the following countries:[78][79]
- Certain Chinese defense companies are also subject to Treasury Department restrictions on U.S. outbound investments[80]
Department of Commerce Military End Use/User Rule
The U.S. government also enforces stricter restrictions on a more expansive definition of defense items, including the export of any U.S.-origin item that "supports or contributes" to the operation, installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul, refurbishing, development, or production of military items to specified countries. The same countries are also subject to additional license requirements in place for certain exports to the targeted countries' "military end users", defined as their national armed services, national police, national intelligence services, and anyone whose activities "support or contribute to military end uses."[81]
Russia/Belarus MEU FDP Rule
Russia and Belarus are subject to the same restrictions as the military end use/user rule, with a more expansive coverage that includes foreign-produced items that are produced using U.S.-origin software or technology, manufactured by plants or major components that are products of the U.S.[83]
 | This section is written like a personal reflection, personal essay, or argumentative essay that states a Wikipedia editor's personal feelings or presents an original argument about a topic. (November 2022) |
Since 1990, the use of sanctions by the United States has significantly increased, and since 1998, the US has established economic sanctions on more than 20 countries.[3]
A series of studies led by economist Gary Hafbauer has found destabilization of the sanctioned country is the frequent goal of US sanctions programs.[85] Destabilization occurs when people in the sanctioned country lose confidence in their government's ability to operate the country and viable alternatives for them to consider exist.[85]
According to Daniel T. Griswold, sanctions failed to change the behavior of sanctioned countries but they have barred American companies from economic opportunities and harmed the poorest people in the countries under sanctions.[86] Secondary sanctions,[lower-alpha 1] according to Rawi Abdelal, often separate the US and Europe because they reflect US interference in the affairs and interests of the European Union (EU).[87] Abdelal said since Donald Trump became President of the United States, sanctions have been seen as an expression of Washington's preferences and whims, and as a tool for US economic warfare that has angered historical allies such as the EU.[88]
Efficacy
The increase in the use of economic leverage as a US foreign policy tool has prompted a debate about its usefulness and effectiveness.[89] According to Rawi Abdelal, sanctions have become the dominant tool of statecraft of the US and other Western countries in the post-Cold War era. Abdelal stated; "sanctions are useful when diplomacy is not sufficient but force is too costly".[90] British diplomat Jeremy Greenstock said sanctions are popular because "there is nothing else [to do] between words and military action if you want to bring pressure upon a government".[91] Former CIA Deputy Director David Cohen wrote: "The logic of coercive sanctions does not hold, however, when the objective of sanctions is regime change. Put simply, because the cost of relinquishing power will always exceed the benefit of sanctions relief, a targeted state cannot conceivably accede to a demand for regime change."[92]
Most international relations scholarship concludes sanctions almost never lead to overthrow of sanctioned countries' governments or compliance by those governments.[93] More often, the outcome of economic sanctions is the entrenchment in power of state elites in the sanctioned country.[93] In a study of US sanctions from 1981 to 2000, political scientist Dursan Peksen found sanctions have been counterproductive, failing to improve human rights and instead leading to a further decrese in sanctioned countries' "respect for physical integrity rights, including freedom from disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture, and political imprisonment".[94] Economists Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot state while policymakers often have high expectations of the efficacy of sanctions, there is at most a weak correlation between economic deprivation and the political inclination to change.[95] Griswold wrote sanctions are a foreign policy failure, having failed to change the political behavior of sanctioned countries; they have also barred American companies from economic opportunities and harmed the poorest people in the sanctioned countries.[86] A study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics said sanctions have achieved their goals in fewer than 20% of cases. According to Griswold, as an example, the US Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 could not stop Pakistan and India from testing nuclear weapons.[86]
Political scientist Lisa Martin criticized a game theory view of sanctions, stating proponents of sanctions characterize success so broadly—applying it to a range of outcomes from "renegotiation" to "influencing global public opinion—the terminology of "winning" and "losing" overextends those concepts.[96]
Efficacy of sanctions against Russia
The United States imposed sanctions against Russia following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[97]: 145 Asian countries, primarily China and India, absorbed an increasing amount of Russian oil and gas.[97]: 145 Because Russian imports from the West declined after sanctions, Russia's trade balance rose sharply, increasing cash reserves and the economy generally.[97]: 145 By June 2022, the Russian ruble had risen sharply and was one of the world's best performing countries.[97]: 145 Academic Jeremy Garlick writes that at least in the short term, sanctions against Russia has backfired economically by benefitting its economy and backfired geopolitically by bringing Russia and China closer together.[97]: 145
