1954

Lieutenant General (LTG) Michael "Iron Mike" O'Daniel had been a U.S. observer in Indochina before Dien Bien Phu.^[9] Keyes Beech, a reporter for the Chicago Daily News, said that O'Daniel was optimistic of forming tank divisions and saving Dien Bien Phu, but was both sensitive to, and contemptuous of, the French. Beech quoted him as saying "I can understand why they are sensitive, but not what they are proud of."

In deference to French sensibilities and to ensure the seniority of the French Commander in Chief in Indochina, O'Daniel relinquished his third star and reverted to the rank of major general.

LTG O'Daniel was to have retired, but was convinced to come to Vietnam, in April 1954, as the third head of MAAG-I. Lieutenant General John W. O'Daniel, Commanding General, U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), on three trips to Indochina. General O'Daniel's visits were made after General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny had been replaced by General Raoul Salan on 1 April 1952, and after General Henri-Eugene Navarre had succeeded General Salan in May of the following year. With him was then-Lieutenant Colonel William B. Rosson, who would later rise to high rank with the U.S. combat forces in Vietnam.

1955: Establishing two Vietnams

Cardinal Francis Spellman, in the region to visit U.S. troops, came to Vietnam in early January, celebrated masses, and gave a donation to Catholic Relief Services. While various reports suggested Spellman was Diệm's patron in the U.S., it seems likely that his visit was one for his coreligionists. Obviously, Spellman would not be unhappy with a Catholic leader, but the U.S. was quite aware that Diệm's Catholicism isolated him from the majority of South Vietnamese. When an Australian cardinal visited Vietnam shortly afterwards, J. Lawton Collins suggested to Diệm's brother, the Bishop of Huế, that there be a moratorium on high-level Catholic visits. Collins suggested that these visits aggravated the isolation of Diệm from the majority.

Lansdale also advised against Diệm being too visible with his Catholicism, citing an anti-Catholic bias in U.S. politics and a concern about creating a "Vatican state". As a response to Spellman's visibility as a member of the hierarchy, Lansdale encouraged U.S. support of Dr. Tom Dooley, a physician volunteer for the "Passage to Freedom" refugee program, who was Catholic but not clerical.^[15]

The U.S. and France, going into 1955, were dubious of Diệm's ability to unify South Vietnam, but there was no obvious alternative: anti-French, nationalist, anti-Bảo Đại. The French supported the Vietnamese National Army chief of staff, Gen. Nguyễn Văn Hinh. Hinh, working with the Cao Đài, Hòa Hảo, and Bình Xuyên, failed to organize a coup.

In January, the Republic of Vietnam received its first direct shipment of military supplies from the U.S. The U.S. also offered to train the fledgling National Army. A paramilitary group had cached its supplies in Haiphong, having had them shipped by Civil Air Transport, a CIA proprietary airline belonging to the Directorate of Support.

On February 12, 1955, the U.S. assumed responsibility for training Vietnamese forces, and the French disassociation began.^[16]

In Tây Ninh on February 22, the "United Front" against Diệm was formed, composed of Cao Đài, Hòa Hảo, Dan Xa Dang, Lien Minh and Bình Xuyên representatives. On 28 April, Diệm, against U.S. advice, against French advice, and against the advice of his cabinet, moved again against the sects.

In June, concerned that Viet Minh might win, Diệm abolished elections for village councils.^[17] Traditionally, the village level was autonomous. By replacing it at all, he inherited responsibility for corruption at that level. His appointments were usually from outside the villages; outsiders that he considered "dependable" Catholics, Northerners, or others not tied to the rural culture. This drove the villagers to the sort of conspiracy that they used against the French.

The Geneva agreements had specified the start of consultations on the 1956 referendum would begin, between Hanoi and Saigon, in July 1955.^[18] Diệm refused to enter into talks. On 20 July, Vietnam announced that it would not participate in talks for the reunification of North and South Vietnam through the elections that were scheduled for the following year, according to the Geneva agreements.^[19] Diệm pointed out that his government had not signed the Geneva agreements, and thus was not subject to them. The U.S. did not—as is often alleged—connive with Diệm to ignore the elections. The U.S. expected elections to be held and fully supported them.^[17]

1956

Under the French, the Montagnard tribes of the Central Highlands had had autonomy from the lowland colonial government. In 1956, these areas were absorbed into the Republic of Vietnam, and Diêm moved ethnic Vietnamese, as well as refugees from the North, into "land development centers" in the Central Highlands. Diệm intended to assimilate the unwilling tribes, a point of ethnic resentment that was to become one of the many resentments against Diệm.^[24] These resentments both cost internal support, and certainly were exploited by the Communists.

The US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) assumed responsibility, from French, for training South Vietnamese forces.

