Islamic_Revolutionary_Guard_Corps_Ground_Forces

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces

Land service branch of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

This article is about Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. For Ground Forces of Iran's regular military, see Islamic Republic of Iran Army Ground Forces.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces (Persian: نیروی زمینی سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی), acronymed NEZSA (Persian: نزسا), are the ground forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC Ground Forces are more geared towards internal disorder than the regular Iranian Army. However, in recent years, the IRGC Ground Forces and by extension the entire IRGC, have transitioned to becoming an expeditionary force, capable of projecting power abroad, through conventional military operations or via proxies and unconventional warfare.[2] There are at least around 150,000 IRGC Ground Force troops.[3]

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Following this transition, the Ground Forces structure remains focused on brigade levels units, supported by armoured, air support (drone), artillery, intelligence and special forces formations.[4]

History

The Guardians of the Islamic Revolution Ground Forces was officially established on 5 May 1979. It was conceived as a popular militia force to monitor the remainders of the Shah's Artesh and defend the Islamic Revolution (such as against Nojeh coup plot).[5] However, the official establishment followed several months of activity of the Revolutionary Guards.[6]

According to Mohsen Rafiqdust, the establishment of and armed force tasked to secure the Revolution was proposed by Hujjat al-Islam Mohammad Montazeri, son of Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri; Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini ordered in February 1979 the establishment of such a force, which was established by Mohammad Montazeri itself and Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, leader of the Islamic Republican Party.[6] Moshen Rafiqdust was charged with organizing the Revolutionary Guard and Abbas Duzduzani was the first Commander.

Between February and December 1979, the IRGC evolved from a loose militia into an armed force;[6] In early days, IRGC units seemed to operate independently and in different capacities in different locations.[6] In March 1979, a national command was established.[6]

The mission of the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution accorded primacy to an internal security role, while at the same time pushing for the export of the Islamic Revolution:[5] in the early days, the IRGC was responsible for both internal and external intelligence and security, which was carried out in conjunction with the prime minister's office; the alghare’eh, combat units, were involved in fighting enemy groups.[5][6]

Initially, the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution operated in coordination with Komitehs and their command echelon, but with an official approval.[6]

In the aftermath of the official establishment of the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, there were four factions within it; these factions were included in the Command and Central Councils, with the greates influence exercised by the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization.[6] Members of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization in the IRGC used their positions against the People's Mujahedin of Iran, Tudeh and Fadai in the general campaign against the political left and ethnic minorities, where the left was strong.[6] In September 1979, the IRGC were entrusted with providing security detail to Friday congregational prayer leader Ayatollah Montazeri, while failed to resist Iranian students in the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.[6] The 1979 Iranian constitution gave Khomeini the supreme command of all armed forces, including the IRGC.[6]

In the wake of Iraq invasion of Iran in 1980, Islamic Republican Party (whose forces were led by the IRGC) and leftist organizations harshly confronted each other, resulting in thousands of casualties; the impeachment and removal of President Abolhassan Banisadr allowed the Islamic Republican Party to gain control of the defence strategy and to involve deeply the IRGC in it.[6]

The Iran–Iraq war caused the IRGC to align closely with the clerical rule of the Islamic Republican Party; IRGC commander Mohsen Rezai resigned from Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization due to the latter's contrast with the clerical rule.[6] During the confrontation between Montazeri and President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, hundreds were arrested from IRGC ranks. By 1988, the radical-leftist faction had vanished within the IRGC.[6]

IRGC membership grew steadily in the first years of operation and during the Iran–Iraq War: by the end of 1979 there were about 10,000 guardsmen; in mid 1980 the number swelled to 25,000 and reached 50,000 by the end of 1981. In 1986 there were 350,000 guardsmen,[6] organized into battalion-level units.[7] The Iran–Iraq war forged the identities of the IRGC, Basij, and other associated organizations.[6]

After the war, the Iranian leadership provided the IRGC new outlets of service.[6] Some, external to the Basij, proposed their demobilization or their merger in the IRGC under the name of Resistance Guard.[8] Instead of demobilizing IRGC and Basij, Iranian leadership maintained and expanded their mobilization, particularly in extra-military sectors.[6]

In 1989, the IRGC lost its ministry and was merged with the Artesh in the Ministry of Defence and Armed Force Logistics as part of a Rafsanjani's policy aimed at reforming and consolidating the state control over governmental institutions. The IRGC even received a military ranks system.[6] Between 1990 and 1995 the Basij Resistance Force was supported by new Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei against the Ground Forces of the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution in equipment allocations. The Basij supplanted the IRGC also in guarding sensitive buildings and installations.[8]