Humanitarian concerns
Daniel T. Griswold of the Cato Institute criticizes sanctions from a conservative Christian perspective, writing sanctions limit the possibilities of a sanctioned country's people to exercise political liberties and practice market freedom.[98] In 1997, the American Association for World Health stated the US embargo against Cuba contributed to malnutrition, poor water access, and lack of access to medicine and other medical supplies; it concluded "a humanitarian catastrophe has been averted only because the Cuban government has maintained a high level of budgetary support for a health care system designed to deliver primary and preventative medicine to all its citizens".[99]
Economist Helen Yaffe estimates United States sanctions against Venezuela have caused the deaths of 100,000 people due to the difficulty of importing medicine and health care equipment.[99]
According to journalist Elijah J Magnier in Middle East Eye, the West—led by America and Europe—had not sent any immediate aid to Syria after the 2023 Turkey–Syria earthquake. According to Magnier, some mainstream media incorrectly stated President Bashar al-Assad was preventing humanitarian aid from reach the Turkish-occupied northwestern provinces of Syria and border crossings. According to one Western diplomat; "the goal is to get the Syrian people to blame their president for western countries’ refusal to provide aid".[100]
U.S. economic decoupling
According to Abdelal, US sanctions on its own internal economy cost almost nothing but overuse of them could be costly in the long term. Abdelal said the biggest threat is the US's gradual isolation and the continuing decline of US influence in the context of an emerging, multi-polar world with differing financial and economic powers.[101] Abdelal also said the US and Europe largely agree on the substance of sanctions but disagree on their implementation. The main issue is secondary US sanctions—also known as extraterritorial sanctions—[102]which prohibit any trading in US dollars and prevent trade with a country, individuals and organizations under the US sanctions regime.[87] Primary sanctions restrict US companies, institutions, and citizens from doing business with the country or entities under sanctions.[102] According to Abdelal, secondary sanctions often separate the US and Europe because they reflect US interference in the EU's affairs and interests. Increasing use of secondary sanctions increases their perception in the EU as a violation of national and EU sovereignty, and an unacceptable interference in the EU's independent decision-making.[87] Secondary sanctions imposed on Iran and Russia are central to these tensions,[90] and have become the primary tool for signaling and implementing secession from US and European political goals.[102]
In 2019, the United States Department of State reported it received complaints from American telecommunications providers and television companies the sanctions against Cuba caused difficulties in incorporating the country into their grid coverage.[103]
De-dollarization efforts
Retired business-studies academic Tim Beal views the US's imposition of financial sanctions as a factor increasing dedollarization efforts because of responses like the Russian-developed System for Transfers of Financial Messages (SPFS), the China-supported Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), and the European Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) that followed the US's withdrawal of from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran.[9]
Historian Renate Bridenthal wrote; "the most looming blowback to US sanctions policy is the growing set of challenges to dollar hegemony". Bridenthal cited the use of local currencies to trade with sanctioned countries, and attempts by Russia and China to increase the gold backing of their respective currencies.[104]
- Bureau of Industry and Security
- Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
- Office of Foreign Assets Control
- U.S. Customs and Border Protection
- United States Department of Commerce (Export Administration Regulations, EAR)
- United States Department of Defense
- United States Department of Energy (nuclear technology)
- United States Department of Homeland Security (border crossings)
- United States Department of Justice (including ATF and FBI)
- United States Department of State (International Traffic in Arms Regulations, ITAR)
- United States Department of the Treasury
Several laws delegate embargo power to the President:
- Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917[105]
- Foreign Assistance Act of 1961[105]
- International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977
- Export Administration Act of 1979
Several laws specifically prohibit trade with certain countries:
- Cuban Assets Control Regulations of 1963
- Cuban Democracy Act of 1992[105]
- Helms–Burton Act of 1996 (Cuba)[105]
- Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
- Trade Sanction Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (Cuba)[105]
- Iran Freedom and Support Act of 2006
- Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
- Secondary US sanctions prohibit any trading in US dollars and prevent trade with a country, individuals or organizations under the US sanctions regime.[87]
- State Sponsors of Terrorism (U.S. list) – placement on the list puts severe restrictions on trade with that nation
- Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List
- United States sanctions against China
- Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act
- Rogue state
- Economic sanctions
- 2002 United States steel tariff
- Permanent normal trade relations
- Arms Export Control Act
- United States and state terrorism
- Criticism of United States foreign policy
- European Union sanctions
- United Kingdom sanctions
- United States foreign adversaries
Citations
- "Overview of US Sanctions". Retrieved January 23, 2024.