As part of a response to excesses in Northern land reform, for which Ho dismissed Trường Chinh as head of the program, Võ Nguyên Giáp, in the fall of 1956, offered the self-criticism for the Party:

We made too many deviations and executed too many honest people. We attacked on too large a front and, seeing enemies everywhere, resorted to terror, which became far too widespread. . . . Whilst carrying out our land reform program we failed to respect the principles of freedom of faith and worship in many areas . . . in regions inhabited by minority tribes we have attacked tribal chiefs too strongly, thus injuring, instead of respecting, local customs and manners. . . . When reorganizing the party, we paid too much importance to the notion of social class instead of adhering firmly to political qualifications alone. Instead of recognizing education to be the first essential, we resorted exclusively to organizational measures [using punishment].^[17]

In late 1956 one of the leading communists in the south, Lê Duẩn, returned to Hanoi to urge that the Vietnam Workers' Party take a firmer stand on national reunification, but Hanoi hesitated in launching a full-scale military struggle. In the fall of 1956, Diệm dealt strongly with another group not considered of his circle: the approximately 1,000,000 Chinese-identified people of Vietnam, who dominated much of the economy.^[25] He barred "foreigners", including Chinese, from 11 kinds of businesses, and demanded the half-million Vietnamese-born men, known as "uncles", "Vietnamize", including changing their names to a Vietnamese form. His vice-president, Nguyen Ngoc Tho, was put in charge of the program.

1957

As opposition to Diệm's rule in South Vietnam grew, a low-level insurgency began to take shape there in 1957, conducted mainly by Viet Minh cadres who had remained in the south and had hidden caches of weapons in case unification failed to take place through elections. This widespread campaign of terror included bombings and assassinations. Guerilla attacks reported included the killing of a group, not further identified, of 17 people in Châu Đốc in July, 1957. A District chief and his family were killed in September. In October, the clandestine radio of the "National Salvation Movement" began to broadcast support for armed opposition to Diệm. By year's end, over 400 South Vietnamese officials were killed. Operations appeared to solidify in October, beyond what might have been small group actions:

In Washington, U.S. intelligence indicated that the "Viet Minh underground" had been directed to conduct additional attacks on U.S. personnel "whenever conditions are favorable." U.S. intelligence also noted a total of 30 armed "terrorist incidents initiated by Communist guerillas" in the last quarter of 1957, as well as a "large number" of incidents carried out by "Communist-lead [sic] Hòa Hảo and Cao Đài dissident elements", and reported "at least" 75 civilians or civil officials assassinated or kidnapped in the same period.^[17]

In December 1957, the Soviet Union and China agreed to proposals to seat both the North and South, as independent countries, in the United Nations. Their decision was based on a growing east-west détente, but the North Vietnamese saw it as a sellout of their goal of reunification, and this may have led to their decision, in 1959, to seek reunification through military means.^[26]

Elbridge Durbrow became U.S. Ambassador in April, succeeding G. Frederick Reinhardt.

1958: North Vietnam looks South

Beginning with a plantation raid in January and a truck ambush in February, steady guerilla ambushes and raids became more regular in 1958, and of serious concern to the GVN. This intensity level was consistent with Mao's Phase I, "the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defensive."^[27] Mao's use of "strategic defensive" refers to the guerilla force making its presence known and building its organization, but not attempting to engage military units. George Carver, the principal CIA analyst on Vietnam, said in a Foreign Affairs article,

A pattern of politically motivated terror began to emerge, directed against the representatives of the Saigon government and concentrated on the very bad and the very good. The former were liquidated to win favor with the peasantry; the latter because their effectiveness was a bar to the achievement of Communist objectives. The terror was directed not only against officials but against all whose operations were essential to the functioning of organized political society, school teachers, health workers, agricultural officials, etc. The scale and scope of this terrorist and insurrectionary activity mounted slowly and steadily. By the end of 1958 the participants in this incipient insurgency, whom Saigon quite accurately termed the "Viet Cong", constituted a serious threat to South Viet Nam's political stability

On March 7, President Diệm received a letter from North Vietnam Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng proposing a discussion on troop reductions and trade relations as a renewed step towards reunification. On 26 April, Diệm rejected any discussion until North Vietnam had established "democratic liberties" similar to those in the South. A coordinated command structure was formed by Communists in the Mekong Delta where 37 armed companies were being organized in June 1958. North Vietnam invaded Laos and occupied parts of the country. Fall reported that the GVN lost almost 20% of its village chiefs through 1958.^[17]

1959

On March 1959, the armed revolution began as Ho Chi Minh declared a People's War to unite all of Vietnam under his leadership. His Politburo now ordered a changeover to an all-out military struggle. Thus began the Second Indochina War.

On July 1959, North Vietnam invaded Laos, opening the first tracks of what was to become the Ho Chi Minh Trail.