However, Supreme Leader Khamanei managed to forge in the early 1990s a solid alliance with the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution; in the late 1990s, during the Mohammad Khatami's presidency, the IRGC provided the conservative faction considerable resources in the usage of force in combating perceived political threats.[6]

During the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013), the IRGC was increased its influence in Middle East (in Lebanon but especially with Shiite stakeholders in Iraq), but also in Chavez's Venezuela.[6] In 2009 Basij military responsibilities (including Basij military training) were transferred back to the Ground Forces of the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution in order to free the former and let it to concentrate on cultural struggle.[8]

The Islamic Republic of Iran has been involved in active support to Syria since early stages of the Syrian Civil War; while the initial instrument of support was the Qods Force, the IRGC Ground Forces subsequently stepped in.[3]

In 2017, Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour, IRGC Ground Forces Commander, stated that the NESZA set up a drone centre.[citation needed]

Commanders

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Organization

Across their 38 years-long history, the IRGC Ground Forces underwent to several organizational changes. From 2007 until 2015, they were organized in territorial commands in order to ensure defence against ground invasion and decapitation strikes, as well as to counter internal unrest. Alongside territorial commands, the IRGC Ground Forces also have conventional formations.[3]

Operational organization

According to Anthony Cordesman and Bryan Gold, the IRGC Ground Forces control the Basij and strictly cooperate with Basij's Imam Hossein Brigades.[4]

Iranian APCs and armoured cars
Toophan 5, the latest variant of the Iranian copy of the American anti-tank missile TOW

Due to the involvement of the IRGC Ground Forces in the Syrian Civil War,[3] according to Ali Alfoneh for Atlantic Council an increased deployment of IRGC Ground Forces in Syria changed the IRGC itself from a political army, tasked with countering domestic unrest, to an expeditionary force.[10]

Divisions and Brigades

The IRGC also maintains a structure of infantry and armoured formations. NEZSA also include artillery and engineer units and an airborne brigade. The IRGC Ground Forces have recently announced efforts to form an air assault unit.[3]

According to Marie Donovan, Nicholas Carl, and Frederick W. Kagan, IRGC Ground Forces military formations are in service as cadre organizations, with officers and NCOs, but without or with few enlisted personnel. These commands and formations may be complemented by Basij's Imam Hussein infantry battalions or foreign militia and military units.[11]

Some IRGC Ground Forces have a readiness preparation higher than others.

The Imam Hussein battalions are mixed IRGC-Basij units, with one battalion assigned to each region within a province.[12] Imam Hussein battalions are infantry units used for internal military defence as well as for missions beyond Iranian borders.[11] Imam Hossein Battalions deployed to Syria with IRGC operational division and brigade cadres.

Alongside Imam Hussein battalions, each Provincial command establishes at least one Basij Fatehin unit in its own boundary. While being light infantry units, Fatehin units have also been used as anti-riot force multipliers to law enforcement.[12]

Saberin Unit

The IRGC Ground Forces have several elite units that form one single unit at a brigade level, the Saberin Unit, established in 2000. The Saberin Unit is a force highly trained in a number of specialized capabilities.[13] Some IRGC divisions and brigades have separate Saberin units directly subordinated to them.[3] The IRGC has also designated certain formations as light infantry commandos, or takavaran.[3] In 2017 the NESZA set up a drone centre.[13]

The Saberin Unit ranks its commandos according to three levels:[13]

  • Rapid Response (Vakonesh-e Sarie);
  • Special Force (Nirooy-e Vijeh);
  • Special Operations Force (Nirooy-e Makhsoos).

Aviation Unit

A Mohajer-2 drone

The Aviation Unit (Yegan-e Havanirooz) of the IRGC Ground Forces is the IRGC's most important helicopter unit.[13] It was established in 2015, by order of Ali Khamenei.[13]

The Aviation Unit consists of four subdivisions:[13]

  • Advanced Aviation Training Center;
  • Helicopter Research Center;
  • Helicopter Professional Repair Center;
  • Seyyed-al-Shohada Aviation Base.

