Manual methods

One method of manual counting is to sort ballots in piles by candidate, and count the number of ballots in each pile. If there is more than one contest on the same sheet of paper, the sorting and counting are repeated for each contest.^[5] This method has been used in Burkina Faso, Russia, Sweden, United States (Minnesota), and Zimbabwe.^[6]

A variant is to read aloud the choice on each ballot while putting it into its pile, so observers can tally initially, and check by counting the piles. This method has been used in Ghana, Indonesia, and Mozambique.^[6] These first two methods do not preserve the original order of the ballots, which can interfere with matching them to tallies or digital images taken earlier.

Another approach is for one official to read all the votes on a ballot aloud, to one or more other staff, who tally the counts for each candidate. The reader and talliers read and tally all contests, before going on to the next ballot.^[4] A variant is to project the ballots where multiple people can see them to tally.^[7][8]

Another approach is for three or more people to look at and tally ballots independently; if a majority agree on their tallies after a certain number of ballots, that result is accepted; otherwise they all re-tally.^[9]

A variant of all approaches is to scan all the ballots and release a file of the images, so anyone can count them. Parties and citizens can count these images by hand or by software. The file gives them evidence to resolve discrepancies.^{[10] [11]} The fact that different parties and citizens count with independent systems protects against errors from bugs and hacks. A checksum for the file identifies true copies.^[12] Election machines which scan ballots typically create such image files automatically,^[13] though those images can be hacked or be subject to bugs if the election machine is hacked or has bugs. Independent scanners can also create image files. Copies of ballots are known to be available for release in many parts of the United States.^[14][15][16] The press obtained copies of many ballots in the 2000 Presidential election in Florida to recount after the Supreme Court halted official recounts.^[17] Different methods resulted in different winners.

When manual counts happen

The tallying may be done at night at the end of the last day of voting, as in Britain,^[18] Canada,^[19] France,^[20] Germany,^[21] and Spain,^[22] or the next day,^[6] or 1–2 weeks later in the US, after provisional ballots have been adjudicated.^[23]

If counting is not done immediately, or if courts accept challenges which can require re-examination of ballots, the ballots need to be securely stored, which is problematic.

Australia federal elections count ballots at least twice, at the polling place and, starting Monday night after election day, at counting centres.^[24][25]

Errors in manual counts

Hand-counting can be boring, so officials lose track, or they fail to read their own tally sheets correctly at the end of the process.

A 2023 test in Mohave County, Arizona, used 850 ballots, averaging 36 contests each, from logic & accuracy tests, so they had been machine-counted many times. The hand county used 7 experienced poll workers: 1 reader with 2 watchers, 2 talliers with 2 watchers. There were 46 errors in contest totals which were not noticed by the counting team, including:^[26]

• "Caller called the wrong candidate and both watchers failed to notice the incorrect call;
• Tally markers tried to work out inconsistencies while tallying;
• Tally markers marked a vote for an incorrect candidate and the watchers failed to notice the error;
• Caller calling too fast resulted in double marking a candidate or missed marking a candidate;
• Caller missed calling a vote for a candidate and both watchers failed to notice the omission;
• Watchers not watching the process due to boredom or fatigue;
• Illegible tally marking caused incorrect tally totaling;
• Enunciation of names caused incorrect candidate tally; and
• Using incorrect precinct tally sheets to tally ballots resulted in incorrect precinct level results."

Some of these tallying errors were also reported in Indiana and Texas elections. Errors were 3% to 27% for various candidates in a 2016 Indiana race, because the tally sheet labels misled officials into over-counting groups of 5 tally marks, and officials sometimes omitted absentee ballots or double-counted ballots.^[27] 12 of 13 precincts in the 2024 Republican primary in Gillespie County, TX, were added or written down wrong after a handcount, including two precincts with seven contests wrong and one with six contests wrong.^[28] These Texas errors were caught and corrected before results were final. The Indiana ones were not.

Average errors in candidate tallies in New Hampshire towns were 2.5% in 2002, including one town with errors up to 20%. Omitting that town cut the average error to 0.87%. Only the net result for each candidate in each town could be measured, by assuming the careful manual recount was fully accurate. Total error can be higher if there were countervailing errors hidden in the net result, but net error in the overall electorate is what determines winners.^[29] Connecticut towns in 2007 to 2013 had similar errors up to 2%.^[30]

Errors were smaller in candidate tallies for precincts in Wisconsin recounted in 2011 and 2016. The average net discrepancy was 0.28% of the recount tally in 2011 and 0.18% in 2016.^[31]