- Manu Karuka (December 9, 2021). "Hunger Politics: Sanctions as Siege Warfare". Sanctions as War. BRILL. pp. 51–62. doi:10.1163/9789004501201_004. ISBN 9789004501201. S2CID 245408284.
- Gordon, Joy (March 4, 1999). "Sanctions as Siege Warfare". The Nation.
- "Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Economic Sanctions". PIIE. March 2, 2016. Retrieved August 25, 2020.
- Strang, G. Bruce (2008). ""The Worst of all Worlds:" Oil Sanctions and Italy's Invasion of Abyssinia, 1935–1936". Diplomacy & Statecraft. 19 (2): 210–235. doi:10.1080/09592290802096257. S2CID 154614365. Retrieved August 13, 2020.
- "Bernie Sanders and AOC call on US to lift Iran sanctions as nation reels from coronavirus". The Independent. April 1, 2020. Retrieved January 23, 2023.
- Tim Beal (December 9, 2021). "Sanctions as Instrument of Coercion: Characteristics, Limitations, and Consequences". Sanctions as War. BRILL. pp. 27–50. doi:10.1163/9789004501201_003. ISBN 9789004501201. S2CID 245402040.
- Haidar, J.I., 2017."Sanctions and Exports Deflection: Evidence from Iran," Economic Policy (Oxford University Press), April 2017, Vol. 32(90), pp. 319-355.
- "Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism". Country Reports on Terrorism 2009. United States Department of State. August 5, 2010. Retrieved March 11, 2017.
- "Where is OFAC's Country List? What countries do I need to worry about in terms of U.S. sanctions?". OFAC. Retrieved January 22, 2024.
- "OFAC Homepage". Retrieved January 22, 2024.
- "Sanctioned Destinations". Retrieved January 22, 2024.
- "Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation". Retrieved January 22, 2024.
- "OFAC Sanctioned Countries". Princeton Research. Retrieved January 22, 2024.
- "Is Cuba open for U.S. business and investment?". Retrieved January 22, 2022.
- "Cuba Sanctions". Retrieved January 22, 2022.
- "State Sponsors of Terrorism". Retrieved January 22, 2022.
- "Iran sanctions overview" (PDF). July 1, 2019.
- "Iran sanctions". Retrieved January 22, 2024.
- "North Korea Sanctions". Retrieved January 22, 2024.
- "North Korea - BIS". Retrieved January 22, 2024.
- "Sanctions Summary – Russia Invasion of Ukraine". March 28, 2022.
- "Syria sanctions program". August 2, 2013.
- "Ukraine-/Russia-related Sanctions". Retrieved January 22, 2024.
- "Temporarily occupied Crimea region of Ukraine and covered regions of Ukraine". Retrieved January 22, 2024.
- Knights, Michael (December 6, 2019). "Punishing Iran's Triggermen in Iraq: Opening Moves in a Long Campaign". The Washington Institute.
- "Program Tag Definitions for OFAC Sanctions Lists". Retrieved January 23, 2023.
- "Executive Order 13405". June 20, 2006.
- "Part 533 - Central African Republic Sanctions Regulations". September 29, 2022.