Territorial organization

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces have a territorial organization in charge of activities and operations. This organization has multiple layers: multi-provincial regional headquarters, provincial headquarters, commands for each county, district commands for each bakhsh (township), and a local Basij base for each neighborhood.[14]

According to Saeid Golkar, this arrangement should constitute a system directly parallelling the state's administrative system.[14]

Thar-Allah Headquarters

See also: Thar-Allah Headquarters

The Thar-Allah Headquarters is a command directly subordinated to the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It is in charge of security for the Tehran area.[15] and doubles as Headquarters with territorial responsibilities.[11]

The Thar-Allah Headquarters is among the most important IRGC commands in Iran, tasked with protecting key institutions and the offices of the Government of Iran. The Thar-Allah Headquarters is also tasked with thwarting all threats against Tehran.[16]

Officially, Thar-Allah's commander is the same as the IRGC commander. The Thar-Allah Headquarters, however, also has a deputy commander in charge of day-to-day operations.

Headquarters

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces maintain ten regional headquarters (Gharargah), with the Sar-Allah headquarters in charge for Tehran and Alborz provinces as well as Tehran City. These headquarters are responsible for coordinating the activities of both operational and territorial units, being similar to corps-level commands.[11]

This territorial organization, according to the Mosaic Doctrine and the Layered Defence approach, is focused heavily on security against internal threats and on "soft war" operations.[11][12]

More information Headquarters (Gharargah), Provinces ...

Provincial commands

Flag of Muhammad Rasul Allah Corps of IRGC in charge for Tehran.

Below the multi-provincial Headquarters, there are 32 provincial or city commands.[12][13][17] These new command centers are intended to operate flexibly and independently from Tehran.[19]: 19 

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces structure includes 32 separate territorial commands. These territorial commands, styled "Corps" (Sepah), have been established in 2008. They are part of the four-layered military doctrine for the defence of Iran.

The Provincial Guard was created to take over the IRGC's responsibilities on the provincial level against any and all threats as well as to enforce and coordinate re-islamization processes in Iran through social welfare programmes.[12][20] Provincial units are composed of the natives of the province in which the IRGC Ground Force members serve.[10]

The territorial commands are 31 Provincial commands and a Tehran city command for a total of 32 commands.[3]

The provincial commands are under direct control and supervision of the IRGC commander, but the Basij are responsible for planning, supporting them logistically, and inspecting their functions.[12] In turn, IRGC territorial commanders have a direct supervision over local Basij organizations[8] and enjoy of authority and autonomy in order to be enabled to independently take action in case of an immediate crisis arising,[12][21]

The Provincial commands do not form an independent command of their own, and as such does not have an independent line in Iran's annual state budget. Financing of provincial commands activity comes from both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces and Basij.[12]

Each Provincial command is composed of three main branches:[12]

  • Military command;
  • Counterintelligence: primarily responsible for protecting the IRGC personnel against both physical and moral threats and identifying foreign espionage;
  • Office of the Representative of the Supreme Leader: responsible for mobilizing, the IRGC and the Basij.

The main anti-riot units are Imam Ali battalions, consisting of both cadre and full members. Imam Ali battalions are responsible for suppressing internal unrest, maintaining public order and for security patrols in the neighborhoods where they operate. Each Imam Ali battalion has a motorcycle unit for rapid deployment purposes.[11][12]

Administratively, an Imam Ali battalion aligns with the Basij district. Imam Ali battalions have their training, education, and logistics centrally coordinated through the Imam Ali Headquarters. Imam Ali battalions in each city have a close relationship with the Iranian police and receive specific anti-riot equipment and training.[12]

Since September 2012, the IRGC and Basij have established small Basij-only Beit al-Muqaddas battalions (for male Basiji) and Kowsar battalions (for female Basiji). These battalions consist of 234 active Basij members in each district. These units are designed to fulfill support roles:[12]

  • Around 1,000 of these units are assigned to support Imam Ali riot battalions;
  • Around 500 Beit al-Muqaddas (i.e. male-only) battalions are assigned to support Imam Hussein infantry battalions in their military and defence missions in their local area;
  • Around 500 battalions are mainly trained for relief and rescue missions under the operational command of the Imam Hadi Headquarters.

Each Provincial command also has a cyberspace division responsible for directing pro-government online voices as well as producing cyberspace propaganda in their own boundary. The intelligence department in each provincial command is directly subordinate to the IRGC Intelligence Organization.[12]

More information Province, Provincial Command ...

