Most jurisdictions in the United States of America maintain the felony murder rule.^[1] In essence, the felony murder rule states that when an offender kills (regardless of intent to kill) in the commission of a dangerous or enumerated crime (called a felony in some jurisdictions), the offender, and also the offender's accomplices or co-conspirators, may be found guilty of murder. It means that the common law malice required for murder is "implied as a matter of law for homicides arising from felonies."^[2] It is a widely criticized feature of American criminal law.^[3] Initially, it was widely believed by scholars that the felony murder rule had originated in England. However, more recent scholarship has argued that it likely originated in America separately from England.^[4] Its historic roots have been called "deep but terribly obscure".^[5]

There are two forms of the felony murder doctrine practiced in the United States. The first uses a "dangerous felony" approach, which relies upon felonies which are thought to be dangerous listed in the felony-murder statute and if the defendant commits one of those felonies, it triggers the rule.^[6] The other form requires that the defendant commit an act clearly dangerous to human life while committing a felony and does not rely on any enumerated felonies in a statute.^[6] Further, whether the murder is considered first or second degree murder depends on the jurisdiction.^[3]

The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit imposing the death penalty for felony murder. The Supreme Court has created a two-part test to determine when the death penalty is an appropriate punishment for felony murder. Under Enmund v. Florida,^[7] the death penalty may not be imposed on someone who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place. However, under Tison v. Arizona,^[8] the death penalty may be imposed on someone who was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. In Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), the Court added with respect to the defendants in Tison it "allowed the defendants’ death sentences to stand where they did not themselves kill the victims but their involvement in the events leading up to the murders was active, recklessly indifferent, and substantial."^[9]

The law of felony-murder in the United States varies substantially jurisdiction to jurisdiction.^[5] It has been abolished by Hawaii, Kentucky, and Michigan.^[5] Most states limit the rule to deaths caused negligently during the commission of a felony.^[3] While California uses the enumerated felonies approach, Texas requires that the defendant committed an act clearly dangerous to human life during the commission of a felony, and Alabama uses both approaches.^[6][5] All jurisdictions have limited the application of the felony murder rule to those who have committed or attempted certain felonies.^[3] The traditional predicate felonies (felonies which are either enumerated or considered "inherently dangerous") are "burglary, arson, robbery, rape, and kidnapping"^[3] (informally "BARRK crimes").

The felony murder rule is a popular topic of discussion in criminal law scholarship.^[3] It is often criticized by scholars for disconnecting liability from culpability.^[6] David Crump, a legal scholar, argued that the felony murder rule is misunderstood, that unlike the popular perception, no American jurisdictions maintains a rule that is essentially "felony plus death automatically equals murder, without important limits.^[6] Scholars typically rationalize the felony-murder rule in four different ways: deterrence, transferred intent, retribution, and general culpability.^[18]

There are two reasons that the felony-murder rule is argued to deter criminals. The first is that it deters negligent killings during the commission of felonies. The argument goes that cofelons will dissuade their criminal coconspirators from using violence because they too would be liable for any violence that occurs.^[18] The second reason argued is that it deters the commission of felonies altogether, the belief being that the rule adds to the risk of committing a felony in general.^[18] Opponents of the deterrence rationale argue that it is impossible to deter an unintended act, that the cofelons are likely to be unaware of the rule, and that there is no statistical evidence of deterrence.^[18]

The retributivist rationale is that a killing occurring during the commission of a felony is a strict liability offense. The reasoning behind this rationale is that a felon bears responsibility for the harmful result arising from their criminal activity regardless of their intent. Opponents of the retributivist rationale argue that it is "primitive" and "simple", that it lacks nuance in terms of the felon's culpability and that it unjustifiably removes the mens rea element of the crime in question.^[18] Another retributivist argument in favor comes from Crump, who states that societal outrage at the offense is a justification for the rule.^[19] Crump argues that the rule distinguishes crimes that cause human death thereby reinforcing the "reverence for human life."^[19] He also argues that the condemnation represents society's "expression of solidarity with the victim's of the crime" which is useful because it reaffirms to the victim's family "the kinship society as a whole" feels for them.^[19]