Bank of New South Wales v The Commonwealth, also known as the Bank Nationalisation Case, is a 1948 decision of the High Court of Australia[1] (upheld on appeal to the Privy Council) that invalidated Chiefley government legislation that attempted to nationalise the private banking sector. Separate majorities held that the legislation breached three different provisions of the Constitution: section 92 (requiring trade and commerce between the states to be "absolutely free"), section 51(xxxi) (requiring compulsory acquisition of property to be "on just terms") and section 75(iii) (which grants the High Court original jurisdiction in cases where the Commonwealth is sued).
Bank of New South Wales and others and The Commonwealth and others; Bank of Australasia and others and The Commonwealth and others; State of Victoria and another and The Commonwealth and others; State of South Australia and another and The Commonwealth and others; State of Western Australia and another and The Commonwealth and others
Nationalisation of private banking amounts to a violation of an individual right to engage in particular types of trading and commercial activity under s 92.
Failure to provide for the provision of interest on compensation meant the acquisition of bank shares and business was not made on "just terms".
Close
A subsequent appeal application by the Commonwealth to the Privy Council was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. The Board held that the case involved potential questions around the limits of the powers between the Commonwealth and the states and hence they were precluded from hearing the case under section 74 of the Constitution. However, the Board did affirm that the legislation breached section 92 of the Constitution, thus endorsing the individual right interpretation of the section. Additionally, the Board formulated its own test for when section 92 would be breached. This test was adopted and applied by the High Court until 1988, where in the case of Cole v Whitfield the section was reinterpreted as a prohibition on protectionist legislation.
The case rendered a key pillar of Labor's economic policy unworkable and possibly was influential in the eventual defeat of the government in 1949. Labor remained in opposition for 23 years and with nationalisation no longer an option, the party moved towards less direct methods to achieve its social and economic goals. The use of tied grants to the states (section 65) and the external affairs power (section 51(xxix)) were later utilised by the subsequent Whitlam government in 1974.
Background
Comfortable in government after two strong election wins, the Labor government of Ben Chifley announced in 1947 its intention to nationalise private banks in Australia. To accomplish this goal the Parliament passed the Banking Act 1947.[2] Under the Act, shares in the private banks would be owned by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, which in turn would be owned by the Federal Government.[3] The proposal was controversial, and the constitutional validity of the law was challenged by a number of banks, including the Bank of New South Wales, as well as the non-Labor states of Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia.[4] The banks were represented by a formidable legal team,[4] with the Australian incorporated banks represented by Garfield BarwickKC,[1]:at p. 7 who would later become the Chief Justice, and the United Kingdom incorporated banks represented by Frank KittoKC,[1]:at p. 37 who would later be appointed to the High Court, while the Commonwealth was represented by the former High Court judge H. V. EvattKC.[1]:at p. 49
High Court decision
The Court hearing lasted for a record 39 days.[4] The summary of the parties arguments occupies 143 pages of the Commonwealth Law Report.[1]:at pp. 7–149 A number of arguments were put to the Court, most of which were rejected.
However the Court declared the law invalid on four grounds, albeit by different majority of judges:[4]
Section 92 of the Constitution,[5] in providing that "trade, commerce, and intercourse among the States ... shall be absolutely free." conferred a positive right on the banks to engage in the business of interstate banking.[1]:at pp. 388
it involved the acquisition of property that was not "on just terms, contrary to section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution.[6] The problem with acquisition arose out of the Act's sections detailing the appointment of new directors for all private banks with the power to control, manage, direct and dispose of assets of those banks. Dixon J held that this was a "circuitous device to acquire indirectly the substance of proprietary interest."[1]:at pp. 349
In appealing the decision to the Privy Council, the Commonwealth adopted a deliberate strategy of limiting the grounds of appeal to avoid seeking a certificate from the High Court under section 74 of the Constitution.[8][9][10]
The Privy Council endorsed the High Court decision in adopting the individual rights approach. Provisions of the Commonwealth law prohibited private banks from carrying out interstate business banking. Interstate banking transactions under the law were thus not "absolutely free" and hence in violation of Section 92 of the Constitution. The Law Lords held that a simple legislative prohibition of interstate trade and commerce would be constitutionally invalid, but a law seeking to regulate or prescribe rules as to the manner of trade and commerce would not necessarily be in breach of section 92. The Board noted that the question of whether a law was merely regulatory or unduly discriminatory "will often be not so much legal as political, social or economic. Yet it must be solved by a court of law."[11]
Additionally, while rejected this nationalisation by the government, the Board left the door open to future takeovers where "on its own facts and in its own setting of time and circumstances ... prohibition with a view to State monopoly was the only practical and reasonable method of regulation".[12]
This particular understanding of s 92 would remain highly influential, until it was overturned in favour a free trade interpretation in Cole v Whitfield.[14]
Constitution (Cth) s51(xxxi) "The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for ... the acquisition of property on just terms ...".