India hand tallies paper records from a 1.5% sample of election machines before releasing results. For each voter the machine prints the selected candidate on a slip of paper, displays it to the voter, and drops the slip into a box. In the April–May 2019 elections for the lower house of Congress, the Lok Sabha, the Election Commission hand-tallied the slips of paper from 20,675 voting machines (out of 1,350,000 machines)^[32] and found discrepancies for 8 machines, usually of four votes or less.^[33] Most machines tally over 16 candidates,^[34] and they did not report how many of these candidate tallies were discrepant. They formed investigation teams to report within ten days, were still investigating in November 2019, with no report as of June 2021.^[33][35] Hand tallies before and after 2019 had a perfect match with machine counts.^[33]

An experiment with multiple types of ballots counted by multiple teams found average errors of 0.5% in candidate tallies when one person, watched by another, read to two people tallying independently. Almost all these errors were overcounts. The same ballots had errors of 2.1% in candidate tallies from sort and stack. These errors were equally divided between undercounts and overcounts of the candidates. Optical scan ballots, which were tallied by both methods, averaged 1.87% errors, equally divided between undercounts and overcounts. Since it was an experiment, the true numbers were known. Participants thought that having the candidate names printed in larger type and bolder than the office and party would make hand tallies faster and more accurate.^[36]

Intentional errors hand tallying election results are fraud. Close review by observers, if allowed, may detect fraud, and the observers may or may not be believed.^[37] If only one person sees each ballot and reads off its choice, there is no check on that person's mistakes. In the US only Massachusetts and the District of Columbia give anyone but officials a legal right to see ballot marks during hand counting.^[38] If fraud is detected and proven, penalties may be light or delayed. US prosecution policy since the 1980s has been to let fraudulent winners take office and keep office, usually for years, until convicted,^{[39] [40]} and to impose sentencing level 8-14,^[41] which earns less than two years of prison.^[42]

Data in the table are comparable, because average error in candidate tallies as percent of candidate tallies, weighted by number of votes for each candidate (in NH) is mathematically the same as the sum of absolute values of errors in each candidate's tally, as percent of all ballots (in other studies).

Time needed and cost of manual counts

Cost depends on pay levels and staff time needed, recognizing that staff generally work in teams of two to four (one to read, one to watch, and one or two to record votes). Teams of four, with two to read and two to record are more secure^[36][47] and would increase costs. Three to record might more quickly resolve discrepancies, if 2 of the 3 agree. Typical times in the table below range from a tenth to a quarter of a minute per vote tallied, so 24-60 ballots per hour per team, if there are 10 votes per ballot. One experiment with identical ballots of various types and multiple teams found that sorting ballots into stacks took longer and had more errors than two people reading to two talliers.^[36]

Errors in mechanical counting

Tampering with the gears or initial settings can change counts, or gears can stick when a small object is caught in them, so they fail to count some votes.^[61] When not maintained well the counters can stick and stop counting additional votes; staff may or may not choose to fix the problem.^[62] Also, election staff can read the final results wrong off the back of the machine.

Optical scan counting

In an optical scan voting system, or marksense, each voter's choices are marked on one or more pieces of paper, which then go through a scanner. The scanner creates an electronic image of each ballot, interprets it, creates a tally for each candidate, and usually stores the image for later review.

The voter may mark the paper directly, usually in a specific location for each candidate, either by filling in an oval or by using a patterned stamp that can be easily detected by OCR software.

Of the voter may pick one pre-marked ballot among many, each with its own barcode or QR code corresponding to a candidate.

Or the voter may select choices on an electronic screen, which then prints the chosen names, usually with a bar code or QR code summarizing all choices, on a sheet of paper to put in the scanner.^[65] This screen and printer is called an electronic ballot marker (EBM) or ballot marking device (BMD), and voters with disabilities can communicate with it by headphones, large buttons, sip and puff, or paddles, if they cannot interact with the screen or paper directly. Typically the ballot marking device does not store or tally votes. The paper it prints is the official ballot, put into a scanning system which counts the barcodes, or the printed names can be hand-counted, as a check on the machines.^[66] Most voters do not look at the paper to ensure it reflects their choices, and when there is a mistake, an experiment found that 81% of registered voters do not report errors to poll workers.^[67]

Two companies, Hart and Clear Ballot, have scanners which count the printed names, which voters had a chance to check, rather than bar codes and QR codes, which voters are unable to check.^[68]

Direct-recording electronic counting

A touch screen displays choices to the voter, who selects choices, and can change their mind as often as needed, before casting the vote. Staff initialize each voter once on the machine, to avoid repeat voting. Voting data and ballot images are recorded in memory components, and can be copied out at the end of the election.

The system may also provide a means for communicating with a central location for reporting results and receiving updates,^[95] which is an access point for hacks and bugs to arrive.