See also

References

  1. [1]
    The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) (2020). "Middle East and North Africa". The Military Balance 2020. Vol. 120. Routledge. pp. 348–352. doi:10.1080/04597222.2020.1707968. ISBN 9780367466398. S2CID 219624897.
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    http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060728_gulf_iran.pdf Archived 21 September 2015 at the Wayback Machine [bare URL PDF]
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    Bucala, Paul; Kagan, Frederick W. (March 2016). "Iran's Evolving Way of War" (PDF). Critical Threats. pp. 10–11. Retrieved 17 June 2017.
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    Cordesman, Anthony H.; Bryan, Gold; Garrett, Berntsen (2014). The Gulf Military Balance The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions. Lanham: Center for Strategic & International Studies. pp. 131–132, 143. ISBN 978-1-4422-2792-7. Retrieved 18 June 2017.
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    Frederic Wehrey; Jerrold D. Green; Brian Nichiporuk; Alireza Nader; Lydia Hansell; Rasool Nafisi; S. R. Bohandy (2008). "The Rise of the Pasdaran Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps" (PDF). RAND Corporation. pp. 20–21, 30. Retrieved 19 June 2017.
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    Afshon P. Ostovar (2009). "Guardians of the Islamic Revolution Ideology, Politics, and the Develo pment of Military Power in Iran (1979–2009)". University of Michigan. pp. 48, 51–53, 54–55, 59, 60–61, 66, 68–69, 73–74, 75, 85–86, 100, 108, 130, 157, 135–136, 132, 173–174. Retrieved 19 June 2017.
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    Sloan, Stephen; Anderson, Sean K. (2009). Historical Dictionary of Terrorism. Plymouth: The Scarecrow Press. p. 318. ISBN 978-0-8108-6311-8. Retrieved 20 June 2017.
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    Golkar, Saeid (2015). Captive Society: The Basij Militia and Social Control in Iran. Washington D.C.: Columbia University Press. pp. 17–19, 27–28, 31. ISBN 978-0-231-80135-5. Retrieved 20 June 2017.
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    "Plane crash kills Iran commander". BBC News. 9 January 2006. Retrieved 25 December 2011.
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    Alfoneh, Ali (4 April 2017). "Iran's Revolutionary Guards Transform into an Expeditionary Force". Atlantic Council. Retrieved 18 June 2017.
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    Donovan, Marie; Carl, Nicholas; Kagan, Frederick W. (January 2020). "Iran's Reserve of Last Resort" (PDF). www.criticalthreats.org. Critical Threats. pp. 5, 6. Retrieved 19 September 2021.
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    Golkar, Saeid (2020). TAKING BACK THE NEIGHBORHOOD The IRGC Provincial Guard's Mission to Re-Islamize Iran. WINEP. pp. 4, 6, 7, 9.
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    "The IRGC Ground Forces". IranWire. 10 April 2019. Retrieved 13 September 2021.
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    Golkar, Saeid (28 June 2020). "These Are the Special Iranian Units That Crackdown on Domestic Unrest". The National Interest. Retrieved 9 October 2021.
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    Nadimi, Farzin (21 August 2017). "Murmurs of a Second Cultural Revolution". The Washington Institute. Retrieved 22 September 2021.
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    "Trusted IRGC General Appointed Commander Of Key Base In Iran's capital". RFE/RL. 21 June 2020. Retrieved 21 September 2021.
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    Vaisibiame, Morad (28 March 2020). "Regional Headquarters Of The IRGC: Tasked With Asymmetrical Warfare; Crushing Dissent". Radio Farda. Retrieved 13 September 2021.
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    Vaisibiame, Morad (21 June 2020). "A New Appointment At IRGC May Signal Concern Over Unrest In Iran". RFE/RL. Retrieved 9 October 2021.
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    McInnis, J. Matthew. The Future of Iran's Security Policy (PDF). American Enterprise Institute. p. 19.
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    "The IRGC Provincial Corps". IranWire. 9 April 2019. Retrieved 11 September 2021.
  21. [21]
    Sinkaya, Bayram (2016). The Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics: Elites and Shifting Relations. New York: Routledge. p. 52. ISBN 978-1-138-85364-5.
  22. [22]
    "پایگاه خبری سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی - با حکم سرلشکر سلامی؛ سردار احمد ذوالقدر فرمانده سپاه سیدالشهداء(ع) استان تهران شد". www.sepahnews.com (in Persian). Sepah News. 22 November 2020. Archived from the original on 4 December 2020. Retrieved 12 October 2021.

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