- "Executive Order 14046". November 17, 2021.
- "Executive Order 13936". July 14, 2020.
- "Executive Order 13438". July 19, 2007.
- "Part 549 - Lebanon Sanctions Regulations". July 30, 2010.
- "Executive Order 13726". April 19, 2016.
- "Executive Order 14014". February 10, 2021.
- "Executive Order 13851". November 27, 2018.
- "Executive Order 13664". April 3, 2014.
- "Executive Order 14098". May 4, 2023.
- "Executive Order 13884". August 5, 2019.
- "Executive Order 13850". November 1, 2018.
- "Executive Order 13692". March 8, 2015.
- "Executive Order 14115". February 1, 2024.
- "Part 552 - Yemen Sanctions Regulations". October 29, 2020.
- "Part 541 - Zimbabwe Sanctions". July 29, 2004.
- "Treasury Targets Transnational Corruption". December 11, 2023.
- "Treasury Targets Corrupt Military Officials in Cambodia". U.S. Department of the Treasury. June 27, 2023. Retrieved July 27, 2023.
- "US sanctions Myanmar military over Rohingya ethnic cleansing". ABC News. August 17, 2018. Retrieved October 5, 2018.
- Ong, Andrew (2023). Stalemate: Autonomy and Insurgency on the China-Myanmar Border. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-1-5017-7071-5. JSTOR 10.7591/j.ctv2t8b78b.
- Koran, Laura (July 5, 2018). "US slaps new sanctions on Nicaragua over violence, corruption". CNN. Retrieved October 5, 2018.
- "Treasury Sanctions Hizballah Financiers in Lebanon". January 18, 2022.
- "Treasury Sanctions the Zhao Wei Transnational Criminal Organization". January 30, 2018.
- "Export Control Countries of Concern". Retrieved January 23, 2024.
- "US Government Tightens Export Controls for Cambodia". December 13, 2021.
- "U.S. Department of Commerce & Bureau of Industry and Security Russia and Belarus Rule Fact Sheet". Retrieved January 23, 2024.
- Hafbauer, Gary (2023). Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy. p. 31. ISBN 978-1-64259-812-4. OCLC 1345216431.
- Griswold, Daniel. "Going Alone on Economic Sanctions Hurts U.S. More than Foes". CATO Institute. Archived from the original on September 23, 2011.
- Abdelal 2020, p. 118.
- Abdelal 2020, p. 133.
- Lenway 1988, p. 397.
- Abdelal 2020, p. 114.
- Marcus, Jonathan (July 26, 2010). "Analysis: Do economic sanctions work?". BBC News. Retrieved March 30, 2015.
- Peksen, Dursun (2009). "Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights". Journal of Peace Research. 46 (1): 59–77. doi:10.1177/0022343308098404. ISSN 0022-3433. S2CID 110505923.
- Hufbauer, Gary Clyde; Schott, Jeffrey J.; Elliott, Kimberly Ann; Oegg, Barbara (2007). Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Peterson Institute. p. 162. ISBN 9780881325362.
- Garlick, Jeremy (2024). Advantage China: Agent of Change in an Era of Global Disruption. Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN 978-1-350-25231-8.
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- Abdelal 2020, p. 134.
- Abdelal 2020, p. 117.
- Renate Bridenthal (December 9, 2021). "Blowback to US Sanctions Policy". Sanctions as War. BRILL. pp. 323–332. doi:10.1163/9789004501201_020. ISBN 9789004501201. S2CID 245394028.
Sources
- Abdelal, Rawi; Bros, Aurélie (2020). "The End of Transatlanticism?: How Sanctions Are Dividing the West". Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development. 16 (16). Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development: 114–135. JSTOR 48573754.
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- Krugman, Paul, "The American Way of Economic war: Is Washington Overusing Its Most Powerful Weapons?" (review of Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, Underground Empire: How America Weaponized the World Economy, Henry Holt, 2023, 288 pp.), Foreign Affairs, vol. 103, no. 1 (January/February 2024), pp. 150–156.
- Mulder, Nicholas. The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War (2022) also see online review
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