Some of these machines also print names of chosen candidates on paper for the voter to verify. These names on paper can be used for election audits and recounts if needed. The tally of the voting data is stored in a removable memory component and in bar codes on the paper tape. The paper tape is called a Voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT). The VVPATs can be counted at 20–43 seconds of staff time per vote (not per ballot).^[96][54]

For machines without VVPAT, there is no record of individual votes to check.

Interpretation, in any counting method

Election officials or optical scanners decide if a ballot is valid before tallying it. Reasons why it might not be valid include: more choices selected than allowed; incorrect voter signature or details on ballots received by mail, if allowed; lack of poll worker signatures, if required; forged ballot (wrong paper, printing or security features); stray marks which could identify who cast the ballot (to earn payments); and blank ballots, though these may be counted separately as abstentions.^[6]

For paper ballots officials decide if the voter's intent is clear, since voters may mark lightly, or circle their choice, instead of marking as instructed. The ballot may be visible to observers to ensure agreement, by webcam or passing around a table,^[6] or the process may be private. In the US only Massachusetts and the District of Columbia give anyone but officials a legal right to see ballot marks during hand counting.^[38] For optical scans, the software has rules to interpret voter intent, based on the darkness of marks.^[71] Software may ignore circles around a candidate name, and paper dust or broken sensors can cause marks to appear or disappear, not where the voter intended.

Officials also check if the number of voters checked in at the polling place matches the number of ballots voted, and that the votes plus remaining unused ballots matches the number of ballots sent to the polling place. If not, they look for the extra ballots, and may report discrepancies.^[6]

Secure storage to enable counts in future

If ballots or other paper or electronic records of an election may be needed for counting or court review after a period of time, they need to be stored securely.

Election storage often uses tamper-evident seals,^[106][107] although seals can typically be removed and reapplied without damage, especially in the first 48 hours.^[108] Photos taken when the seal is applied can be compared to photos taken when the seal is opened.^[109] Detecting subtle tampering requires substantial training.^{[108][110][111]} Election officials usually take too little time to examine seals, and observers are too far away to check seal numbers, though they could compare old and new photos projected on a screen. If seal numbers and photos are kept for later comparison, these numbers and photos need their own secure storage. Seals can also be forged. Seals and locks can be cut so observers cannot trust the storage. If the storage is breached, election results cannot be checked and corrected.

Experienced testers can usually bypass all physical security systems.^[112] Locks^[113] and cameras^[114] are vulnerable before and after delivery.^[112] Guards can be bribed or blackmailed. Insider threats^[115][116] and the difficulty of following all security procedures are usually under-appreciated, and most organizations do not want to learn their vulnerabilities.^[112]

Security recommendations include preventing access by anyone alone,^[117] which would typically require two hard-to-pick locks, and having keys held by independent officials if such officials exist in the jurisdiction; having storage risks identified by people other than those who design or manage the system; and using background checks on staff.^[106]

No US state has adequate laws on physical security of the ballots.^[118]

Starting the tally soon after voting ends makes it feasible for independent parties to guard storage sites.^[119]

Secure transport and internet

The ballots can be carried securely to a central station for central tallying, or they can be tallied at each polling place, manually or by machine, and the results sent securely to the central elections office. Transport is often accompanied by representatives of different parties to ensure honest delivery. Colorado transmits voting records by internet from counties to the Secretary of State, with hash values also sent by internet to try to identify accurate transmissions.^[120]

Postal voting is common worldwide, though France stopped it in the 1970s because of concerns about ballot security. Voters who receive a ballot at home may also hand-deliver it or have someone else to deliver it. The voter may be forced or paid to vote a certain way,^[37] or ballots may be changed or lost during the delivery process,^{[121] [122]} or delayed so they arrive too late to be counted or for signature mis-matches to be resolved.^{[123] [124]}

Postal voting lowered turnout in California by 3%.^[125] It raised turnout in Oregon only in Presidential election years by 4%, turning occasional voters into regular voters, without bringing in new voters.^[126] Election offices do not mail to people who have not voted recently, and letter carriers do not deliver to recent movers they do not know, omitting mobile populations.^[127]

Some jurisdictions let ballots be sent to the election office by email, fax, internet or app.^[128] Email and fax are highly insecure.^[129] Internet so far has also been insecure, including in Switzerland,^[130] Australia,^[131] and Estonia.^[132] Apps try to verify the correct voter is using the app by name, date of birth and signature,^[133] which are widely available for most voters, so can be faked; or by name, ID and video selfie, which can be faked by loading a pre-recorded video.^[134] Apps have been particularly criticized for operating on insecure phones, and pretending to more security during transmission than they have.^{[135] [136] [134]}